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ABSTRACT 
 
We hypothesise that certain market conditions could lead to liquidity shocks that will 
consequently increase SEO underpricing (defined as the close-to-offer return). We 
propose three scenarios of market conditions, namely aggregate issues with large 
volume, large market declines and market volatility. Using a sample of about 5,000 
seasoned equity offerings from 1987 to 2009, we found that market volatility is 
significantly and positively related to SEO underpricing after controlling for other 
factors.  
 
We employed an estimation method proposed by Chambers and Dimson (2009) to 
examine the behaviour of SEO underpricing over our sample period from 1987 to 
2009. We found that after controlling for changing risk composition, price practice, 
market conditions and the influence of underwriter reputation and analyst coverage, 
there was still an upward shift in SEO underpricing over the sample period, and the 
pattern cannot be fully explained by the practice of setting offer prices at lower 
integers. 
 
We borrowed the investment banking power hypothesis from the literature and argued 
that the upward shift of SEO underpricing over the sample period could be explained 
by the increase of investment banking power. As the industry structure of 
underwriting transfers from a competitive market to an oligopoly market, banks use 
non-price dimensions to gain market power and consequently increase SEO 
underpricing. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Research Questions 
There are several ways a company can raise funds. These include taking loans from a 
commercial bank, issuing corporate bonds in the debt markets and issuing shares in 
the stock markets. A FRPSDQ\¶V ILrst public offering of shares is called an Initial 
Public Offering (IPO) and each subsequent offering is a seasoned equity offering 
(SEO) (Ross et al., 2006, p374). As a fund raising measure, the SEO has experienced 
substantial growth during the past two decades. Bortolotti et al. (2008) document the 
total volume of global SEOs in 1991 at $91,904 million (in the equivalent of 2004 US 
dollars) and the number of issues at 1,099, increasing to $320,714 million and 3,223 
issues in 2004.  
 
As the SEO has become an increasingly important mode of fund raising, SEO pricing 
models have naturally attracted more attention in the literature. A number of 
theoretical pricing models and empirical pricing models have been proposed, and 
accompanying the expansion of the SEO market, SEO underpricing has increased 
substantially ± this is defined as the difference between the closing price prior to the 
offer (or the offer day closing price) and the offer price. Several studies have 
examined SEO underpricing in the long run and found that average SEO underpricing 
has increased from about 1% in the 1980s to about 3% in the 2000s (e.g. Corwin, 2003; 
Autore, 2011).  
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The title of this PhD study is Liquidity Shocks and SEO Underpricing, and it 
endeavours to join and contribute to the literature by addressing the following research 
questions: 
1. Could liquidity shocks caused by certain market conditions increase SEO 
underpricing? 
2. What is the behaviour of SEO underpricing over the long run and what is the 
reason behind the pattern? 
3. What is the relationship between SEO flotation costs and liquidity of 
underlying shares? 
 
1.2. Research Motivation and Proposed Contributions 
Unlike IPO pricing, historical market data are available for SEO pricing. The offer 
price can be decided by making an adjustment on the closing price prior to the offer. 
In an SEO transaction, the offer price is often set lower than the closing price prior to 
the offer; in other words, the offering is often underpriced. The SEO underpricing can 
be defined as the close-to-offer return or offer-to-close return. The former is the 
percentage change from the prior closing price to the offer price while the latter is the 
percentage change from the closing price on the issue date to the offer price. In this 
thesis, we follow the definition by Corwin (2003) and refer to SEO underpricing as the 
close-to-offer return. 
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Studies in SEO underpricing not only borrow a number of hypotheses proposed in IPO 
underpricing but also propose some exclusive hypotheses for SEO underpricing1 . 
Several important determinants of SEO underpricing have already been identified. 
These determinants include offer characteristics and firm characteristics2. Based on 
the price pressure hypothesis (Scholes, 1972; Corwin, 2003), we have developed a 
hypothesis that certain market conditions could lead to liquidity shocks that 
consequently increase SEO underpricing. We propose three proxies to represent three 
scenarios of market conditions, namely aggregate issues with large volume, large 
market declines and high market volatility. Therefore, the first contribution we plan to 
make in this study is to incorporate market conditions into the existing empirical 
models of SEO underpricing. 
 
One significant phenomenon in the SEO market is the increase of SEO underpricing 
since the 1980s, which is documented in a number of studies (e.g.  Altinkilic and 
Hansen, 2003; Corwin, 2003; Kim and Shin, 2004; Mola and Loughran, 2004; Autore, 
2011). Several studies have already examined the pattern of SEO underpricing from 
the 1980s to the 2000s and proposed their own explanations for the pattern (e.g. Mola 
and Loughran, 2004; Kim and Shin, 2004; Autore, 2011). 
 
Recently, Chambers and Dimson (2009) proposed an estimation method to examine 
the long run behaviour of IPO underpricing in the UK. Under their method, all 
variables except year dummies are demeaned, then the coefficients of the year 
dummies are estimated using a regression model. The year dummy coefficients 
                                                 
1
 For example, see Chemmanur and Jiao (2011). 
2
 For the discussions of offer characteristics and firm characteristics, see e.g. Jeon and Ligon (2011). 
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represent the magnitude of SEO underpricing in a given year by an IPO with 
characteristics in line with average values for the sample. 
 
The estimation method proposed by Chambers and Dimson (2009) controls for the 
effects of other factors and therefore presents a clear economic interpretation of the 
year dummy coefficients. To our best knowledge, this estimation method has not been 
employed in studies of SEO underpricing over the long run, so we fill the gap by 
employing this estimation method to examine the behaviour of SEO underpricing 
during our sample period from 1987 to 2009, which could be regarded as the second 
contribution of the study.  
 
Setting SEO offer prices at next lower or other lower integers has become a common 
practice since the 1990s (e.g. Mola and Loughran, 2004; Jeon and Ligon, 2011; Huang 
and Zhang, 2011)3. To examine the effects of this practice on the behaviour of SEO 
underpricing over time, we divide our sample into two subsamples. One only includes 
offers that were priced at the next lower or other lower integer offer price. The other 
subsample includes the rest of the offers. If the patterns of annual underpricing 
dummies of the two subsamples are similar, we can conclude that setting offer prices 
at lower integers cannot fully explain the behaviour of SEO underpricing over time4. 
 
There is some evidence suggesting that issues with more liquid shares have lower 
investment banking fees, ceteris paribus (Butler et al., 2005). Since both SEO 
                                                 
3
 For instance, if  the prior closing price of  the issuer's stock is $10.7, setting the offer price at next 
lower integer means that the offer price is set at $10, and setting offer price at other lower integer 
means that the offer price is set at $9, $8, etc. 
4
 The annual underpricing dummies refer to the year dummy coefficients estimated by the method 
proposed by Chambers and Dimson (2009). 
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underwriting spreads and underpricing belong to flotation costs, we also check the 
relationship between liquidity of underlying shares and SEO flotation costs with our 
sample in Chapter Seven.  
 
1.3. Thesis Structure 
The thesis is structured as follows: in Chapter Two, we discuss the important elements 
of SEO transactions. This discussion provides background knowledge that is 
important for the sample selection and hypothesis development that follows. In 
Chapter Three, studies related to equity offerings are categorised, and we also discuss 
the studies related to liquidity shocks, liquidity and liquidity risk.  
 
Chapter Four discusses sample selection and presents the descriptive statistics. 
Chapter Five analyses the current explanations for the increase in SEO underpricing. 
In Chapter Six we test the hypothesis that certain market conditions could cause 
liquidity shocks and consequently increase SEO underpricing. After that, we analyse 
the behaviour of SEO underpricing over the sample period using the estimation 
method proposed by Chambers and Dimson (2009). Chapter Seven examines the 
relationship between liquidity of underlying shares and flotation costs (including gross 
spread and SEO underpricing). Robustness tests are conducted in Chapter Eight. 
Conclusions are presented in Chapter Nine.  
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CHAPTER 2: INTRODUCTION OF SEASONED EQUITY 
OFFERINGS 
 
In this chapter we discuss the definition of equity offerings and the differences 
between initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). We then 
introduce the major types of flotation method, underlying shares and the role of 
investment banks. Last but not least, trends in seasoned equity offerings are discussed 
in a global context. The material discussed in this chapter is crucial for the sample 
selection and hypothesis development in the following chapters. 
 
2.1. Introduction of Equity Offerings 
Most companies at their birth raise equity from a small number of investors. If the 
investors want to sell their stakes, they generally find the market illiquid. Later, as the 
company develops and needs additional equity capital, it may become desirable to go 
public by selling shares to a larger number of investors (Ibbotson and Ritter, 1995). 
This process is called an Initial Public Offering (IPO). In order to complete the IPO, 
the company needs to hire auditing and law firms to prepare the required documents 
and investment banks to underwrite the offering. Thus, the IPO process generates 
auditing fees, legal fees and underwriting fees. In return, the company not only raises 
the funds it needs but also improves the liquidity of its shares. With the enhanced 
liquidity, the company can raise funds on more favourable terms than if it had to 
compensate investors for bearing the lack of liquidity before the IPO.  
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After the IPO all subsequent issuances of shares by the company are referred to as 
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), also called follow-on offerings or secondary 
offerings in the industry. By one definition (Ross et al., 2006), a secondary equity 
offering is a registered offering of a large block of a security that has been previously 
issued to the public.  
 
SEOs can be used to raise fresh equity capital for the firm or to reduce the positions of 
existing shareholders (Geddes, 2005). In the former case, the proceeds of the sale go 
to the issuing firm and the offerings are issued in the primary market. In the latter case, 
which is also called secondary distribution, existing shareholders wanting to reduce 
their positions in the shares of the firm are often large investors or institutions. 
Because the number of shares they want to sell is large, they use SEOs to sell the 
blocks in the secondary market, with the proceeds of the sale going (of course) to 
those shareholders rather than to the issuing company. An SEO can be issued in both 
the primary market and the secondary market simultaneously. In this case, both the 
issuing firm and the shareholders can receive the proceeds of the sale according to the 
proportions of shares that they hold. Because SEO studies emphasise financing 
activity, many studies in SEO underpricing select their samples with the constraint 
that the offerings should include at least some primary shares.  
 
2.2. Main Differences between SEOs and IPOs 
Although SEOs and IPOs follow similar processes, there are important differences 
between the two. One is the degree of information asymmetry, which is higher in IPOs 
than in SEOs, since IPOs involve the sale of shares in closely-held firms in which 
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some of the existing shareholders may possess non-public information (Ibbotson and 
Ritter, 1995). Conversely, SEOs are conducted by listed firms and their information is 
more accessible due to their status as public firms. For example, SEO issuers have the 
market closing price prior to the offer. According to the theory of market efficiency, 
this price would reflect all the information relating to the company if the market were 
efficient. This closing price prior to issue is used as the starting point for SEO pricing. 
In contrast, before an IPO there is no market price for the securities of the issuing firm.  
 
Another difference is in flotation methods (also called underwriting method in some 
studies, since most SEOs are underwritten by investment banks). In the US, the firm 
commitment method is the main flotation method used in IPO transactions. According 
to the record of All US Public New Issues in SDC Platinum, the issues underwritten 
by the firm commitment method made up 98% of all US IPOs during the period from 
1980 to 2010. For SEOs, although the firm commitment method is also the main type 
of underwriting method (Booth and Smith, 1986; Eckbo et al., 2007), issues 
underwritten by other flotation methods take a substantial portion of all offerings. For 
instance, from 1980 to 2010, the record of All US Public New Issues in SDC Platinum 
shows that around 82% of all US SEOs were underwritten by the firm commitment 
method and the rest of the offerings were underwritten by other flotation methods.  
 
Last but not least, SEOs have a larger market than IPOs. For instance, in 2004-2005 
WKH JOREDO 6(2 GROODU YROXPH ZDV QHDUO\ GRXEOH WKH ,32 YROXPH DQG ¶V QHDU
record IPO volume of $256.4 billion was still around 80% of global SEO issuance, 
which was $317.2 billion (Bortolotti et al., 2008). 
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2.3. Flotation Methods, Underwriters and Types of Underlying Securities 
As discussed in the previous section, there are differences in main flotation methods 
between IPOs and SEOs. In this section, we discuss six main flotation methods for 
equity offerings, namely firm commitment, best efforts, rights, accelerated 
underwriting methods, self-registered and private placements5.   
 
2.3.1. Flotation Methods 
Firm commitment: Under the firm commitment method, the underwriter will buy the 
issue from the issuing firms and guarantee sale of a certain number of shares to 
investors (Ross et al., 2006). The underwriter assumes all the risk through the 
guarantees and so underwriting fees with the firm commitment method are high. The 
detailed process of firm commitment is discussed in the next section. 
 
Best efforts: In a best efforts transaction an investment bank only promises to sell as 
much of the issue as possible to the public but does not make a promise to sell a 
certain number of securities (Brealey et al., 2006). Under this flotation method, the 
investment banks assume less risk than in firm commitment issues and, consequently, 
charge relatively low underwriter fees. As noted in the previous section, the best 
efforts method is often used in IPOs and is rare in SEOs. This is probably because 
IPOs are riskier than SEOs because of the problem of information asymmetry: IPO 
stocks have no public market price prior to the issue, no stock analysts following the 
                                                 
5
 We summarise these six flotation methods from different sources. Firm-commitment, best efforts and 
rights are based on Eckbo and Masulis (1995). Self-registered and private placement are based on 
Eckbo et al. (2007). Accelerated underwriting methods are based on Geddes (2005) and Bortolotti et al. 
(2008).  
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company, limited information available to the public and a high concentration of 
ownership, often with managers as the major holders of equity (Eckbo and Masulis, 
1995). Therefore, investment banks choose the best efforts method if they believe the 
risk associated with the IPOs is too high.  
 
Rights: A rights offer is quite different from a firm-commitment offer. A rights offer 
can be non-underwritten or underwritten (Eckbo et al., 2007). In the former case, the 
issuer assumes all the risk associated with the issue. The rights offer grants only 
existing shareholders the right to purchase a pro rata portion of a new equity issue at a 
fixed price (Eckbo and Masulis, 1995). In the US, a rights offer is often valid only 
within one month of the issue (Eckbo et al., 2007). During that time the shareholders 
have the right to accept or decline the offer. Therefore, a rights offer is like an option 
or a warrant. The shareholders can subscribe, sell the rights in the secondary market, 
or do nothing (Geddes, 2005). At the issue date the offer price is often set at a discount 
from the current market price. However, during the waiting time, the offer price might 
still exceed the market price, which ends in offer undersubscription or offer failure. 
The rights offer price is therefore often more discounted than that of a firm 
commitment offer. Typically the rights subscription price is 15-20% below the current 
market price of the stock (Eckbo and Masulis, 1995). 
 
Because the current shareholders can capture the full value of rights either by 
exercising the rights or selling rights in the market, theoretically the firm can increase 
the offer price discount at no extra cost until the success of the issue is almost 
guaranteed. However, the above argument is not always the case, again because of the 
problem of information asymmetry (Eckbo and Masulis, 1995). If the rights are 
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unsubscribed, the issuing firm can either reallocate unsubscribed rights among 
VXEVFULELQJ VKDUHKROGHUV RU KLUH DQ XQGHUZULWHU WR ³VWDQG E\´ WR JXDUDQWHH WKH
proceeds on any unsubscribed rights (Eckbo et al., 2007).  
 
The underwritten rights offer is often called a Standby Rights Offer (Eckbo and 
Masulis, 1995). In a standby rights offer, because the underwriters bear the price risk 
DVWKH\GRLQDILUPFRPPLWPHQWLVVXHWKH\FKDUJHDIL[HG³VWDQGE\´IHHDQG³WDNH-XS´
fee in the transaction  (Eckbo et al., 2007). Eckbo and Masulis (1992) report that 
rights offers in the US market are usually fully subscribed. The portion taken by 
underwriters in a standby rights offer is typically around 15% of the issue (Singh, 
1992). In the US market, rights issues are largely confined to closed-end investment 
companies. However, in Europe, seasoned equity issues must generally be sold by 
rights (Brealey et al., 2006)6.  
 
Accelerated underwritings: Accelerated underwriting refers to the underwriting 
methods that execute the transactions much more quickly than traditional firm 
commitment underwriting. This concept was proposed by Bortolotti et al. (2008). 
According to Bortolotti et al. (2008), there are three forms of accelerated 
underwritings, namely accelerated book-built offerings, block trades and bought deals7.  
 
Accelerated book-built offerings (ABOs) have a process similar to the traditional firm-
commitment underwriting in terms of book-building, shares allocation and 
                                                 
6
 Brealey et al. (2006, p402) also mention that companies in Europe have increasingly lobbied for the 
freedom to make general cash offers.  Rights issues compose one quarter of total volume of SEOs in 
Europe according to Bortolotti et al. (2008). 
7
 Bortolotti et al. (2008) do not present the difference between block trades (BTs) and bought deals 
(BDs). Geddes (2005) suggests that BTs and BDs are the same type of flotation method. 
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responsibilities of underwriters. However, ABOs are executed much more rapidly than 
conventional firm commitment offers. Geddes (2005) suggests that ABO firms are 
generally reasonably well-known, with good share liquidity.  
 
In both block trades (BTs) and bought deals (BDs), large blocks of shares are priced 
by auction. Geddes (2005) mentions that bought deals (BDs) are sometimes referred to 
as block trades (BTs). In other words, BTs and BDs are the same type of flotation 
method. The issuing firms sell the shares to an investment bank for the highest bid, 
then the banks resell the shares to institutional investors. During the process there is 
little information production. Therefore, both BTs and BDs are executed very rapidly.  
 
The main advantage of accelerated underwriting is that it reduces the cost (SEO 
announcement reaction and underwriting fees) for the issuing firms (Bortolotti et al., 
2008). In recent years, the growth of accelerated underwriting has challenged the 
domination of traditional underwriting. Armitage (2010) documents that in the UK 
much of the SEO issuance declined by existing shareholders is bought in a few large 
blocks by both other existing shareholders and new investors. He argues that the rise 
of block trades is the reason for the decline of rights issues in the UK. Moreover, 
seasoned common stock sales executed through accelerated underwritings now 
account for over half the value of US SEOs8. Figure A-1 in Appendix 1 to this chapter 
shows the evolution of global SEOs from 1991 to 2004. The number of ABOs 
increased rapidly from 1997 and ABOs accounted for almost one third of the total 
SEOs by 2004.  
                                                 
8
 The results are based on the sample selection criteria of Bortolotti et al., 2008.  
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Shelf-registration: The US Securities and Exchange Commission introduced Rule 
415 in 1983, allowing a single registration document to be filed that permits the 
issuance of multiple securities. In order to use this flotation method the issuer must 
meet four requirements: 1) common stock (with or without voting rights) having a 
market value of at least $75 million; 2) the issuer has had no default on debt, preferred 
stock or rental payments for 3 years; 3) all SEC disclosure requirements have been 
PHWIRUWKHODVW\HDUVWKHILUP¶VGHEWLVLQYHVWPHQWJUDGH(Eckbo et al., 2007). 
 
Issuers use shelf-registration to register securities that will be offered on an immediate, 
continuous or delayed basis over the next two years using a list of possible 
underwriters. Shelf-registration allows the issuing firms to execute issues when market 
conditions become favourable, thereby increasing the flexibility and the speed of the 
issue.  
 
On December 1st, 2005, the SEC created a new category of issuers described as well-
known, seasoned issuers (WKSIs). WKSIs must meet one of two conditions required 
by the SEC. WKSIs are given automatic shelf-registration status, which means their 
registration statements are automatically effective on filing without SEC review 
(Eckbo et al., 2007). It is worth mentioning that shelf-registration has become an 
important part of the SEO market in the US.  Autore (2011) documents that $51 
billion was through 317 shelf offerings from 2004-2006, while only $18 billion was 
raised via 146 traditional offerings during the same period in their sample9. 
 
                                                 
9
 Their sample selection requires data from the Compustat database, which could screen off a number of 
small issues offered by traditional offerings. 
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Private placement: In a private placement the issuing firm sells the entire issue to a 
single investor or consortium of investors, bypassing current shareholders (Eckbo et 
al., 2007). These placements are non-public and the SEC has issued Rules 144 and 
144a to regulate private placements in the US. Private placement is the simplest way 
for a foreign firm to issue equity in the US An issuer is not required to prepare a 
registration statement and changes in accounting to meet US GAAP, and the reporting 
requLUHPHQW IRU DQ LVVXHU LV OLPLWHG WR WKDW ZKLFK LV UHTXLUHG LQ WKH LVVXHU¶V KRPH
market (Geddes, 2005). Although the threshold for a foreign issuer is low, placements 
are subject to a number of regulations (such as the Securities Act of 1993) designed to 
protect investors. For private placements, typical investors are institutions such as 
banks, insurance companies and pension funds. 
 
2.3.2. Underwriters and Syndicates 
Underwriters (investment banks) act as the agents in the transactions, executing the 
issue for their clients, the issuing firms. Among different underwriting methods, 
underwriters play a crucial role in firm commitment issues. In a firm commitment 
issue, underwriters:1) provide issuers with procedural and financial advice; 2) promise 
to buy the entire issue from the issuing firm; 3) then resell the shares to investors 
(Brealey et al., 2006).  
 
In order to spread the risk associated with the issue, underwriters often form a 
syndicate to distribute the shares (Eckbo et al., 2007). Geddes (2005) suggests that the 
syndicate is formed to broaden distribution, to encourage research support and market-
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making following the offering and due to reciprocity10. Within the syndicate, banks 
are categorised into different groups according to their roles and responsibilities in the 
transactions and according to whether they are receiving management fees, 
underwriting fees, selling concessions and reallowance fees11. The sum of these fees is 
called gross spread (also called total management fees in SDC Platinum), represented 
as a percentage of the proceeds.  
 
Book managers: Book managers (also called lead managers or lead underwriters) are 
the investment banks that form and coordinate syndicates and receive the management 
fees12. In SEO transactions, the book managers maintain a record of activity for the 
syndicate and underwrite the largest portion of the securities13. Many studies of IPOs 
and SEOs recognise the important role of book managers. Loughran and Ritter (2004) 
use the ranking of lead managers to represent the reputation of the underwriter in IPOs. 
Studies of SEOs likewise use a similar ranking and some studies have found that 
SEOs underwritten by lead managers with high reputations are less underpriced than 
others (Mola and Loughran, 2004; Kim and Shin, 2004). Mola and Loughran (2004) 
additionally used WKHUDQNLQJRIOHDGPDQDJHUV¶DQDO\VWWHDPVWRUHSUHVHQWWhe analysis 
capacity of the underwriters. 
 
Co-managers: Co-managers (also called co-lead managers or co-lead underwriters) 
do not keep the record of activity and, therefore, receive no management fees. They 
                                                 
10
 Reciprocity means that banks invite other banks into the syndicate so that they can be invited into a 
new syndicate led by other banks next time. 
11
 These terminologies (management fees, underwriting fees, selling concessions and reallowance fees) 
are taken from Thomson SDC Platinum. 
12
 Book managers, co-managers and all managers are the terms used by SDC Platinum. All managers 
include book managers, co-managers and other syndicate members. 
13
 The role of book managers is stated in SDC Platinum. 
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underwrite lesser portions of the shares than book managers, though they share 
underwriting risks and underwriting fees with the book managers. Jeon and Ligon 
(2011) document that about 86% of syndicates in SEOs for industrial firms included 
more than one co-manager during the period 1997-2007, and the average number of 
co-managers was 2.44 per offering. Chen and Ritter (2000) and Corwin and Schultz 
(2005) found that more co-managers leads to more analyst coverage for issuers after 
IPOs. Corwin and Schultz (2005) also show that more co-managers results in 
additional market makers after the IPO is launched. Although issuers benefit from the 
increase in co-managers in the syndicate, Corwin and Schultz (2005) point out several 
factors that could limit syndicate size: offer size, competition for future underwriting 
business and the increase in underwriting spread for small IPOs. 
 
Other Syndicate Members: Besides lead managers and co-managers, there are some 
banks which are only responsible for distribution of the shares (Eckbo et al., 2007). 
Selling concessions are allocated to all members in the syndicate, including lead 
managers, co-managers and other members. Reallowance fees are fees paid to 
secondary sellers (other members of the syndicate) of the securities 14 . Lead 
underwriters, co-managers and other syndicate members often commit to producing 
analyst coverage for the shares for a period after the offering, which is likely to draw 
the attention of investors for the securities and LPSURYHWKHVWRFN¶VOLTXLGLW\ (Eckbo et 
al., 2007). 
 
                                                 
14
 The definitions of selling concessions and reallowance fees are stated in SDC Platinum. 
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2.3.3. Types of Underlying Securities 
There are many types of securities in SEO transactions15. Issuing firms may have 
different equity structures and different types of shares depending on their specific 
corporate charter. Some types of securities are excluded in many SEO studies due to 
the unique characteristics of the securities and so next we shall consider the various 
types.  
 
The most common types of securities in SEOs are the common shares, class A shares, 
and class B shares16. Common shares (also called ordinary shares) are standard voting 
shares which give the holders the right to vote on matters of corporate policy and the 
composition of the board of directors (Ross et al., 2006). Class A (B) shares typically 
have enhanced (limited) voting rights or other benefits compared to the other types of 
shares in the firm (Brealey et al., 2006). Besides those shares, three forms of securities 
in SEOs are recorded by SDC Platinum and we discuss these next. 
 
ADRs: In the US, foreign firms can issue American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) to 
raise capital. An ADR is a certificate representing ownership of shares of the foreign 
company, allowing that stock to be traded in the United States (Ross et al., 2006). 
Under the ADR arrangement, shares of the foreign company are deposited with a US 
bank. The US depository bank in turn issues ADRs in the name of the foreign 
company and also converts dividends and other payments into US dollars to ADR 
                                                 
15The types of securities discussed in this section are based on both the existing SEO studies (e.g. 
Corwin 2003; Kim and Shin, 2004; Mola and Loughran 2004) and the Types of Security in SDC 
Platinum. 
16
 For SEOs, these three types of shares are the most common in SDC Platinum. There are also other 
uncommon types of stocks in SEOs, such aV³&ODVV$/LPLWHG9RWLQJ&RPPRQ´³&ODVV$6XE9RWLQJ
&RPPRQ´³&ODVV&6KDUHV´³&ODVV'6KDUHV´³&ODVV(6KDUHV´&ODVV+2UGLQDU\VKDUHVHWF 
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holders in the US (Diro Ejara and Ghosh, 2004). Due to the differences between 
operational environments, many studies in SEO underpricing exclude the non-US 
companies in their samples. Chen et al. (2009) present a study on how investment 
banks determined the gross spread paid by ADRs during the period 1980-2004. In 
their study, ADR SEO gross spread can be explained in a similar way (offer 
characteristics) to that explaining the gross spreads of US SEOs.  
 
Unit: A unit is a merger of two or more classes of securities into a single securities 
product. Units are issued by unit investment trusts. A unit investment trust offers 
UHGHHPDEOH³XQLWV´WRLQYHVWRUVIRUDVSHFLILFSHULRG$XQLWUHSUHVHQWs one share of a 
fixed, unmanaged portfolio, generally of shares and bonds. A unit is designed to 
provide capital appreciation and dividend income. Three types of investment 
companies are unit investment trusts, mutual funds and closed-end funds (Fabozzi and 
Modigliani, 2003). Due to their complex features, units are often excluded from the 
sample selection in SEO underpricing studies. 
 
REITs: REIT stands for real estate investment trusts. REITs are closed-end 
investment companies that invest in commercial real estate (Brealey et al., 2006). In 
SEO studies the term REITs refers to the shares issued by real estate investment trusts. 
These shares are traded on a stock market, therefore REITs are more liquid than direct 
investment in real estate. Real estate investment trusts invest in various types of real 
estate, diversifying the risks within the real estate industry. By aggregating individual 
investors, REITs provide investors easy access to real estate and diversification within 
real estate.  
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Based on the type of investment, REITs can be categorised into mortgage REITs and 
equity REITs (e.g. Lee and Chiang, 2004). Mortgage REITs that primarily invest in 
mortgages are akin to a bond investment, while equity REITs which invest primarily 
in commercial or residential properties using leverage are more akin to an investment 
in leveraged equity real estate. Because REITs are a closed-end investment vehicle in 
real estate, studies in SEOs often exclude REITs from their samples. 
 
2.4. The Process of Firm Commitment Underwritten SEOs 
As discussed in the previous section, firm commitment underwriting is the most 
prominent underwriting method in seasoned equity offerings. Understanding the 
process of firm commitment underwritten SEOs is crucial for hypothesis development 
in SEO studies. According to the timeline in a firm commitment offering, we divide 
the process into three stages, namely before the announcement, after the 
announcement but before the issue and after the issue. 
 
Before the announcement: If the management of a firm wants to issue a seasoned 
equity offering, it first needs the approval of its board of directors. For most 
companies, shareholders authorise large numbers of shares far in advance of their 
possible use (Eckbo et al., 2007). Following approval, the issuing firm chooses one or 
more underwriters as lead underwriters. Lead underwriters then give advice on issuing 
items, such as price, the timing and size of the offering, road show mechanism, legal 
requirements, etc., then lead underwriters choose other banks to form a syndicate. The 
compensation mechanism is also negotiated within the syndicate. After the syndicate 
is formed, underwriters conduct a due diligence investigation to collect the 
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information about the issuing firm required to meet SEC filing requirements. With the 
help of underwriters, the issuing firm produces a prospectus and uses it to register the 
offering at SEC (Geddes, 2005). 
 
Before the issue: Following announcement of the issue, the underwriters and the 
issuing firm managers travel to major cities to meet potential investors to discuss the 
planned offering. This process is called a road show (Geddes, 2005; Eckbo et al., 
2007). Then the underwriters begin the book building process and collect bid 
information from institutional investors. This information is used to set the offer price. 
When the book building process is finished, the underwriters negotiate the offer price 
with the issuing firm. The underwriters usually sign an underwriting agreement to 
purchase the shares at a fixed price within 24 hours of the start of the offering (Eckbo 
et al., 2007).  
 
Generally, the issue is oversold by the syndicate because the orders made by investors 
are not legally binding and can be withdrawn. If the issue is oversubscribed by 
investors, the allocation of shares can be either discretionary or non-discretionary. In a 
discretionary allocation, the issuer and underwriters determine who is allowed to buy 
and how much of their order is filled (Geddes, 2005). On the offering date, the 
underwriters confirm investors¶orders and deliver shares to investors according to the 
allocation they made. 
  
After the issue: When the offering is completed, there are still some responsibilities 
for underwriters. Underwriters in the syndicate often commit to providing analyst 
coverage for the shares for a certain period after the offering (e.g.  Corwin and Schultz, 
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2005; Chen and Ritter, 2000). This practice can attract more market attention toward 
the shares of the issuing firm. Besides the analyst coverage, lead underwriters and co-
lead underwriters have more responsibilities than other underwriters in terms of 
market-making commitment and price support. The market-making commitment 
requires lead underwriters to be active market- makers in the stock for a certain period 
after the offering (e.g. Corwin and Schultz, 2005). Price support means that lead 
underwriters can place limit orders to buy shares immediately after an offering 
without being subject to price manipulation restrictions (Eckbo et al., 2007). 
 
If the offering is oversold, lead underwriters can buy shares either from the secondary 
market or from the issuers to meet the order. When the price in the secondary market 
drops below the offer price, lead underwriters buy shares in the secondary market. 
This practice will have the effect of supporting the price in the secondary market. If 
the price in the secondary market is above the offer price, there is no need for price 
support activity. Many contracts contain a Green Shoe Provision (Ross et al., 2006). 
This provision allows underwriters to exercise their over-allotment option to buy 
additional shares from the issuer and resell the shares to the public immediately when 
the price in the market is above the offer price. 
 
2.5. The Trend of Global Seasoned Equity Offerings 
In the global context, seasoned equity offerings are different between regions in terms 
of volume and underwriting methods. Bortolotti et al. (2008) summarise several points 
worth mentioning. Firstly, the volume of seasoned equity offerings worldwide rose 
substantially during their research period 1991-2004. For example, in 1991 the volume 
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of global SEOs was $91 billion in 2004 terms and this figure increased threefold to 
$320 billion by 2004. The number of global SEOs also increased from 1099 in 1991 to 
3223 in 2004. The increase in both volume and transaction numbers suggests the 
increasing importance of SEOs as a way of financing around the globe. As a result, 
research into SEOs has more practical meaning and can make an increasing 
contribution to the broad area of corporate finance.  
 
Secondly, the US market is the largest single-country SEO market in the world. 
During their research period, the volume raised in the US market reached $8.27 billion, 
representing one quarter of the total volume raised in the world. The average proceeds 
in the US. during the period were $115 million, while the average proceeds in Europe 
were only slightly higher at $127 million. Both figures are significantly higher than 
the average size of the rest of the world. During the same period, although the total 
value of SEOs in the rest of world was $14.4 billion, the average size was only $61 
million. These figures suggest that the US market is not only the most important 
single-country SEO market in the world, but also that it is leading the trend of global 
SEO. Therefore, research focusing on the US market can represent the latest trends in 
SEO markets and provide important implications for SEO transactions around the 
world.  
 
Thirdly, Different regions have their own different prominent underwriting methods. 
In the US, the most prominent method is the firm commitment underwriting method. 
According to the figures provided by Bortolotti et al. (2008), during 1991-2004 firm 
commitment comprised around 75% of all SEOs in the US. This result is consistent 
with the findings of Eckbo and Masulis (1995), who report that 81.5% of all SEOs 
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during 1977-1982 were underwritten by firm commitment. In Europe, in contrast, only 
3.8% of all SEOs were firm commitment offers during 1991-2004 (Bortolotti et al., 
2008).  
 
According to the statistics in Bortolotti et al. (2008), the majority of SEOs in Europe 
are accelerated transactions, placement offers and rights offerings. These three 
methods have a similar total value and number of transactions. In particular, the 
number of accelerated transactions represent one quarter of the number of all offers, 
while the total value of accelerated transactions consists of more than 30% of the total 
value of all offers. These statistics show that accelerated transactions are more 
prominent in Europe than in the US. In the rest of the world, firm commitment offers, 
placement offers and rights offerings have similar numbers of transactions, but firm 
commitment offers have the highest total value, representing 36.5% of total value of 
all SEOs. Thus, firm commitment offers are the main method in the rest of the world.  
 
Although there are some differences between the US and the rest of the world, the US 
PDUNHW UHPDLQV WKHZRUOG¶VPost important market for SEO transactions in terms of 
both total value and transaction numbers. As for underwriters, most of the top 
investment banks are US companies. According to the ranking made by the Financial 
Times as shown in Table A-1 in Appendix 2, in 2010 five of the top ten investment 
banks (in terms of fees) were US-oriented. Moreover, in the US market, almost all 
major underwriting methods have substantial proportions of total value and 
transaction numbers. Again, therefore, studies on the US market can provide 
indications not only for the US market itself but also for the rest of the world. Based 
on the above discussions, we next focus on US SEOs in this thesis.   
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this chapter several research topics related to SEOs are introduced. We discuss the 
reasons why firms might decide to issue seasoned equity. Studies related to SEO 
flotation cost are discussed in the second section of particular interest are the possible 
reasons for the increase in SEO underpricing. All the possible determinants about SEO 
underpricing are then discussed. Last but not least, this thesis focuses on the 
explanations involving liquidity shocks and liquidity risk. These discussions 
distinguish several concepts related to liquidity and pave the path for hypothesis 
development in the later empirical chapters.  
 
3.1. Introduction of Studies on Seasoned Equity Offerings 
As noted in Chapter Two, SEOs share a number of similarities with IPOs and, 
therefore, there are several common topics for both IPO and SEO studies. These topics 
are reasons for issue underpricing, market timing and flotation costs. SEOs also have 
unique features in underwriting methods, market price and more available public 
information. Those features involve SEO announcement effects, determinants for 
flotation costs, market microstructure effects of SEOs, the reason for choosing 
different underwriting methods and the reasons for the difference in prominent 
underwriting methods among regions, etc. In this section several important studies 
related to SEOs are introduced (briefly) to provide an overall picture of SEO research.  
 
 
Chapter 3                                                                                              Literature Review 
25 
 
In SEOs flotation costs are an economically important portion of gross proceeds, 
where these include direct and indirect costs (Eckbo et al., 2007). Direct flotation 
costs refer to the costs directly associated with the issue, including fees paid to 
underwriters, registration and listing fees, legal fees, accounting fees and costs such as 
printing expenses. In IPO and SEO studies underwriting fees comprise the major 
portion of direct flotation costs. Studies on direct flotation costs are discussed in 
Section 3.2. Indirect flotation costs include three components, namely underpricing, 
announcement effects and the probability of issue withdrawal.  
 
For IPO studies indirect flotation costs do not include announcement effects because 
the shares are not publicly traded before the IPO. Section 3.3 therefore only discusses 
studies on announcement effects and the probability of issue withdrawal. In Section 
3.4 ZHGLVFXVVZKLFKIDFWRUVPD\EHDWWULEXWHGWRDILUP¶VGHFLVLRQWRODunch an SEO. 
Underpricing is the main part of this chapter and studies on SEO underpricing are 
discussed in Section 3.5 and Section 3.6. We further extend price pressure ± one of the 
determinants of SEO underpricing to liquidity shocks and discuss the differences 
among liquidity, liquidity risks and liquidity shocks in Section 3.7. Last but not least, 
we discuss an option-based model in Section 3.8 and discuss the possibility of 
applying it to calculate SEO immediacy cost. 
 
3.2. Studies on Direct Flotation Costs 
In this section, we discuss two theories that emphasise the role of scale in deciding 
underwriting spread, namely economy of scale and u-shaped underwriting spread. We 
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then focus on the 7% solution and net proceeds maximisation theory. Last but not least, 
we discuss the effects of liquidity and information asymmetry on underwriting spread. 
 
3.2.1. Economy of Scale and U-Shaped Underwriting Spread 
For direct flotation costs, Smith (1977) examined mean underwriter fees and other 
expense of IPOs and SEOs across issue size categories and three major underwriting 
methods (firm commitment, best efforts and rights offers). Two findings are 
documented in his study. First, the issue size is negatively related to the underwriter 
fees as a percentage of gross proceeds. This relation is explained by the economy scale. 
Bigger economies of scale can lead to more efficiency of fixed costs and lower 
underwriting costs. Second, different underwriting methods affect the underwriting 
spread. Specifically, firm commitment offers have the highest mean underwriting 
spread while right offers have the lowest mean underwriting spread for comparable 
size offers.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, firm commitment underwriting dominates SEOs and the 
majority of studies restrict their samples to firm commitment offers. The impacts of 
underwriting methods are not important for SEOs. Lee et al. (1996) conducted a study 
on direct flotation costs (including underwriting spread and other expenses) of IPOs, 
SEOs and convertible and straight corporate debt issues during the  sample period 
1990-1994. In their research direct costs average 7.1% for seasoned equity offerings 
and direct costs of SEOs exhibit economies of scale, which is consistent with the 
findings of Smith (1977).  
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However, underwriting spreads do not always fall as more capital is raised. After 
examining spreads on 1,325 SEOs from 1990 to 1997 in the US market, Altinkiliç and 
Hansen (2000) estimate that fixed cost is no more than 10% of total fees on average. 
In other words, underwriter costs are mostly variable. Also, their research indicates 
that issuers face U-shaped spreads. Initially the spread declines as the fixed cost is 
distributed over the proceeds, but as more capital is raised beyond a certain amount 
the underwriting spread will increase due to diseconomies of scale and the increase in 
variable costs. This nonlinear and U-shaped relationship is also confirmed by Hansen 
(2001), Drucker and Puri (2005) and Kim et al. (2010). 
 
Two recent studies provide empirical evidence consistent with the explanations of 
economy of scale. Lee and Masulis (2009) employed a sample of 963 SEOs over the 
period 1990-2002 and found that the log of net proceeds is negatively related to gross 
spreads in their regression tests. Using a sample of 2071 SEOs from 1997 to 2007, 
Jeon and Ligon (2011) employed gross proceeds as a control variable and found the 
generally negative effect of gross proceeds on underwriting spread.  
 
3.2.2. The 7% Solution and Net Proceeds Maximisation Theory 
Chen and Ritter (2000) document that from 1995 to 1998, more than 90% of the 1111 
IPOs raising $20-80 million had spreads of exactly 7%, but only 26% of moderate size 
IPOs in the 1985 to 1987 period had 7% spreads. They call this clustering of spreads 
at 7% the 7% solution. The explanation for this large clustering of spreads is that 
investment bankers tend to use non-price competitions such as analyst coverage and 
price support to attract deals. The empirical tests of Hansen (2001) found no evidence 
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that investment bankers collude to profit from the 7% solution. Instead, Hansen (2001) 
argues that a 7% gross spread is an efficient contract since the 7% spread is not 
abnormally profitable.  
 
Garner and Marshall (2010) employed a sample of 2265 firm commitment IPOs 
between 1993 and 2004. They document that more than a third of IPOs in their sample 
charged non 7% spreads. For those IPOs where underwriters (primarily middle-tier) 
charged something other than 7% and less than expected, they found evidence of a 
trade-off between IPO compensation and future SEO business. Chen et al. (2009) 
document the clustering of spreads at the 7% level for their American Depositary 
Receipt (ADR) IPO sample from 1980 to 2004, but no discernible clustering at any 
level was found in their ADR SEO sample and matched SEO sample during the same 
period. Moreover, they found that US underwriters set gross spreads differently for 
IPOs than SEOs.   
 
Different to studies of the 7% solution, Yeoman (2001) developed the net proceeds 
maximisation theory to explain how spread and offering price are determined in all 
underwritten offerings (including IPOs and SEOs). In the study, both optimal spread 
and offering price for equity offerings were generated by equilibrium constraints, then 
the optimal spreads were tested with the sample of 1143 seasoned equity offerings 
from 1988 to 199317. The empirical results are consistent with the implication of the 
net proceeds maximisation theory.  
 
                                                 
17
 The optimal spreads for IPOs cannot be tested because the price uncertainty which is an input for the 
optimal spreads is not observable in unseasoned offerings.  
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The net proceeds maximisation theory suggests a potential trade-off or substitution 
relationship between underwriting spread and equity underpricing. But Garner and 
Marshall (2010) found no evidence that underwriters trade-off IPO compensation with 
underpricing when underwriters charge less than expected. Moreover, Kim et al. 
(2010) summarise three possible relationships between SEO underwriting spread and 
underpricing, namely insignificant relationship, substitution relationship (Yeoman, 
2001) and complementary relationship. Kim et al. (2010) recognise the potential joint 
determination of underwriting spreads and initial returns. Their sample includes 4875 
IPOs and 4348 SEOs from 1980 to 2000. Using a 3LS approach, the study confirms 
that underwriting spreads and underpricing were positively and significantly related 
for both IPOs and SEOs, which is consistent with the complementary relationship. 
  
3.2.3. Liquidity, Asymmetric Information and Underwriting Spread 
Butler et al. (2005) propose that stock market liquidity is an important determinant of 
the costs of raising external capital. This hypothesis is based on the idea that 
investment banks play a market making role in placing a seasoned offering and firms 
that have stocks with better market liquidity pay significantly lower underwriting 
spread. In the study, they used a sample of 2,387 SEOs from 1993 to 2000 to test the 
K\SRWKHVLVWKDWWRWDOLQYHVWPHQWEDQNV¶IHHVJURVVVSUHDGDUHVXEVWDQWLDOO\ORZHUIRU
firms with more liquid stocks.  
 
In their sample they document substantial cross-sectional variation in SEO gross 
spreads and a set of liquidity variables is incorporated into regression. To control the 
effects of other factors, the study uses lead manager reputation (Megginson and Weiss, 
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1991), return volatility, share price, firm size, principal amount (Lee et al., 1996) and 
several dummy variables as control variables. The results show that firms with higher 
stock market liquidity have lower gross spread. Moreover, after setting the size 
quintile, the study found that the effect of liquidity is stronger for large equity issues, 
indicating that the marginal cost of illiquidity is higher for large issues. 
 
Bid-ask spread used by Butler et al. (2005) could also be used as a proxy of 
asymmetric information (e.g. Corwin, 2003). Lee and Masulis (2009) emphasise the 
role of asymmetric information in determining underwriting spreads. However, the 
study points out that common measures used in the literature, such as stock return 
volatility (e.g. Altinkiliç and Hansen, 2000; Corwin, 2003; Drucker and Puri, 2005), 
DQDO\VWV¶ HDUQLQJV IRUHFDVW GLVSHUVLRQ (Marquardt and Wiedman, 1998), debt ratings 
(Liu and Malatesta, 2005) and bid-ask spread (Corwin, 2003) cannot provide strong 
theoretical support to reflect the information asymmetry between issuers and outside 
investors. Specifically, Lee and Masulis (2009) argue that these measures are likely to 
capture other economic effects beyond asymmetric information. 
 
To solve the problem Lee and Masulis (2009) introduce accounting information 
quality as an alternative measure of information asymmetry. The hypothesis is that 
accounting statements are the primary source of information about corporate 
performance available to outside investors; if the accounting quality deteriorates, the 
LQYHVWRUV¶XQFHUWDLQW\DERXWWKHILUPVKRXOGULVHDQGGHPDQGIRULWVHTXLW\VKRXOGIDOO
leading to more underwriting efforts and thereby higher underwriting spread.  
 
Chapter 3                                                                                              Literature Review 
31 
 
In their study, the measures of accrual quality which represent the accounting quality 
were generated by two models, namely the MDD (McNichols, 2002) and the FDD 
models. The underlying idea is to calculate the standard deviation of a ILUP¶VFURVV-
sectional regression residuals across the period. Larger standard deviations of 
residuals mean a greater portion of current accruals left unexplained by the models, 
which suggests lower accrual quality. The regression results suggest that both 
measures have a significantly positive relation with gross spreads in their sample.  
 
Besides accounting quality, recently Jeon and Ligon (2011) proposed the hypothesis 
that the co-managers in the syndicate can reduce the underwriting spread. Their study 
extends the research of the role of co-managers on the flotation costs from IPOs (e.g. 
Corwin and Schultz, 2005) to SEOs. The underlying notion is that highly prestigious 
banks tend to enhance the quality of the certification of the issues, reduce information 
asymmetry and, therefore, lower SEO flotation costs (Carter and Manaster, 1990; 
Habib and Ljungqvist, 2001; Megginson and Weiss, 1991). 
 
The sample from Jeon and Ligon (2011) includes 2071 completed and 183 withdrawn 
SEOs from 1997 through 2007. The study examines the effects of the number and 
identity of co-managers on five components of flotation costs of SEOs. The results of 
empirical tests suggest that underwriting spreads are significantly lower when highly 
prestigious underwriters or commercial banks are included as co-managers in a 
syndicate. Moreover, although it found that the number of co-managers has no 
significant effect on the indirect components of flotation costs, the relationship 
between the number of co-managers and spreads is quadratic with spreads first 
increasing, but ultimately decreasing with the number of co-managers.   
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3.3. Studies on Indirect Flotation Costs 
Except for those on SEO underpricing, studies on indirect flotation costs of SEOs 
include determinants of announcement effects, probability of issues being withdrawn 
and offer delays. Among those studies, those on announcement effects are in the 
majority. This is probably because only a small fraction of all issues experience issue 
withdrawal (failure) or delays18. Moreover, the announcement effects only exist in 
SEO studies. Since both underpricing and announcement effects are indirect flotation 
costs, underpricing is also used as a determinant to explain the announcement effects 
(e.g. Altinkilic and Hansen, 2003). Therefore, discussions on studies of indirect 
flotation costs (mainly announcement effects) have important implications for SEO 
underpricing. 
  
3.3.1. Announcement Effects 
Masulis and Korwar (1985) document on average a negative stock price change on the 
announcement of seasoned equity offerings. Their sample contained 972 primary 
stock offerings, 242 combination primary and secondary stock offerings and 182 dual 
debt and equity offerings from 1963 to 1980. The study found evidence that the 
information conveyed by the offerings was much greater for industrial firms than for 
public utilities, which can be partially explained by the high frequency of public 
utilities offerings.  
 
                                                 
18
 For instance, the sample in Jeon and Ligon (2011) has 2071 completed SEOs but only 183 withdrawn 
SEOs during the sample period. 
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In the regression analysis of Masulis and Korwar (1985), the explanatory variables are 
percentage change in outstanding shares, changes in financial leverage, stock return 
volatility and a dummy variable indicating management share sales. The results 
VXSSRUWVWRFNSULFHFKDQJHVSURSRUWLRQDOZLWKWKHFKDQJHVLQPDQDJHPHQW¶VIUDFWLRQDl 
shareholdings in the firm. This finding is consistent with the agency model proposed 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and the signalling model proposed by Leland and Pyle 
(1977). They also found that the announcement period returns were positively related 
to leverage change, which is consistent with Masulis (1983). 
 
Following Masulis and Korwar (1985), many empirical studies have documented the 
evidence of significantly negative reaction to seasoned equity offerings. For instance, 
Hansen and Crutchtey (1990) document an announcement period abnormal return of -
3.65% in their sample. The announcement period abnormal return is defined as an 
abnormal return in the period from 1 day prior to the announcement to the 
announcement date. Korajczyk et al. (1991) report significant negative average 
abnormal returns of -2.26% and -0.43% on the day preceding and the day of 
announcement, respectively. Denis (1991) found that the announcement period 
abnormal returns are -4.33% for non-shelf offerings and -3.62% for non-shelf 
offerings, and defines the announcement period abnormal return as the 2 day abnormal 
returns including the day and the day before the announcement of the seasoned equity 
offerings.  
 
Using the same definition, Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) recorded an average 
abnormal return of -2.5% over their sample period from 1974 to 1990. Chaplinsky and 
Ramchand (2000) compared the price reaction to the announcement of SEO for both 
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US issues and global issues. They define the price reaction of CAR (-1, 1) (the 
cumulative average abnormal return from day -1 and day +1), where day 0 represents 
the announcement or registration date of the offer. In the study, they reported CAR (-1, 
1) of -2.4% for US offers and -2.2% for global offer.  
 
Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) analysed the offer announcement price reaction. Their 
sample consisted of 1703 SEOs from 1990 to 1997. They report an announcement 
period abnormal return of -2.23%. The cross-section estimates of announcement 
period abnormal returns show that expected discounting has a statistically significant 
negative impact on the announcement reaction, indicating that investors account for 
expected discounting costs when they learn of the seasoned offer19.  
 
3.3.2. Explanations for Announcement Effects  
In this section, we first discuss three hypotheses summarised by Kalay and Shimrat 
(1987) namely the price-pressure hypothesis, the wealth redistribution hypothesis and 
the information release hypothesis. We then further discuss empirical models 
developed based on the information release hypothesis. 
 
3.3.2.1. Three Hypotheses related to Announcement Effects 
Kalay and Shimrat (1987) summarise three hypotheses related to announcement 
effects of seasoned equity offerings. The price-pressure hypothesis proposed by 
Scholes (1972) suggests that the demand curve for the shares offered is downward 
                                                 
19
 In their regression, the announcement period abnormal return is the dependent variable while 
independent variables include firm size, relative amount, announcement period return on the CRSP 
index, expected discounting and the discrete measure of expected discounting.  
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sloping. Announcement of equity offerings means more shares will be poured into the 
market, thereby decreasing the price of the security. Mixed evidence is found in the 
literature for this hypothesis (e.g. Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Masulis and Korwar, 
1985).  
 
The wealth redistribution hypothesis argues that the decrease in the market value of 
the outstanding equity is accompanied by an increase in the market value of 
outstanding bonds. Due to the increase in the equity the leverage ratio of the firm 
decreases, making the debt less risky. As a result, the value lost by shareholders is 
granted to bondholders. Masulis and Korwar (1985) report a negative relation between 
the abnormal return on the announcement day and the leverage change caused by the 
issuance, but if the relative issue size is taken into consideration, the negative 
relationship no longer exists (Masulis and Korwar, 1985; Asquith and Mullins, 1986).  
 
The third hypothesis is the information release hypothesis. Under that hypothesis, 
theoretical models (e.g.  Leland and Pyle, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Miller and 
Rock, 1985) emphasise that the firm possesses superior information over outside 
investors. Therefore, the financing decision made by the firm can be seen as a signal 
of negative information. 
 
Kalay and Shimrat (1987) tried to find out which of the three hypotheses is relatively 
the most important and used the effects on bond price made by the equity offerings to 
decide. The results of empirical tests suggest that bond prices are negatively related to 
the announcement of equity offerings. Therefore, Kalay and Shimrat (1987) conclude 
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that the information release hypothesis is the prevailing factor affecting the share 
prices, although, at the same time, the study does not rule out the other two hypotheses.  
 
3.3.2.2. Adverse Selection, Agency Issues and Information Asymmetry 
Models developed under the information release hypothesis are also called adverse 
selection models. Under the assumptions that managers are maximising the wealth of 
shareholders and capital markets are efficient,  Myers and Majluf (1984) and Krasker 
(1986) predict that managers are more likely to issue equity when the current stock 
price rises relative to its intrinsic value. Rational investors then interpret the decision 
of eqXLW\ RIIHULQJ DV FRQYH\LQJ PDQDJHPHQW¶V RSLQLRQ WKDW WKH VKDUHV DUH QRW
undervalued. This interpretation will truncate the right tail of the stock price 
probability distribution (stock undervaluation). As a result, the share price will 
decrease. 
 
The alternative framework of adverse selection is agency issues. The agency models 
assume that managers often pursue their own private benefits. Therefore, firms are 
more likely to use the capital for agency spending, such as empire building. Jung et al. 
(1996) used book-market ratios as the proxy of investment opportunities and found 
that firms without valuable investment opportunities have more negative 
announcement returns than firms with better investment opportunities. They claim that 
their results strongly support the agency model.  
 
Recently, Walker and Yost (2008) confirmed the negative announcement period 
abnormal return in their study. They define the abnormal return as a two day 
cumulative return CAR (0, +1), where day 0 is the announcement date. They found 
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that the average two-day abnormal announcement return is -2.76%. They collected the 
VWDWHGLQWHQWLRQVIRUWKHSURFHHGVUHFHLYHGIURP6(2LVVXHVIURPILUPV¶6HFXULWLHVDQG
Exchange Commission equity registration filings, and the stated use of funds is 
primarily for investment (INVEST firms), debt reduction (DEBT firms) or for general 
corporate purposes (GENERAL firms). Walker and Yost (2008) found that regardless 
of what they say in the S-filing, firms increase investment at economically meaningful 
rates after SEO. However, the empirical results show a negative relationship between 
anticipated firm investment and abnormal returns for GENERAL firms, suggesting 
that the market reacts favourably to the anticipated seasoned equity offerings if the 
firm provides specific plans for the use of the soon-to-be-raised capital.  
 
Based on both adverse selection and the alternative agency model framework, Lee and 
Masulis (2009) argue that poor accounting information prevents investors from 
evaluating the true financial status of the issuing firm and increases information 
asymmetry between issuers and investors. As a result, the increased asymmetric 
information leads to more adverse selections and moral hazards. Therefore, they 
propose a hypothesis that poor accounting information quality is associated with larger 
negative SEO announcement effects. The hypothesis is supported by the empirical 
results which show a significant negative coefficient of the accruals quality measures. 
 
Another recent study also investigated the importance of information asymmetry on 
announcement effects. Jeon and Ligon (2011) examined the role of co-managers in 
reducing information asymmetries in SEO transactions and hypothesised that 1) the 
announcement return would increase the number of co-managers, if more co-managers 
can more accurately certify the value of the issuing firm; 2) announcement returns 
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would be positively associated with the inclusion of highly reputable co-managers and 
commercial banks co-managers, if they can reduce information asymmetries by 
credibly certifying the value of the securities. The results suggest that 1) the effect of 
the number of co-managers on increasing announcement returns is largely 
insignificant, and 2) co-managers with a high reputation serve a certification role, 
mitigating the information asymmetry in SEO, thus increasing the announcement 
return of SEOs. 
 
Table 3-1 Summary of completed offers and withdrawals for IPO and SEO 
Study Time Period 
No of 
Completed 
Offerings 
No of 
Withdrawn 
Offerings 
Sample Selection 
Hao 2011 1996-2005 2284 594 
US IPOs, excluding unit offers, ADRs, carve-
out/spin-offs, reverse LBOs, partnerships and 
financial firms 
Lee and 
Masulis 2009 
1990-2002 963 89 
US SEOs listed on NYSE, NASDAQ or Amex, 
excluding offers prices<$5, spin-offs, reverse 
LBOs, closed-end fund, unit investment trusts, 
REITs, limited partnerships, rights and standby 
issues, unit offers and warrant, nondomestic and 
simultaneous domestic-international offers, offers 
with required financial data unavailable in 
Compustat 
Jeon and 
Ligon 2011 
1997-2007 2071 183 
US SEOs listed on NYSE, NASDAQ or Amex, 
excluding offers prices<$ 3 or price>$400, 
financial and utility firms, Units, ADRs, REITs, 
limited partnerships, rights offerings, pure 
secondary offers, offers with required price and 
financial data unavailable in CRSP and Compustat 
 
3.3.3. Issue Withdrawal and Offer Delays 
Issue withdrawal occurs if an investment banking syndicate declines to underwrite an 
offering or an issuer chooses to cancel the equity offerings. Lee and Masulis (2009) 
summarise two parts of expected cost of issue withdrawal to an issuer: 1) the delay of 
valuable investment opportunities or turning to most costly sources of external capital; 
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2) registration fees, accounting expenses and management time devoted to the offering 
process. 
 
Due to the high cost of issue withdrawal, it rarely occurs for both IPO and SEO 
transactions. Table 3-1 provides a summary of both completed offers and offer 
withdrawals for IPOs and SEOs. For IPOs, there is a higher ratio of withdrawals to 
completed offers. According to Hao (2011), there were 594 IPO withdrawals from 
1996-2005, representing 26% of the total completed offers during the same time 
period. SEOs have a lower ratio of withdrawals to completed offers. Lee and Masulis 
(2009) report a ratio of 9.2% from 1990 to 2002, while Jeon and Ligon (2011) report 
8.8% from 1997 to 2007. 
 
Table 3-2 Factors affecting withdrawal probability 
Study 
Variables positively and 
significantly associated with 
the probability of offering 
withdrawal 
Variables negatively and 
significantly associated with 
the probability of offering 
withdrawal 
Regression Methods 
Hao 2011 
Ratio of withdrawn IPOs to 
completed IPOs and IPOs in 
active registration, industry 
daily return volatility, change 
in AAA-10 year treasury yield 
spread 
Filing Amount, Technology 
dummy, utility dummy, Bank 
market share, number of IPO 
filings, average underpricing, 
industry return 
Logit 
Lee and 
Masulis 
2009 
Accruals quality, total assets, 
leverage, secondary shares, 
return volatility,  
Net proceeds 
Instrumental 
Variable Probit (IV-
probit)  
Jeon and 
Ligon 
2011 
Return volatility, leverage, 
Sarbanes-Oxely Act (SOX) 
dummy 
Cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR), market-book ratio, 
market return, the inclusion 
of prestigious co-manager in 
the syndicate 
Logit, Instrumental 
Variable Probit (IV-
probit), Maximum-
likelihood estimator 
(MLE), Instrumental 
variables model of 
average treatment 
effects (IV-ATE) 
 
Chapter 3                                                                                              Literature Review 
40 
 
Variables affecting withdrawal probability are summarised in Table 3-2. Hao (2011) 
reports that for IPO withdrawals, issuer and issue characteristics (filing amount, 
technology dummy and utility dummy), investment bank characteristics (bank market 
share) and market conditions during registration period (number of IPO filings, ratio 
of withdrawn IPOs to completed IPOs and IPOs in active registration, average 
underpricing, industry return, industry daily return volatility and change in AAA-10 
year Treasury yield spread) are associated with the withdrawal probability at a 
statistically significant level. 
   
For SEOs, issuer and issue characteristics which have significant effects on the 
probability of offering withdrawal include accruals quality, total assets, leverage, net 
proceeds, market-book ratio, secondary shares, return volatility and cumulative 
abnormal return during the registration period (e.g. Lee and Masulis, 2009; Jeon and 
Ligon, 2011). Investment bank characteristics include the inclusion of a prestigious 
co-manager in the syndicate (Jeon and Ligon, 2011), while variables of market 
conditions include Sarbanes-Oxley Act dummy and market return. 
 
Jeon and Ligon (2011) define the offer delay as the natural logarithm of the number of 
days during the registration period. They use the OLS regression as a base line model 
and 2SLS and treatment regressions to deal with the possible endogeneity. The 
empirical results suggest that offer delays are significantly and positively associated 
with asset, market-book ratio, pure primary dummy and market return and 
significantly and negatively associated with NASDAQ dummy, Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
dummy, active-market, underwriter rank, number of co-managers and the inclusion of 
a prestigious co-manager or commercial bank co-manager in the syndicate.  
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3.4. Reasons to Conduct Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEO) 
In the literature, the reasons that explain why a firm conducts a seasoned equity 
offering (SEO) can be summarised in several categories, namely pecking-order theory, 
tax and leverage cost trade-off models, market timing, corporate lifecycle stage and 
near-term cash need. Table 3-3 summarises the reasons to issue a SEO under different 
theory frameworks.  
 
Table 3-3 Reasons to conduct SEOs 
Theory Reason to Conduct SEOs Studies 
Pecking-order 
theory 
The reason for a company to conduct an SEO is 
that all other measures cannot meet cash flows 
required by the investment opportunities. 
Myers and Majluf 
(1984),Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999),Leary and 
Roberts (2010)  
Tax and 
leverage cost 
trade-off 
models 
The reason for a company to issue equity 
offerings is the change in either equity or debt, 
or even the debt target ratio itself. In order to 
keep the target debt ratio, the company has to 
make equity offerings.  
Modigliani and Merton 
(1958),Fama and French (2002), 
Flannery and Rangan (2006), 
Chang and Dasgupta (2009) 
Market timing  
Managers try to sell highly priced shares when 
stock market conditions permit. 
Taggart (1977), Loughran and 
Ritter (1995), Loughran and 
Ritter (1997), Baker and 
Wurgler (2002), DeAngelo et al. 
(2010) 
Corporate 
lifecycle stage 
Young companies with high market-to-book 
ratios and low operating cash flows tend to sell 
equity to fund investment while mature 
companies prefer to fund investment internally. 
Carlson et al. (2006), DeAngelo 
et al. (2010) 
Near-term 
cash need 
Issuers have to conduct SEOs in order to avoid 
running out of cash in the near term. 
DeAngelo et al. (2010) 
 
3.4.1. SEOs, Pecking Order Theory and Trade-off Models 
0\HUVDQG0DMOXI¶V(1984) pecking order theory suggests that companies tend to rely 
on internal finance and prefer safe securities (e.g. debt) to risky ones (e.g. equity) if 
external finance is required. In short, when a company is facing investment 
opportunities, it tends to use retention first. If retention cannot meet the funding 
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requirement, the company will issue debt, then possibly hybrid securities such as 
convertible bonds and then equity as a last resort. Therefore, under the pecking order 
theory, the reason for a company to conduct an SEO is that all other measures cannot 
meet cash flows required by the investment opportunities.  
 
The trade-off theory of capital structure proposed by Modigliani and Merton (1958) is 
described as a common practice adopted by companies in many finance textbooks (e.g. 
Brealey et al., 2006). Under this theory, the debt-equity decision can be viewed as a 
trade-off between interest tax shields and the costs of financial distress. Instead of 
suggesting that firms should take on as much debt as possible as the pecking order 
theory does, the trade-off theory argues that companies should take a target debt ratio 
which balances the benefits brought by interest tax shields and the costs of financial 
distress or bankruptcy. Therefore, according to the trade-off theory, the reason for a 
company to issue equity offerings is the change in either equity or debt, or even the 
debt target ratio itself. In order to keep the target debt ratio, the company has to make 
equity offerings.  
 
3.4.2. Empirical Results of the Pecking Order and Trade-off Theory 
Mixed evidence is found by a number of empirical studies related to the pecking order 
theory and trade±off theory. Table 3-4 summarises empirical studies related to the 
pecking-order and trade-off theories. 
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Table 3-4 Summary of empirical studies related to pecking-order and trade-off 
theory 
Study Sample Methodologies Conclusions 
Shyam-
Sunder and 
Myers 
(1999) 
157 US firms from 
1971-1989 
OLS regression 
The basic pecking order model is an excellent first-
order descriptor of financing behaviour 
Frank and 
Goyal 
(2003) 
A sample of US publicly 
traded firms for 1971-
1998. And the study 
does not require firms 
to survive during the 
sample period 
OLS regression 
Large firms exhibit some aspects of pecking order 
behavior but the evidence is not robust when 
conventional leverage factors are included nor 
when sample period is restricted to the 1990s. 
Leary and 
Roberts 
(2010) 
34470 firm-year 
observations over the 
period 1980-2005 
Empirical model 
and simulation 
experiment 
Even when controlling for the debt capacity, the 
pecking order is never able to accurately classify 
more than half of the observed financing decisions; 
The predictive accuracy of the model increases 
dramatically when factors typically attributed to 
alternative theories are incorporated; The both 
pecking order and trade-off models have elements 
of truth that help explain some aspects of financing 
decisions. 
Fama and 
French 
(2002) 
An average of about 
1600 firms per 
regression over 35-
year period (1965-
1999) 
Fama-MacBeth 
regressions 
Two models share many predictions about 
dividends and leverage while the two models 
disagree on some issues. The trade-off model 
suffers a "scar" (it predicts negative relation 
between leverage and profitability while the 
relation is positive; and the rate of mean reversion 
predicted by the trade-off model is suspiciously 
slow 
Flannery 
and Rangan 
(2006)  
111,106 firm-year 
observations from 
1965-2001 
Fama-MacBeth 
regressions; Fixed-
Effect Panel; IV 
Panel 
The inconsistence of the adjustment speed between 
their study and other studies (e.g. Fama and French 
2002) is attributed to the unwarranted, but 
testable, assumptions about the adjustment speed 
and/or the dynamic properties of target leverage.  
Chang and 
Dasgupta 
(2009)  
112035 firm-year 
observations from 
1971-2004 
Simulations 
Existing tests of target behaviour based on leverage 
ratio changes might not be able to give conclusive 
results; in order to find out which tests are useful in 
identifying target behaviour, we need to look at 
financing behaviour (debt versus equity choices). 
de Jong et 
al. (2010)  
2259 US firms and 
13338 firm-year 
observations from the 
Compustat and CRSP 
databases for the 
period of 1985-2005 
Two-step GMM 
estimator; a fixed 
effects approach 
The pecking order theory is a better descriptor of 
ĨŝƌŵƐ ?ŝƐƐƵĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐƚŚĂŶƚŚĞƐƚĂƚŝĐƚƌĂĚĞ-off 
theory while the static trade-off theory is a better 
descriptor for firms' purchase decisions 
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3.4.2.1. Empirical Results of the Pecking Order Theory 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) tested the basic pecking order model, which predicts 
external debt financing driven by the internal financial deficit. They estimated an OLS 
UHJUHVVLRQRIDILUP¶VQHWJURVVGHEWLVVXHGVFDOHGE\WKHERRNYDOXHRIDVVHWVRQLWV
financing deficit for a small sample of 157 firms that survived from 1971 to 1989. 
They found that the basic pecking order model has much greater time-series 
explanatory power than a static trade-off model, and conclude that the basic pecking 
order model is an excellent first order descriptor of financing behaviour.  
 
Frank and Goyal (2003) selected a sample of US publicly traded firms in Compustat 
from the period 1971-1998. The study did not require firms to survive during the 
sample period. They estimate the same regression as that in Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) DQGIRXQGWKDWWKHSHFNLQJRUGHUWKHRU\LVDSRRUGHVFULSWRURIILUPV¶ILQDQFLQJ
behaviour for the whole sample. Specifically, they found that large firms exhibit some 
aspects of pecking order behaviour, but the evidence is not robust when conventional 
leverage factors are included into the analysis, nor when the sample period is 
restricted to the 1990s.  
 
Furthermore, Frank and Goyal (2003) argue that over time support for the pecking 
order theory declines and they attribute two reasons to the decline. One is that more 
small firms are listed publicly over time and small firms often do not follow the 
pecking order. The other is that for the quartile of largest firms, support for the 
pecking order theory declines over time, suggesting that equity becomes more 
important.  
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Fama and French (2005) also found evidence that is contrary to Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999). In their sample, equity issues are both commonplace and on average 
large. Thus their results reject the central predictions of pecking order theory about 
how often and under what circumstances firms issue and repurchase equity. Given the 
contradictions of the trade-RII PRGHO¶V FHQWUDO SUHGLFWLRQV GRFXPHQWHG LQ PXFK
previous work (e.g. Fama and French, 2002), they argue that both the pecking order 
model and the trade-off model have serious problems and suggest that a combination 
of the two models can better explain the financing decisions. 
 
Leary and Roberts (2010) conducted an empirical test with a sample of 34470 firm-
year observations over the period 1980-2005 drawn from Compustat. They developed 
an empirical model and a simulation experiment to test the prediction accuracy of the 
pecking-order theory. They found that fewer than 20% of firms followed the pecking 
order predictions concerning debt and equity issuance decisions under the strict 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI SHFNLQJ RUGHU WKDW OLPLWV WKH YDULDWLRQ LQ ILUPV¶ VDYLQJ DQG GHEW
policies. This result remains the same even after relaxing the strict interpretation and 
DOORZLQJILUPV¶GHEWFDSDFLW\WRYDU\LQDPDQQHUFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKDWRILQYHVWPHQW-
grade rated firms in the same industry.  
 
However, when the debt capacities of the firms are allowed to vary with variables 
often attributed to alternative theories (e.g. trade-off theory), the predictive capacity of 
pecking order theory improves significantly: over 80% of the observed debt and 
equity issuance decisions can be accurately classified. Leary and Roberts (2010) argue 
that their findings are consistent with Fama and French (2005), who suggested that 
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both pecking order and trade-off models have elements of truth that help explain some 
aspects of financing decisions.  
 
3.4.2.2. Empirical Results of the Trade-off Theory 
Fama and French (2002) tested both the pecking order model and trade-off model. 
They summarise that the two models share many predictions about dividends and 
leverage while the two models disagree on some issues. Figure 3-1 shows the shared 
predictions and disagreements between two models. Both models predict 1) negative 
relationship between investment and book leverage; 2) positive relationship between 
firm size and leverage dividend payout; 3) negative marginal relationship between 
leverage and the target dividend payout ratio. All of the above predictions are 
supported by empirical results. 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1 Shared predictions and disagreements between trade-off model and 
pecking order model 
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,QYHVWPHQWĹĺERRN
OHYHUDJHĻ 
)LUPVL]HĹĺ
OHYHUDJHĹDQG
GLYLGHQGSD\RXWĹ 
¨/HYHUDJHĹĺ 
¨7DUJHWGLYLGHQG
SD\RXWUDWLRĻ 
Pecking order 
Model: 
3URILWDELOLW\ĹĺE
RRNOHYHUDJHĹ 
¨HDUQLQJV	 
LQYHVWPHQWĺ 
¨GHEW 
Trade-off 
Model: 
3URILWDELOLW\Ĺĺ
book &Market 
OHYHUDJHĻ 
/HYHUDJHĺ
Mean reverting 
 
Chapter 3                                                                                              Literature Review 
47 
 
Although the trade-off model predicts a negative relationship between leverage and 
profitability, empirical results in Fama and French (2002) show a positive relationship. 
7KLV IDLOXUH LV FDOOHGD³VFDU´E\ Fama and French (2002). Moreover, despite there 
being evidence for the mean reverting of leverage target, they found that the rate of 
mean reversion (7-17% per year) was suspiciously slow.  
 
Table 3-5 Effects of exclusion of partial adjustment and firm fixed effects on the 
adjustment Speed 
Assumptions 
Examples of 
Studies 
Effect 
Conclusions 
from 
Flannery and 
Rangan 2006 
A firm's observed capital 
ratio is also its desired 
(target) ratio; when the 
market debt ratio (MDR) 
is the dependent variable, 
the coefficient on lagged 
MDR is zero 
Fama and 
French 2002 
When the lagged MDR is added, it has a 
very highly significant coefficient, thus 
Ignoring lagged MDR would lead to an 
incorrect model specification 
Partial 
adjustment 
toward a 
target capital 
ratio exists 
Firm fixed effect could be 
excluded 
Fama and 
French 2002, 
Baker and 
Wurgler 
2002, Huang 
and Ritter 
2009 
Firm-specific unobserved effects 
substantially influence estimated 
adjustment speeds, apparently because 
they substantially sharpen estimates of 
the target debt ratio 
Exclusion of 
firm fixed 
effects is 
unwarranted 
Target measurement 
noise could be included 
Flannery and 
Rangan 2006  
Adding target measurement noise would 
biases the estimated coefficient on MDR 
toward unity. A noise volatility of 20% to 
25% roughly halves the estimated 
adjustment speed from 34.5% to about 
17% 
The effect of 
noisy targets 
on the 
estimated 
adjustment 
speed is 
substantial 
 
Contrary to the slow rate of mean reversion found by Fama and French (2002), 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) found that firms move relatively quickly towards their 
target debt ratio. In their study, the typical firm has a rate of mean reversion of more 
than 30% per year. Flannery and Rangan (2006) attribute the inconsistency of the 
adjustment speed between their study and other studies  (e.g. Fama and French, 2002) 
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to the unwarranted, but testable, assumptions about the adjustment speed and/or the 
dynamic properties of target leverage. Table 3-5 shows the effects of exclusion of 
partial adjustment and firm fixed effects on the adjustment speed summarised by 
Flannery and Rangan (2006).  
 
Chang and Dasgupta (2009) demonstrated that it is possible to observe target 
adjustment behaviour, direct rebalancing behaviour and significant firm-specific 
variables in leverage regressions even in samples through simulations in which no 
target behaviour is assumed. Therefore, they argue that existing tests of target 
behaviour based on leverage ratio changes might not be able to give conclusive results. 
Moreover, they suggest that in order to find out which tests are useful in identifying 
target behaviour, we need to look at financing behaviour (debt versus equity choices). 
Table 3-6 illustrates conclusions drawn from test results on simulation samples under 
three types of tests.  
 
Table 3-6 Conclusions based on simulation samples 
Tests 
Representativ
e studies 
Results on simulation 
samples 
Conclusions 
Adjustment 
speeds 
Fama and 
French 2002, 
Flannery and 
Rangan 2006 
A move from random 
financing to vigorous target 
behaviour generates only a 
10% change in the estimated 
speed of adjustment 
The estimated speeds of 
adjustment are likely to provide 
a very imprecise picture of the 
extent of rebalancing going on 
in the data 
Direct evidence 
of rebalancing 
behaviour 
Leary and 
Roberts 2005, 
Alti 2006, 
Kayhan and 
Titman 2006 
Mechanical effects could 
arise when firms do not 
follow target behaviour. 
Tests of rebalancing behaviour 
do not have the power to reject 
mechanical effects associated 
with non-target behaviour 
Significant 
effects of firm-
specific 
variables in 
leverage 
regressions 
Frank and 
Goyal 2007 
Even for simulation samples, 
several firm-specific variables 
are statistically significant in 
leverage regressions 
It is difficult to conclude the 
observed relationship between 
a particular firm-specific 
variable and the leverage ratio 
in the actual sample 
 
Chapter 3                                                                                              Literature Review 
49 
 
de Jong et al. (2011) focus on financing decisions for which the trade-off theory and 
the pecking order theory have different predictions. Their sample includes a broad 
cross-section of US firms from the Compustat and CRSP databases for the period 
1985-2005. They found that for issuing decisions, in more than three-quarters of the 
observations, over-leveraged firms still increased their leverage by issuing debt. This 
HYLGHQFHVXJJHVWV WKDW WKHSHFNLQJRUGHU WKHRU\ LVDEHWWHUGHVFULSWRURI ILUPV¶ LVVXH
decisions than the static trade-off theory. For under-leveraged firms that do have 
sufficient debt outstanding to be repurchased, they found that the majority of 
observations repurchase equity, which is evidence for the static trade-off theory for 
repurchase decisions. 
 
3.4.3. Equity Market Timing  
Because both the pecking order theory and the trade-off model are problematic (e.g. 
Fama and French, 2002; Leary and Roberts, 2010), studies on SEO have developed 
other explanations for the reason(s) of conducting SEOs specifically. Among them, 
one popular explanation is the market timing hypothesis, which suggests that 
managers try to sell highly priced shares when stock market conditions permit.  
    
Baker and Wurgler (2002) summarise the evidence for market timing in four different 
kinds of study. The first kind of study shows that firms tend to issue equity rather than 
debt when market value is high20, and tend to repurchase equity when market value is 
low. In the second kind, analyses of long-run post issue stock returns suggest that 
                                                 
20
 The high (low) valuation can be indicated by both high (low) market-to-book ratio and high (low) 
pre-issue return. 
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issuers are, on average, successful at equity marketing timing. In the third kind, 
analyses of profitability forecasts and realisations around equity issues suggest that 
firms tend to issue equity at times when investors are over-optimistic about earnings 
prospects. In the fourth kind, anonymous surveys show that managers admit to market 
timing (see Graham and Harvey, 2001). 
 
3.4.3.1. Market-to-book Ratio and Stock Return 
Market-to-book ratio as well as its various transformations is employed in equity 
market timing studies to identify mispricing. For instance, Baker and Wurgler (2002) 
employed a historical market-to-ERRNUDWLRWRFDSWXUHILUPV¶SDVWHTXLW\PDUNHWWLPLQJ
attempts 21 . After controlling for current investment opportunities in the form of 
current market-to-book ratio, the historical market-to-book ratio could be interpreted 
as a proxy of mispricing. They found an inverse relationship between leverage and the 
historical market-to-book ratio, which is interpreted as providing evidence to support 
the market timing hypothesis. 
 
As discussed in the previous section, in the trade-off framework, market-to-book ratio 
is often used as a measure of growth options (e.g. Fama and French, 2002). High 
market-to-book ratios can be viewed as a sign of high growth options. Therefore, it is 
LPSRUWDQWWRFRQWUROIRUILUPV¶JURZWKRSSRUWXQLWLHVZKHQLQWHUSUHWLQJPDUNHW-to-book 
ratio as an indicator of mispricing.  
 
                                                 
21
 The ratio is called external finance weighted average market-to-book ratio in Baker and Wurgler 
(2002).  
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Hertzel and Li (2010) employed a methodology proposed by Rhodes±Kropf et al. 
(2005) (RKRV) that decomposes pre-issue market-to-book (MTB) ratios into 
misevaluation and growth option components22. They found that compared with the 
overall market, issuing firms have greater mispricing and greater growth options. They 
interpret this finding as evidence supporting the fact that both firm-level overvaluation 
and financing needs affect managerial decisions to issue equity.  
 
Besides market-to-book ratio, studies have also tried to use pre-issue return to capture 
the marketing timing attempts. For instance, Hovakimian et al. (2001) found that firms 
with large stock price increases are more likely to issue equity and retire debt than 
firms with stock price declines. Graham and Harvey (2001) conducted a survey study 
and found that recent stock price performance is considered by managers as one of the 
most important factors affecting the equity issuance decision.  
 
Moreover, Alti and Sulaeman (2012) looked at the timing behaviour and document 
that equity issues tend to follow periods of high stock returns. They found that stock 
price increases have a significant impact on the likelihood of equity issuance only 
when accompanied by institutional purchases. When institutional investor demand is 
weak, there is little evidence supporting such timing behaviour. The study provides 
evidence for an important certification role played by institutional investors in equity 
issues. 
 
                                                 
22
 The methodology is developed to identify misevaluation in merger and acquisition activities by 
Rhodes±Kropf et al. (2005). The RKRV (2005) breaks MTB ratios into three components: firm-specific 
error (FSE), time-series sector error (TSSE) and long-run value-to-book (LRVTB).  
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3.4.3.2. Long-run Post-issue Underperformance 
Market timing can be detected ex post by examining long-run stock returns of issuers. 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) document that firms issuing either IPOs or SEOs during 
1970 to 1990 had low long-run return over the five years after the issue. After 
considering a number of possible explanations23, the low long-run return still cannot 
be fully explained. Therefore, they suggest that another possible explanation is that 
firms tend to take advantage of transitory windows of opportunity by issuing equity 
when, on average, they are overvalued. Following  Loughran and Ritter (1995), 
Loughran and Ritter (1997) document the larger declines of profit margin and return 
for issuers than nonissuers within four years of the offering in their sample of SEOs 
from 1979-1989.  
 
However, some studies propose alternative explanations to the long-run 
underperformance based on return benchmark misspecification. Brav et al. (2000) 
found that in event time performance tests IPO returns are similar to nonissuing firm 
returns matched on firm size and book-to-market ratios. While SEO returns show 
some underperformance relative to various characteristic-based benchmarks, time 
series factor models show that SEO returns covary with nonissuing firm returns. 
Moreover, Brav et al. (2000) show that model misspecification could be an important 
consideration in long run performance tests24. 
 
                                                 
23
 Loughran and Ritter (1995) found the low returns of issuers cannot be explained by the three-factor 
model proposed by Fama and French (1993). 
24
 %UDYHWDO PDNHVPDOOFKDQJHV WR WKH IDFWRUVSHFLILFDWLRQ LQ)DPDDQG)UHQFK¶VPRdel and 
improve its ability to price equity issuer returns as well as commonly used test portfolios. 
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Eckbo et al. (2000) note the fact that issuer stocks are on average less risky than stocks 
of matched firms due to changes in unexpected inflation and default risk and stock 
liquidity caused by equity issues. Thus, issuer stocks require lower expected returns 
than those of firms matched on size and book-to-market ratios. They argue that the 
abnormal performance is explained by a failure of the matched firm technique of 
Loughran and Ritter (1995). Carlson et al. (2006) also demonstrate that standard 
matching procedures fail to fully capture the dynamics of risk and expected return by 
developing a real options theory of observed returns throughout the SEO episode. 
They argue that expected returns of issuer stocks decrease because growth options are 
converted into assets with less risk in place.  
 
As discussed in the previous section, Hertzel and Li (2010) break book-to-market 
ratios into three components. They found that in calendar-time factor regressions, SEO 
firms with high misvaluation have significant negative abnormal returns25. Even after 
including an investment factor proposed by Lyandres et al. (2008), firm-level 
misvaluation still plays a statistically significant and economically important role in 
explaining the underperformance. Moreover, they found no relationship between post-
issue abnormal returns and the pre-issue growth option component of MTB. The 
evidence, together with their finding that issuing firms with more growth options have 
higher levels of post-issue investment, is inconsistent with the real investment 
explanations of low post-issue stock returns.  
 
                                                 
25
 Misvaluation is measured by firm-specific error (FSE) in Hertzel and Li (2010). 
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Alti and Sulaeman (2012) used two approaches to detect SEO long-run return 
performance, namely event-time and calendar-time. The event-time approach is 
mainly used in a descriptive analysis because statistical inference based on event-time 
long-run returns is problematic (see, e.g. Brav, 2000). In the calendar-time approach, 
long-run returns exhibit significantly negative alphas in the five years following the 
offer. Moreover, $OWÕDQG6XODHPDQ) found that insitutional demand for issuers' 
stocks has insignificant effects on the underperformance. Thus they conclude that the 
institutional demand effects are unrelated to the long-run underperformance 
phenomenon. 
 
3.4.3.3. Other Empirical Studies related to Market Timing 
Mahajan and Tartaroglu (2008) conducted empirical research to test the equity market 
timing hypothesis in major industrialised G-7 countries26. Although they found that 
historical market-to-book ratio is inversely related to leverage in most industrialised 
countries, they also show that firms in G-7 countries, except Japan, fully rebalance 
their capital structure after equity issuance. Furthermore, they document a negative 
relationship between current market-to-book ratio with book leverage for US and 
Canadian firms when historical market-to-book ratio is included in the regressions. 
This result is consistent with the trade-off framework. 
 
Hovakimian and Hutton (2010) found evidence inconsistent with the market timing 
hypothesis. In their research, they tested and found support for the market feedback 
hypothesis for a sample of firms that issue seasoned equity repeatedly. The hypothesis 
                                                 
26
 G-7 countries include the seven most industrialised countries: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
UK and US. 
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first proposed by Jegadeesh et al. (1993) suggests that high post-issue performance 
FRQYH\V WKH PDUNHW¶V EHOLHI WKDW WKH PDUJLQDO UHWXUQ WR WKH ILUP¶V SURMHFWs is high, 
HQFRXUDJLQJ PDQDJHUV WR UDLVH DGGLWLRQDO FDSLWDO WR LQFUHDVH WKH ILUP¶V LQYHVWPHQW
Additionally, they also found some support for the role of institutional investors in the 
market feedback mechanism. 
 
Jenter et al. (2011) examined the market timing hypothesis in a sample of put option 
sales on company stocks by large US firms. Previous studies examining equity issues 
have often suffered from 1) difficulty in interpreting equity issues and repurchases and 
2) the problems associated with measuring abnormal returns over long periods of time. 
However, the put option sale setting provides a cleaner test by helping address the 
issues of both motivation and measurement. When the stocks are undervalued, 
managers tend to issue puts. They document a 5% abnormal stock return in the 100 
days following put option issues, with much of the abnormal return following the first 
earnings release date after the sale. This result suggests that managers can identify 
mispricing equity and use securities issues to time the market. 
 
3.4.4. Other Explanations for Conducting SEO  
Besides the above explanations, DeAngelo et al. (2010) also try to give their opinions 
about the reasons to conduct SEOs. They propose two explanations for conducting 
SEOs, namely corporate lifecycle and near-term cash need. Under the theory of 
lifecyle, young companies with high market-to-book ratios and low operating cash 
flows tend to sell equity to fund investment while mature companies prefer to fund 
investment internally. Because these growth-stage issuers take a large portion of 
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issuers, the pre-SEO share price increases reflect an increase in the value of growth 
options. When the growth options are converted into assets in place, expected return 
declines endogenously (Carlson et al., 2006).  
 
DeAngelo et al. (2010) found that both the market-timing and corporate lifecyle 
theory have a statistically significant influence on the decision to conduct an SEO, 
with the lifecycle effect being empirically stronger. They argue that neither theory 
adequately explains SEO decisions because the majority of issuers are not growth 
firms and the vast majority of firms with good market-timing opportunities fail to 
issue stock. Therefore, DeAngelo et al. (2010) conclude that a near-term cash need is 
the primary SEO motive by citing that 62.6% of issuers would run out of cash (81.1% 
would have subnormal cash balances) the year after the SEO without the offer 
proceeds.   
 
Table 3-7 Magnitudes of IPO underpricing 
Studies Sample Period Sample Size Average IPO Underpricing 
Liu and Ritter 2011 1980-2008 7319 IPOs 18.20% 
Lowry et al 2010 1965-2005 8759 IPOs 22% 
Loughran and Ritter 2004 1980-2003 6391 IPOs 18.70% 
 
3.5. Introduction of SEO Underpricing 
IPO underpricing has been confirmed as a consistent feature in the literature. For 
instance, Lowry et al. (2010) found that IPO underpricing averaged 22% between 
1965 and 2005 in the US market, and the means of initial returns for 1965-1980, 1981-
1990, and 1991-2005 were 12.1%, 9.2% and 25.8% respectively. A number of studies 
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also document considerable IPO underpricing in the US market. Table 3-7 summarises 
IPO underpricing reported by previous studies. 
 
Table 3-8 Magnitudes of SEO underpricing and discount 
Studies 
Sample 
Period 
Sample 
Size 
Average SEO Underpricing/discount 
Altinkilic and 
Hansen 2003 
1990-1997 1703 SEOs 
Average SEO Discount: 2.47%; Average SEO 
Underpricing:2.58% 
Corwin 2003 1980-1998 4454 SEOs Average SEO Discount:.2.21% 
Mola and Loughran 
2004 
1986-1999 4814 SEOs Average SEO Discount: 3.0% 
Kim and Shin 2004 1983-1998 3034 SEOs Average SEO Discount:2.02% 
Kim and Park 2005 1989-2000 1040 SEOs Average SEO Underpricing: 3.45% 
Chammanur et al 
2009 
1999-2004 1108 SEOs 
Average SEO Discount: 2.97%; Average SEO 
Underpricing: 3.50% 
Autore 2011 1982-2006 4661 SEOs Average SEO Discount: 2.30% 
Jeon and Ligon 
2011 
1997-2007 2071 SEOs Average SEO Underpricing: 3.04% 
Huang and Zhang 
2011 
1995 -2004 2281 SEOs Average SEO Discount: 3.16% 
 
While IPO underpricing in the US market was significant as early as the 1960s, SEO 
underpricing was relatively stable until the 1990s. Table 3-8 shows average SEO 
underpricing/discount reported by previous studies27. The average SEO underpricing 
was around 2-3% in the period 1980-2000. Compared with IPO underpricing, SEO 
underpricing has a relatively smaller magnitude. Moreover, a number of studies 
document relatively low SEO underpricing during the 1980s. For instance, Corwin 
(2003) reports that average SEO discount in the 1980s in his sample was 1.15% while 
the mean discount from 1990 to 1998 was 2.92%. Mola and Loughran (2004) found 
that average SEO discount from 1986 to 1989 was 1.1%. According to the results 
                                                 
27
 The definitions of SEO underpricing and discount vary among studies. Since SEO underpricing and 
discount are analogous, we include studies of both SEO underpricing and discount in this section. In 
this chapter, SEO underpricing and discount refer to terms defined by the cited studies. In Chapter Four, 
differences between these terms are discussed. 
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from previous studies, we can conclude that SEO underpricing has increased 
substantially from the 1980s to the 1990s. 
 
3.6. Determinants of SEO Underpricing 
In this section we discuss several important theoretical models about IPO and SEO 
underpricing. Through these discussions, we can identify which factors affect SEO 
underpricing. We discuss the empirical studies on SEO underpricing and identify 
which proxies are employed in the literature to represent those factors identified by 
theoretical models.  
 
3.6.1. Theoretical Models of Equity Offering Underpricing 
We summarise a number of IPO underpricing models and three SEO underpricing 
models in this section. Some conclusions drawn from IPO underpricing models, such 
as oligopoly market proposed by Liu and Ritter (2011), might be possibly applied in 
SEO underpricing.  
 
3.6.1.1. IPO Underpricing Models 
A number of studies on equity offerings provide theoretical models of underpricing. 
Some factors identified by theoretical models in IPO underpricing can also be applied 
in SEO underpricing28. Thus, the following discussions also include some important 
models in IPO underpricing. A number of studies propose their own theoretical 
explanations about IPO underpricing. These explanations are mainly information 
                                                 
28
 This practice is applied by a number of empirical studies in SEO underpricing (e.g. Altinkilic and 
Hansen, 2003). 
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asymmetry oriented. There are two main dimensions, namely interaction between the 
underwriter and investors and interaction between the underwriter and the issuers.  
 
Interaction between the underwriter and investors 
Rock (1986) proposed a theoretical model explaining why unseasoned issues may be 
VROG DW D SULFH EHORZ PDUNHW YDOXH 5RFN¶V PRGHO LV EDVHG RQ WKH information 
asymmetry among investors. The fundamental assumption of his model is that there is 
a group of investors with information superior to that in the firm as well as that of all 
other investors. The rationale for the model is that uninformed investors expect the 
offer to be oversubscribed if the offer price is too high and undersubscribed if the offer 
price is too low. Informed investors crowd the uninformed out of some offerings and 
they withdraw from others; uninformed investors give up good shares and buy bad 
shares. In order to induce a sufficient number of uninformed investors, issuers have to 
price the shares at a discount to overcome the bias.  
 
Rock (1986) argued that investors should receive higher compensation in the form of 
underpricing when it is more difficult to value the firm in IPO transactions. 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) proposed a dynamic information acquisition model for 
IPOs and argue that, in order to obtain truthful demand information in the book-
building phase, underwriters should reward regular investors with more underpricing 
in the deals for which there is a strong demand. Thus, deals in which the offer price is 
revised upwards pay more through underpricing for information provided by the 
better-informed investors. The model provides important theoretical support for the 
argument that new issues will be underpriced and that the distributional priority will 
EHJLYHQWRDQXQGHUZULWHU¶VUHJXOar investors. 
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Welch (1992) SURSRVHGD³FDVFDGH´PRGHO WRH[SODLQ WKHSULFLQJGHFLVLRQVRI ,32V
The model assumes that when IPO shares are sold sequentially, later investors can 
learn from the purchasing decisions of earlier investors and then rely completely on 
those purchasing decisions and ignore their own private information about the offering. 
The model predicts that demand of the offerings can be so elastic that even risk-
neutral issuers have to underprice their offerings in order to completely avoid failure.  
 
Interaction between the underwriter and the issuers 
Regarding the interaction between the underwriter and the issuers, Baron (1982) 
provides a theoretical model to deal with the asymmetric information between the 
issuer and the banker. He assumes that the banker is better informed than the issuer 
about the capital market. If both the issuer and the banker are equally informed about 
the capital market, a firm commitment contract can be viewed as optimal and the 
banker would provide the distribution service at the first-best level29. When the banker 
has superior information, the issuer is unable to observe the distribution efforts made 
by the bank, causing the banker to spend efforts less than the first-best effort level 
under a pure distribution contract.  
 
As a result there is therefore room for the bank to add advertising services to a pure 
distribution service. Under this contract, the offer price is delegated to the banker who 
has the superior information about the capital market. Because the banker uses 
superior information, the issuer has to compensate for this additional service. 
                                                 
29
 First-best level means that the banker endeavours to provide the best distribution service it can. It 
does not mean the contract is a best-effort one (indeed the contract is a firm-commitment one). 
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Therefore, the optimal offer price is set below the first-best offer price, causing the 
offer to be underpriced when the bank is better informed than the issuer.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-2 Prospect theory's value function (Loughran and Ritter, 2002, p422) 
 
Loughran and Ritter (2002) present a prospect theory model that focuses on the 
FRYDULDQFHRIWKHPRQH\OHIWRQWKHWDEOHDQGWKHLVVXHU¶VZHDOWKFKDQJHV7KHWKHRU\
argues that 1) each individual has a value function; 2) the value function is concave in 
gains and convex in losses; 3) the value function is steeper for small losses than for 
small gains; 4) when an individual faces a gain and a lost, whether the individual feels 
better by integrating or segregating the events depends upon their magnitudes. Figure 
3-2 illustrates the value function. 
 
A shareholder i will have greater wealth gain than his or her share of the money left on 
the table when the following condition is met: 
value 
change in wealth 
Chapter 3                                                                                              Literature Review 
62 
 
ሾݏ݄ܽݎ݁ݏݎ݁ݐܽ݅݊݁݀௜ ൅ ݏ݁ܿ݋݊݀ܽݎݕݏ݄ܽݎ݁ݏݏ݋݈݀௜ሿሾܱܲ െ݉݅݀݌݋݅݊ݐሿ ൅ݏ݄ܽݎ݁ݏݎ݁ݐܽ݅݊݁݀௜ሾܲ െ ܱܲሿ ൐ሾܲ െ ܱܲሿሾݏ݁ܿ݋݊݀ܽݎݕݏ݄ܽݎ݁ݏݏ݋݈݀௜ ൅ ݌ݎ݅݉ܽݎݕݏ݄ܽݎ݁ݏݏ݋݈݀ ቀ௦௛௔௥௘௦௥௘௧௔௜௡௘ௗ೔௦௛௔௥௘௦௥௘௧௔௜௡௘ௗቁሿ  
 
where P is the market price, OP is the offer price, primary shares sold are shares 
being sold by the firm, secondary shares soldi are existing shares being sold by 
shareholder i, and the shares retained are for all shareholders combined. When the 
above condition is met, a preissue shareholder will integrate the loss and the gain and 
accept high IPO underpricing. 
 
Liu and Ritter (2011) developed a model based on differentiated underwriting services 
to explain IPO underpricing. Following previous studies (e.g. Hoberg, 2007), the 
model assumes an imperfect underwriting market where underwriters collude and 
charge the same level of underpricing. The underlining rationale for the imperfect 
underwriting market is that issuers care about non-price dimensions of underwriting 
such as analyst coverage. Thus a limited number of underwriters that have the 
capacity to provide these non-price dimensions will acquire some market power and 
earn rents on the IPOs. In this case, the underwriting market can be characterised as a 
series of local oligopolies. 
 
In the model, the collusion underpricing is deduced as follows. ሶܷ ൌ ഥܷ ൅ ఊ஺ା஼ଶఊ , where ሶܷ
 is the collusion value of underpricing, ഥܷis the dollar amount of underpricing needed 
to compensate investors for the ex-ante uncertainties of issue valuation, C is the cost 
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of providing all-star analyst coverage and ߛ is the fraction of the money left on the 
table that is received by the underwriters.  
 
Under a trigger strategy proposed by Green and Porter (1984), these underwriters can 
maintain the collusive underpricing level given a sufficiently low discount rate i30, and 
underwriters with all-star analysts in an industry can form a local oligopoly and earn 
oligopoly profits. For an underwriter with an all-star analyst, the level of underpricing 
is  ሶܷ ൌ ഥܷ ൅ ఊ஺ା஼ଶఊ , and the underwriter without an all-star analyst charges ܷ ൌ ഥܷ. 
 
3.6.1.2. SEO Underpricing Models 
Compared with IPO theoretical models, theoretical models of SEO underpricing are 
fewer. Three important theoretical models are discussed in this section. Parsons and 
Raviv (1985) provided the first framework for information asymmetry in SEO 
underpricing. Their model assumes that a firm raises funds for a future investment 
with uncertain revenue. The formulation is based on two market stages, namely the 
competitive market in the old shares after the announcement and before the issue and 
the market with new issues sold on the part of the underwriter. The investors are 
GLYLGHG LQWR WZR W\SHV ZLWK GLIIHUHQW H[SHFWDWLRQV RI WKH UHYHQXH RI WKH ILUP¶V
investment. Based on these settings, the equilibrium price is calculated under different 
propositions.  
 
The insight gained from the model is that the market prices and the offer price are 
jointly determined in the equilibrium. As a result, the banker cannot simply set the 
                                                 
30
 Liu and Ritter assume there are three underwriters in the oligopoly. 
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offer price to correspond to the current market price. More importantly, the study 
points out that restriction against short selling is a critical assumption, showing that 
short-sale restrictions make existing share prices less informative and cause the 
underwriters to give larger discounts to counteract the uncertainty. As we will discuss 
in the following section, this important finding related to short-sale/price manipulation 
is cited frequently by many empirical studies (e.g. Corwin, 2003; Altinkilic and 
Hansen, 2003; Kim and Shin, 2004). 
 
Gerard and Nanda (1993) developed a model of manipulative informed trading around 
SEOs to explain SEO underpricing. The model follows the microstructure in Kyle 
(1985) and predicts that increases in selling prior to an SEO leads to increases in the 
PDUNHW PDNHU¶V LQYHQWRU\ DQG WHPSRUDU\ SULFH Gecreases. Specifically, informed 
traders attempt to manipulate offering prices by selling shares prior to the SEO, then 
they bid shares in the offerings at lower prices and profit subsequently. 
 
The equilibrium concept used in Gerard and Nanda (1993) is Sequential Nash. The 
underlining rationale is summarised as follows. Under risk neutrality, market makers 
will set the secondary market clearing price at: 
 
ொܲ ൌ ܧሾ ෨ܸ ȁܳሿ                                                                                                               (3.1) 
 
where ሾ෩ȁሿ represents the expectation of the asset value given the net order flow 
observed by market participants and cleared by the market maker Q.  
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The issuer will set the offering price ொܲכ  such that, given the observed net order flow in 
WKHVHFRQGDU\PDUNHWXQLQIRUPHGELGGHUV¶H[SHFWHGSD\RIIVIURPELGGLQJDUH]HUR 
 
ொܲכ ൌ ܧሾ ෨ܸ หܳሿ ൅ ஼௢௩ሾఈ෥ೆǡ௏෩ȁொሿாሾఈ෥ೆȁொሿ                                                                                          (3.2) 
 
where ߙ෤௎  represents the number of new shares allocated to uninformed bidders. 
According to equation (3.2), the offering price ொܲכ  is always lower or equal to the 
expected terminal value of the security conditional on all public information. 
 
ொܲכ ൑ ܧሾ ෨ܸ ȁܳሿ                                                                                                               (3.3) 
 
The informed investor may have negative or positive information about the offering. 
For the former case, the informed investor will always submit an order ܳଵି כ ൌ െ ?.31   
For the latter case there are three possible orders ܳଵାכ ൌ െ ?, ܳଵାכ ൌ  ?, and ܳଵାכ ൌ ൅ ?. 
Thus Gerard and Nanda (1993) summarise three pure strategy equilibria which are 
referred as equilibria M, PM and NM. Under each equilibrium, the net order flow can 
be ranged and then the market clearing price and offer price can be computed using 
equation (1) and (2) respectively. These results are listed in Table 3-9. 
 
The M equilibrium is the pure manipulation equilibrium. Under this equilibrium, ܳଵି כ ൌ െ ? and ܳଵାכ ൌ െ ?, which means the informed trader always sells in the 
                                                 
31
 Gerard and Nanda (1993) set five time points in the model. The subscript 1 for ଵܳି כ means time point 
1, which represents the time of trading in a secondary market. The superscript ±/+ represents the 
negative/positive information, and there is an assumption that the informed trader secondary market 
sales are restricted to -1 prior to the SEO. 
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secondary market regardless of whether the information is positive or negative. This 
strategy is still profitable for the informed trader as long as the loss from the 
secondary market trading is smaller than the additional gain from a lower issue price. 
The net order flow is ܳ א ሼെ ?ǡെ ?ǡ  ?ሽ. Under the M equilibrium, the net order flow is 
independent of the information and therefore is uninformative. The equilibrium 
market clearing price and offer price are denoted as ଴ܲ and ଴ܲכ.  
 
Table 3-9 SEO price and market clear price under three equilibria 
 
Q ொܲ ொܲכ  Conditions 
The M 
Equilibrium 
0, -1, -2 തܸ  ܸି ൅  ?ܸ ? ൅ ߚ ߙଵ ൒ ଵଶఊ ൈ ଵାఉఉ             (Ia) ߙ௟ஹ ൒ ଵାఊଶሺଵିఊሻ ൈ ଵାఉఉ     (Ib) 
The PM 
Equilibrium 
+1 ܸା ܸା ߙ௟ ൑ ቂ ? െଶఊሺଵିଶఊሻଵିఊ ቃ Ȁ ቈߛ ൅ ሺ ? െ
 ?ߛሻ ቂ ሺଵିଶఊሻሺଵିଶఊሻାఉఊ െ ఊఊାఉሺଵିଶఊሻቃ቉      
(IIa) ߙ௟ ൒ ఊమଵିఊ Ȁ ቂሺ ? െ  ?ߛሻ െሺଵିଷఊሻሺଵିଶఊሻሺଵିଶఊሻାఉఊ െ ఊమఊାఉሺଵିଶఊሻቃ                                   
(IIb) 
0 ܸି ൅  ?ܸ ? െ  ?ߛ ? െ ߛ ܸି ൅  ?ܸ ሺ ? െ  ?ߛሻሺ ? െ ߛሻ ൅ ߚߛ 
-1 ܸି ൅  ?ܸ ߛ ? െ ߛ ܸି൅  ?ܸ ߛሺ ? െ  ?ߛሻߚ ൅ ߛ 
-2 ܸି ܸି 
The NM 
Equilibrium 
+2, +1 ܸା ܸା ߙ௟ ൑ ఊሺଵାఉሻଶሾఉሺଵିଶఊሻାఊሿ,            (IIIa) ߙ௟ ൑ ଵሺଵିఊሻ,                         (IIIb) 0 ܸି ܸି ൅  ?ܸ  ? ? ൅ ߚ 
-2, -1 ܸି ܸି 
 
Furthermore, the PM equilibrium is the partial manipulation equilibrium. The optimal 
strategy for the informed trader is to not trade in the secondary market (ܳଵାכ ൌ  ?) if 
the information is positive (ܸା) and to submit an order ܳଵି כ ൌ െ ?if the information is 
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negative (ܸି). The net order flow is ܳ א ሼെ ?ǡ െ ?ǡ  ?ǡ ൅ ?ሽ. Last but not least, the NM 
equilibrium means non-manipulation equilibrium. Under this equilibrium, the 
informed trader will not conceal the information and profit from the secondary market 
trading directly. ܳଵାכ ൌ ൅ ? if the information is ܸା and ܳଵି כ ൌ െ ? if the information 
is ܸି. The net order flow is then ܳ א ሼെ ?ǡെ ?ǡ  ?ǡ ൅ ?ǡ ൅ ?ሽ. 
 
Besides pure strategy equilibria, Gerard and Nanda (1993) also considered two types 
of mixed equilibrium, namely MX1 and MX2. The informed trader with positive 
information mixes between trading ܳଵାכ ൌ െ ? and ܳଵାכ ൌ  ? in the equilibrium MX1 
while the informed trader mixes between trading ܳଵାכ ൌ  ? and ܳଵାכ ൌ ൅ ? in the 
equilibrium MX2. For both equilibria, the secondary market clearing prices and the 
offer prices are presented in Gerard and Nanda (1993). 
 
Recently, Chemmanur and Jiao (2011) developed a model of the SEO process. Similar 
to Gerard and Nanda (1993), the model starts from the SEO announcement, through 
pre-offer trading, and ends in the offering itself. But the model emphasises the role of 
institutional investors in the SEO process, especially their information production role. 
Chemmanur and Jiao (2011) propose a series of propositions based on the model, and 
among them, several propositions are directly related to SEO discount and 
underpricing. Specifically, the model predicts that 1) the issuer always offers an SEO 
discount to investors in the SEO equilibrium; 2) there is a positive link between the 
SEO discount and the extent of information asymmetry; 3) SEOs with greater pre-
offer net buying by institutional investors have higher institutional allocations, greater 
oversubscription and lower SEO discounts. 
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In the model, firm insiders hold all m shares of the all equity firm. The firm can be 
type H (the "high" type with cash flow of h at time 3) or type L (the "low" type with 
cash flow of l at time 3)32. Outsider investors believe that the firm is of type H with 
probability ߠ and of type L with probability  ? െ ߠ. For the type H and type L firms, 
with a probability ߙு and ߙ௅ respectively, a fraction ɉ of institutional investors who 
produce information receive good signals, whereas the remaining fraction (  ? െ ɉ) 
receive bad signals; with the complementary probability ( ? െ Ƚୌ) and ( ? െ Ƚ୐), a 
fraction ߜ  of institutional investors receive good signals, and (  ? െ Ɂ) receive bad 
signals. The model assumes that ߙு ൐ ߙ௅, and ɉ൐Ɂ. 
 
The equilibrium concept used in the model is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium surviving 
the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion. Two kinds of investors exist: institutional investors 
who can produce information at some cost and retailer investors without information 
production capacity. The model assumes three possible net demand states in the pre-
offer market: high (H), medium (M) and low (L), based on the combinations of 
demands of two kinds of investors33.  
 
Two scenarios are set in the model. Under the first scenario, the cost of SEO failure is 
not too large and firm insiders only need to provide the state-independent discount to 
induce institutional investors to produce information and consequently bid in the SEO. 
The expected profit for an institutional investor from trading in the pre-offer market is: 
                                                 
32
 Chemmanur and Jiao (2011) set up 4 time spots in the model. Time 3 is the time spot when all cash 
flows are realised and all information asymmetry is resolved 
33
 There are four states, namely high, high-low, low-high, and low. The high-low (low-high) state 
means the net demand of institutional investors is high (low) and that of noise traders is low(high). For 
simplicity, Chemmanur and Jiao (2011) impose the parameter restriction and refer to both low-high and 
high-low as the medium state. 
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ߨଵ ൌ ൫ߠሺߙுߣ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߙுሻߜሻ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߠሻሺߙ௅ߣ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߙ௅ሻߜሻ൯ߨଵீ ൅ ሺߠ൫ߙுሺ ? െ ߣሻ ൅ሺ ? െ ߙுሻሺ ? െ ߜሻ൯ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߠሻ൫ߙ௅ሺ ? െ ߣሻ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߙ௅ሻሺ ? െ ߜሻ൯ሻߨଵ஻                           (3.4) 
 
where ߨଵீ  and ߨଵ஻  are an institutional investor's expected profit from buying and 
selling in the pre-offer market respectively. 
 
An institutional investor's expected profit from bidding in the SEO is: 
 ߨଶ ൌ ሺߠߙு ൅ ሺ ? െ ߠሻߙ௅ሻ߶ଵߨଶ௎ ൅ ቀሺߠߙு ൅ ሺ ? െ ߠሻߙ௅ሻሺ ? െ ߶ଵሻ ൅ ൫ߠሺ ? െ ߙுሻ ൅ሺ ? െ ߠሻሺ ? െ ߙ௅ሻ൯߶ଵቁߨଶெ ൅ ൫ߠሺ ? െ ߙுሻ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߠሻሺ ? െ ߙ௅ሻ൯ሺ ? െ ߶ଵሻߨଶ஽             (3.5) 
 
where ߨଶ௎ , ߨଶெ  and ߨଶ஽  are the expected profits of an institutional investor from 
bidding in the SEO conditional on the high, medium and low states respectively.  
 
Total profit an institutional investor expects from trading in the pre-offer market and 
the SEO is: 
 ߨ ൌ ߨଵ ൅ ߨଶ                                                                                                               (3.6) 
 
To induce information production by institutional investors, ߨ ൒ ܿ , where ܿ  is the 
information production cost. 
 
For insiders of the type H firm, the equilibrium payoff is: 
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ߨு ൌ ߙு߶ଵሺ݌ଶ௎ݍ ൅ ሺ݉ െ ݍሻ݄ሻ ൅ ሺߙுሺ ? െ ߶ଵሻ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߙுሻ߶ଵ߶ଶሻሺ݌ଶெݍ ൅ሺ݉ െ ݍሻ݄ሻ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߙுሻሺ ? െ ߶ଵሻሺ݌ଶ஽ݍ ൅ ሺ݉ െ ݍሻ݄ሻ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߙுሻ߶ଵሺ ? െ ߶ଶሻሺ݌ଶெߜ݊ ൅ሺ݉ െ ߜ݊ሻ݄ െ ܭሻ                                                                                                         (3.7) 
 
Similarly, the equilibrium payoff for insiders of type L firm is: 
 ߨ௅ ൌ ߙ௅߶ଵሺ݌ଶ௎ݍ ൅ ሺ݉ െ ݍሻ݈ሻ ൅ ሺߙ௅ሺ ? െ ߶ଵሻ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߙ௅ሻ߶ଵ߶ଶሻሺ݌ଶெݍ ൅ ሺ݉ െ ݍሻ݈ሻ ൅ሺ ? െ ߙ௅ሻሺ ? െ ߶ଵሻሺ݌ଶ஽ݍ ൅ ሺ݉ െ ݍሻ݈ሻ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߙ௅ሻ߶ଵሺ ? െ ߶ଶሻሺ݌ଶெߜ݊ ൅ ሺ݉ െ ߜ݊ሻ݈ െܭሻ                                                                                                                                (3.8) 
 
where ݌ଶ௎, ݌ଶெ and ݌ଶ஽ represent the SEO offer prices for the high, medium and low 
states of the pre-offer market respectively, and ܭ is the cost of SEO failure. 
 
In equilibrium, ߨ ൌ ܿ , and firm insiders adjust the state-independent discount ݏ  to 
induce ݊ ൌ ௤ఒ institutional investors. Also, in equilibrium the payoff (ߨு and ߨ௅) for 
firm insiders is maximised. The state-independent discount ݏ ൐  ? and there is no 
additional state-dependent discount. 
 
Under the second scenario, the cost of SEO failure is sufficiently large. Besides the 
state-independent discount, firm insiders have to give an additional state-dependent 
discount for the medium state of the pre-offer market. The additional discount ܵ is set 
big enough that all institutional investors are induced to produce information and bid 
in the SEO. Therefore, there is zero probability of SEO failure. 
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The expected profit for an institutional investor in the second scenario is similar to 
that in the first scenario. The differences are ݌ଶெ- the SEO offer price for the medium 
state of the pre-offer market and ߨଶெ- the expected profit from bidding in the SEO 
conditional on the medium state. Since there is zero probability of SEO failure, the 
equilibrium payoff for insiders of the type H firm is: 
 ߨு ൌ ߙு߶ଵሺ݌ଶ௎ݍ ൅ ሺ݉ െ ݍሻ݄ሻ ൅ ሺߙுሺ ? െ ߶ଵሻ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߙுሻ߶ଵሻሺ݌ଶெݍ ൅ ሺ݉ െ ݍሻ݄ሻ ൅ሺ ? െ ߙுሻሺ ? െ ߶ଵሻሺ݌ଶ஽ݍ ൅ ሺ݉ െ ݍሻ݄ሻǤ                                                                       (3.9) 
 
Similarly, the equilibrium payoff for insiders of the type L firm is: 
 ߨ௅ ൌ ߙ௅߶ଵሺ݌ଶ௎ݍ ൅ ሺ݉ െ ݍሻ݈ሻ ൅ ሺߙ௅ሺ ? െ ߶ଵሻ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߙ௅ሻ߶ଵሻሺ݌ଶெݍ ൅ ሺ݉ െ ݍሻ݈ሻ ൅ሺ ? െ ߙ௅ሻሺ ? െ ߶ଵሻሺ݌ଶ஽ݍ ൅ ሺ݉ െ ݍሻ݈ሻǤ                                                                      (3.10) 
  
In equilibrium, ߨ ൌ ܿ and  ݊ ൌ ݍ. The state-independent discount ݏ is smaller than in 
the first scenario. For the medium demand state of the pre-offer market, the firm pays 
the state-independent discount ݏ and state-dependent discount ܵ. In sum, when the 
cost of SEO failure ܭ is sufficiently large, the SEO discount is ݏ for the high and low 
states of net demand and for the medium state it is ݏ ൅ ܵ . The state-independent 
discount ݏ ൐  ? and the additional state-dependent discount ܵ ൐  ?. 
 
3.6.2. Empirical Studies on SEO Underpricing 
According to the discussions above, most of the theoretical models on IPO/SEO 
underpricing are based on information asymmetry with various assumptions. However, 
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the limitation of theoretical models is apparent. That is, the explanation of IPO/SEO 
underpricing is often developed from one aspect and it is difficult to test the 
explanation directly. As mentioned in Chapter Two, SEO underpricing has become 
prevalent from the 1990s onwards. Correspondingly, during the same period, there 
have been a number of empirical studies on SEO underpricing. Generally, these 
studies can be categorised into two groups, namely long-run analysis of equity 
underpricing and determinants of SEO underpricing34. 
 
3.6.2.1. Long-run Analysis of Equity Underpricing 
The average underpricing for both IPOs and SEOs has experienced significant 
changes over the long-run. For instance, Lowry et al. (2010) document that the 
monthly mean of IPO initial returns for 1965-1980 was 12.1% while it was 25.8% for 
1991-200535. Autore (2011) reports that the SEO mean discounting increased from 
0.87% in 1982-1987 to 2.16% in 1988-1993, to 3.03% in 1994-1999 and to 3.20% in 
2000-2004. Several studies attempt to give explanations for these changes.  
 
Long-run IPO Underpricing Analysis 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) found that IPO average underpricing doubled from 7% 
during 1980-1989 to almost 15% during 1990-1998. Moreover, the mean underpricing 
of IPOs reached 65% in 1999-2000 and then reverted to 12% during 2001-2003. The 
study checked three hypotheses for the change in underpricing: 1) the changing risk 
composition hypothesis (Ritter, 1984); 2) the realignment of incentives hypothesis 
                                                 
34
 This group also includes studies focusing on effects of specific factor(s) on SEO underpricing. 
35
 Lowry et al (2010) define initial returns as the percentage change from the offer price to the closing 
price on the 21st day of trading in order to avoid the effects of price support. 
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(Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003); and 3) the changing issuer objective function 
hypothesis proposed by Loughran and Ritter (2004). The last of these argues that 
given the constant level of managerial ownership and other characteristics, issuers 
became more willing to accept underpricing. 
 
Two reasons are proposed to explain the changing issuer objective function hypothesis. 
The first reason is that issuers are willing to purchase analyst coverage with excessive 
underpricing. The second reason is the co-opting of decision-makers through side 
payments. Specifically, it refers to a practice where underwriters allocate hot IPOs to 
venture capitalists and the executives of issuing firms. The practice, known as 
spinning, began in the 1990s and became commonplace by the end of the decade. The 
empirical results show that 1) a small part of the increase in IPO underpricing can be 
attributed to the changing risk composition of issuers; 2) there is little support for the 
realignment of incentives hypothesis; 3) analyst coverage and side payments to CEOs 
and venture capitalists became of significant importance for underpricing during the 
internet bubble. 
 
Chambers and Dimson (2009) present a study on UK IPO underpricing over the very 
long term. The sample has 4540 IPOs on the LSE from 1917 to 2007, and the study 
divided these IPOs into three subperiods: 1917 to 1945, post-WWII (1946 to 1986) 
and post-Big Bang (1987 to 2007). Since there was a fundamental change in offer 
method on the LSE (from the fixed price offer method to the book-building) in the 
post-Big Bang period, the study concentrates the analysis on the first two subperiods. 
Thus the multiple regression analysis is based on 2553 IPOs between 1917 and 1986.  
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Chambers and Dimson (2009) employed four testable hypotheses to explain IPO 
underpricing, namely ex ante uncertainty (Loughran and Ritter, 2004), certification 
(Carter et al., 1998; Loughran and Ritter, 2004), disclosure and realigned incentives 
(Sherman and Titman, 2002). The study found that IPO underpricing increased 
markedly from 3.80% in the pre-WWII period (1917 to 1945) to 9.15% in the post-
WWII (1946 to 1986), and the increase in underpricing cannot be explained by the 
changing risk composition, sector risk, equity market conditions as well as the 
influence of underwriter reputation and investor protection.   
 
Regarding the increase of IPO underpricing over the first two subperiods, Chambers 
and Dimson (2009) suggest that other influences overwhelm any benefit from 
improved post-WWII regulation and disclosure. They argue that the increase of IPO 
underpricing might be attributed to three explanations. These explanations are the 
reduced level of trust between investors, issuers and sponsors after the Second World 
War, the increase of market power of investment banks, and the post-WWII growth of 
institutional equity investment.  
 
Recently, Lowry et al. (2010) proposed a study focusing on the relationship between 
the level of IPO initial return and IPO initial return volatility. They suggest that IPO 
initial return volatility could reflect the difficulty of pricing IPOs, and they found that 
1) the IPO initial return volatility fluctuates greatly over time; 2) there is a strong 
positive correlation between the mean and the volatility of initial returns over time. To 
explain why the IPO initial return volatility varies over time, Lowry et al. (2010) 
examined both variation of types of issuers and variation in market-wide conditions.   
 
Chapter 3                                                                                              Literature Review 
75 
 
For certain types of firms (young, small, and technology firms), underwriters might 
find it is difficult to price their IPOs. When the proportion of these types of firms is 
higher, IPO initial return variability should also be higher. Lowry et al. (2010) used 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) to estimate the influence of each characteristic 
on both the level and the uncertainty of firm-level initial returns. Empirical results 
suggest that when the types of issuers are especially difficult to value, both the mean 
and the variability of initial returns are relatively high.  
 
To examine whether there are likely to be additional time-series factors, Lowry et al. 
(2010) used ARMA models (Box et al., 2008) to account for residual autocorrelation 
and EGARCH models (Nelson, 1991) to account for residual heteroskedasticity. After 
adding the time-series terms, the coefficients of firm characteristics were still 
significant with expected signs. Thus, Lowry et al. (2010) conclude that firm 
characteristics that can be associated with greater uncertainty are reliably associated 
with higher, and more variable, initial returns. 
 
Moreover, the significance of the time-series parameters also suggests that other 
factors, such as market-wide conditions, have an important effect on IPO pricing. 
Lowry et al. (2010) used the NASDAQ time-series return volatility and the NASDAQ 
cross-section return volatility to capture the two dimensions of the monthly initial 
returns. Empirical results indicate that NASDAQ time-series return volatility to some 
extent helps explain the level and volatility of IPO initial returns. There is weak 
evidence for a positive relationship between average initial returns and the NASDAQ 
cross-sectional return volatility, and no evidence was found to support an incremental 
link between the NASDAQ cross-sectional return volatility and initial return volatility. 
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Long-run SEO Underpricing Analysis 
Mola and Loughran (2004) focus on the trend of the increase in SEO discount. They 
found that three hypotheses, namely changing issuer composition hypothesis, short-
selling hypothesis and leaving a good taste hypothesis, cannot fully explain the 
increasing SEO discount and they emphasise another explanation: increased 
investment banking power. The changing issuer composition hypothesis refers to the 
phenomenon that NASDAQ issues increasingly represent the SEO market. This 
K\SRWKHVLV LV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH YDULDEOH µ1ASDAQ-OLVWHG ILUPV¶ LQ $OWLQNLOLF DQG
Hansen (2003). Because NASDAQ issues often involve greater uncertainty than 
NYSE/Amex SEOs, more NASDAQ issues result in greater average SEO discounts. 
 
However, data analysis shows that NYSE/Amex SEO discounts also experienced a 
statistically significant increase during the sample period from 1986-1999. Thus, this 
hypothesis cannot fully explain why the average SEO discount was increasing. Mola 
and Loughran (2004) also found little evidence to support the short-selling hypothesis. 
Leaving a good taste hypothesis means big discounts are given because firms want to 
come back later for additional funding (Jegadeesh et al., 1993). The paper found that 
firms with no SEO in the prior year reported larger SEO discounts than firms with an 
SEO in the prior year, which provides some evidence for the hypothesis.  
 
Moreover, Mola and Loughran (2004) found evidence for increased investment 
banking power. They examined analyst coverage and the characteristics that determine 
the subsequent underwriter SEO market share. The study hypothesises that banks use 
analyst coverage to assist extracting rents from issuers and they document the 
evidence in market concentration in SEO underwriting industry. Regression results 
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confirm their argument that analyst coverage is becoming more important. To 
summarise, Mola and Loughran (2004) claim that they found support for the changing 
composition and the investment banker power hypotheses. However, as we will 
discuss thoroughly in Chapter Four, it is highly likely that Mola and Loughran (2004) 
ignored the problem of offer date correction in SDC database36. Therefore, to what 
extent this omission might affect their conclusions needs further investigation. 
 
Kim and Shin (2004) examined the trend of SEO underpricing from 1983 to 1998. 
They argue that the implementation of Rule 10b-21 by the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) on August 25, 1988 led to the increase of SEO 
underpricing. Their argument is based on theoretical models developed by Parsons 
and Raviv (1985) and Gerard and Nanda (1993). The implementation of the rule was 
intended to minimise manipulative short selling prior to SEOs. But Corwin (2003) and 
Kim and Shin (2004) report that the abnormal negative return even increased after the 
implementation of Rule 10b-21. The underlining rationale is that the rule actually 
restricted informational short sales and reduced the informativeness of prices, thereby 
increasing required underpricing. By introducing a dummy variable, Kim and Shin 
(2004) proved that the implementation of Rule 10b-21 had positive effects on SEO 
underpricing37. After exhausting all possible explanations they could find, Kim and 
Shin (2004) attribute the implementation of Rule 10b-21 to the increase of SEO 
underpricing.  
 
                                                 
36
 Other studies in SEO underpricing often use volume-based correction methods to deal with the 
problem of offer date correction (e.g. Corwin 2003; Kim and Shin 2004).  
37
 The dummy is equal to one if the offer is conducted before the implementation of Rule 10b-21 and 
zero otherwise. 
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Autore (2011) proposed three questions against theoretical models supporting the 
hypothesis that Rule 10b-21 increased SEO discounting: first, the share allocations for 
manipulative investors are not always guaranteed; second, despite the fact that 
informativeness could be affected by Rule 10b-21, underwriters can still use 
information collected in the book-building process to price the offer; third, Rule 10b-
21 has less effect on informed short sellers who have negative information than on 
informed short sellers who have favourable information.  
 
Due to the above concerns, Autore (2011) proposed a new test of the hypothesis that 
Rule 10b-21 increased SEO discounting. The test is based on the sample of shelf-
registered offers. Rule 10b-21 took effect on shelf-registered offers in September 2004 
and before that, shelf-registered offers were exempt. The results suggest that the 
discounting of shelf offers slightly decreases after the regulation takes effects. And 
Autore (2011) employed a difference-in-difference methodology to rule out the 
concern that the decrease in discounting is due to a market-wide effect.  
 
The study also re-examines the impact of the adoption of Rule 10b-21 in 1988 using 
rule-exempt shelf offers as a control group. The study shows that the rule seems to 
increase discounting in shelf offers by approximately the same amount that it 
increases discounting in traditional offers. The findings, along with other evidence, 
suggest that pre-issue short sale constraints do not increase SEO discounting. 
Moreover, the study argues that a greater prevalence of overnight shelf offers could 
explain why discounting was greater in the 2000s than in the 1990s. As market 
participants receive no advanced notice in overnight shelf offers, discounting in 
overnight offer is, on average, exaggerated compared to other offers. 
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3.6.2.2. Determinants of SEO underpricing 
Two studies present comprehensive analysis on the determinants of SEO underpricing. 
Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) divided the discounting into expected and surprise 
components38. In the expected part, their study summarises six variables identified 
from previous empirical models of expected underpricing in unseasoned offers. These 
variables are the amount of the offering (Barry et al., 1990; Dunbar, 1995; Hanley, 
1993), relative amount (Hansen, 2001), stock return volatility (Barry et al., 1990; 
Barry et al., 1991; Jegadeesh et al., 1993), stock price (Jegadeesh et al., 1993; Beatty 
and Welch, 1996), NASDAQ-listed firms and lead bank reputation (Smith, 1986; 
Booth and Smith, 1986; Carter and Manaster, 1990).  
 
Beside the variables identified in the literature, the model also included the inverse 
0LOOV¶ UDWLRDQGRWKHUSRVVLEOHYariables (industry-specific dummy variables, one for 
each two-digit SIC code, and dummy variables for each calendar year). Overall, six 
identified variables and the LQYHUVH 0LOOV¶ UDWLR were significant and none of the 
industry and offer-year dummy variable effects were statistically significant. As for 
the surprise component, the paper argues that offer-day returns are volatile and 
significantly negatively related to the discount surprise.  
 
Corwin (2003) also used multivariable models to test the determinants of underpricing 
for SEOs. He selected five determinants in the literature, namely uncertainty and 
asymmetric information, price pressure, preoffer price moves and manipulative 
                                                 
38
 As we will discuss in Chapter Four, the definitions of SEO underpricing are various in the literature. 
In Altinkilic and Hansen (2003), the discounting is defined as the close-to-offer return which is the 
same as the definition of SEO underpricing in Corwin (2003). 
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trading, transaction cost savings and underwriter pricing practices. He found that SEO 
underpricing is positively related to the level of uncertainty about firm value, but little 
evidence was found for a reliable relationship between SEO underpricing and proxies 
for asymmetric information such as firm size and bid-ask spread. Regarding the price 
pressure, the results suggest that underpricing is positively related to relative offer size, 
and the effect is most pronounced when the shares have relatively inelastic demand.  
 
As for the manipulative trading hypothesis, Corwin (2003) examined market-adjusted 
returns prior to the offer. The study uses the bid-ask spread to measure transaction cost 
savings. As discussed previously, little evidence is found between the variable of bid-
ask spread and underpricing. Unlike Altinkilic and Hansen (2003), this study adds the 
conventional underwriter pricing practices into the analysis. Considering offer price 
rounding, the study found strong evidence that seasoned offer prices tend to be 
rounded to even dollar amounts or $ 0.25 increments. The study also found evidence 
that the offer price is likely to be set at the closing bid quote for NASDAQ offers and 
at the closing transaction price for NYSE offers.  
 
Followed the above studies of SEO underpricing determinants, some studies have 
attempted to add new specific factors to the analysis of SEO underpricing. These 
studies often focus on the influence of some specific factors. These factors include 
new proxy of information asymmetry (Chemmanur and Yan, 2009) and the roles of 
institutional investors (Chemmanur et al., 2009),  as well as the role of underwriting 
syndicates (Jeon and Ligon, 2011; Huang and Zhang, 2011). 
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Chemmanur and Yan (2009) propose a new way to deal with information asymmetry 
in equity offerings. They argue that a firm faces asymmetric information in both the 
product and financial markets. When the firm needs external financing to fund its 
growth opportunities, the product market advertising is visible to financial markets as 
well and, in order to convey the product quality and the intrinsic value to customers 
and investors, the firm uses a combination of product market advertising, equity 
underpricing and underfinancing 39 . Under that rationale, they found that product 
market advertising and equity underpricing are substitutes for a firm issuing new 
equity. They tested this prediction with a sample of 1517 equity offerings (884 IPOs 
and 633 SEOs) from 1990 to 2000 and found supporting evidence in the context of 
firms making IPOs and SEOs40.  
 
Another recent study dealing with information asymmetry and the roles of institutions 
in SEOs is Chemmanur et al. (2009). The study proposes two possible roles for 
institutions with private information about SEOs, namely a manipulative trading role 
(e.g. Gerard and Nanda, 1993) and an information production role (e.g. Chemmanur 
and Jiao, 2011). For the latter role, institutions produce information about issuers and 
request allocations in SEOs about which they obtain favourable private information.  
 
By using a large sample of transaction-level institutional data, they found evidence for 
an information production role of institutions instead of a manipulative trading role. 
Specifically, they found that more pre-offer institutional net buying and larger 
                                                 
39
 They refer to underfinancing as raising a smaller amount of external capital than the full information 
optimum. 
40
 The study required relative data from Compustat. Therefore the sample size is greatly reduced. 
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institutional allocations are associated with a smaller SEO discount. This result 
suggests that institutions increase allocations when they have more favourable 
information about the long-term prospects of the issuers, leading to smaller SEO 
underpricing. It is worth mentioning that the sample used by Chemmanur et al. (2009) 
only covers SEOs from 1999 to 2004 and their conclusion does not have direct 
implications on the increase of SEO underpricing during the past two decades. 
 
Jeon and Ligon (2011) examine the role of co-manager in underwriting syndicates. 
The study proposes two hypotheses based on the number and characteristics of co-
managers. First, the number of co-managers in the syndicate is negatively associated 
with SEO underpricing. Second, highly reputable underwriters, when they serve as co-
managers, may help reduce SEO underpricing. Both hypotheses emphasise the 
certification roles of underwriters. For the second hypothesis, commercial banks 
serving as co-managers could use their proprietary information to improve the quality 
of certification and thus reduce SEO underpricing. 
 
Jeon and Ligon (2011) ran the OLS, 2SLS, and treatment effects regressions. 
Empirical results show that adding a co-manager significantly reduces underpricing by 
0.2% in the OLS while the effect is insignificant after controlling for the endogenous 
choice of the number of co-managers by using 2SLS. As for the characteristics of co-
managers, the results indicate that underpricing decreases by 1.0% and 1.9% by the 
presence of prestigious co-managers in the OLS and treatment effects regressions. 
SEO underpricing decreases by about 0.5% when commercial banks are included as 
co-managers in the syndicate. The above results suggest that effect of the number of 
co-managers on SEO underpricing is insignificant after controlling for endogeneity of 
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syndicate structure, and characteristics of co-managers have significant effects on 
reducing SEO underpricing.  
 
Huang and Zhang (2011) checked the marketing efforts of SEOs by underwriters. The 
marketing efforts can influence the demand of SEO shares in the primary market and 
thus lower the offer price discount. Huang and Zhang (2011) used the number of 
managing underwriters in an SEO syndicate, including lead managers and co-
managers, as a proxy of marketing efforts provided by underwriters. They found that 
the natural logarithm of the number of managers is negatively related to the SEO 
discount. They also found that the marginal benefits of additional managers are greater 
when the relative offer size is larger and the stock return volatility is higher. These 
results are more consistent with the marketing hypothesis than with the information 
production hypothesis. 
 
Huang and Zhang (2011) also provide further support for the marketing hypothesis by 
examining the effects of investor networks on SEO discount. They define the variable 
of investor networks as the number of relationship investors of the co-managing 
underwriter(s). A relationship investor is defined as an investor that participated in at 
least 10 SEOs in the 5 years prior to the current SEO, with at least one underwriter in 
the syndicate being a lead or co-managing underwriter, and a participant is recognised 
if it has increased its holding of the stock after the SEO. They found that the SEO 
discount decreases by 0.46% when there is a 1 standard deviation increase in the 
natural logarithm 1+ the number of co-manager relationship investors. The results 
provide strong support for the marketing role of investment banks in bookbuilt SEOs. 
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3.6.3. Explanations for SEO Underpricing 
Following on from the discussions above, this section presents a further analysis of 
several important explanations of SEO underpricing and discounting. We summarise 
six factors of SEO underpricing for which there is robust evidence in the literature. 
According to the literature, two factors may have contributed to the increase of SEO 
underpricing during the past two decades. They are investment banking power and the 
implementation of Rule 10b-21. In Chapter Five, we will conduct a thorough 
investigation of these two explanations and possible hypotheses for the increase of 
SEO underpricing. 
 
3.6.3.1. Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry seems the most popular explanation in IPO pricing. Loderer et 
al. (1991) point out that many of the information asymmetry models in IPO pricing 
can be extended to the case of SEO. However, the results from recent empirical tests 
suggest that information asymmetry is likely to be a smaller problem for SEO pricing. 
These studies involve a variety of measures in information asymmetry. For instance, 
Corwin (2003) measured the information problem by firm size and the bid-ask spread. 
There is little evidence about a reliable relationship between information asymmetry 
and these two variables. Huang and Zhang (2011) used the logged pre-issue market 
capitalisation as a control variable for information asymmetry and found that the 
market capitalisation parameter is positively related to SEO discount at a statistically 
significant level. 
 
Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) used three pricing measures to assess whether 
information during the registration period is incorporated in the discounting. The 
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results show that expected discounting increases when more positive private 
information is released during the registration period. Moreover, Liu and Malatesta 
(2005) used debt ratings as measures of asymmetric information. Their study found 
that firms with credit ratings are underpriced less and they suggest that credit ratings 
reduce information asymmetry in equity offerings. To summarise, prior studies 
suggest information asymmetry is not an important consideration in SEO pricing.  
 
3.6.3.2. Uncertainty about Firm Value 
Uncertainty about firm value or price uncertainty is often measured by stock return 
volatility. Some studies include stock return volatility into the proxies of information 
asymmetry. For instance, Drucker and Puri (2005) and Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) 
used stock return volatility to measure information asymmetry. However, Lee and 
Masulis (2009) point out that stock return volatility is likely to capture other economic 
effects beyond asymmetric information. That is, stock return volatility can also be 
used to measure uncertainty and is influenced by industry and economy wide shocks. 
Therefore, stock return volatility is regarded as a measure of uncertainty in the 
following discussion.  
 
Corwin (2003) employed stock return volatility as the proxy for price uncertainty. 
Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the 30 trading 
days ending 11 days prior to the issue. The study suggests that SEO underpricing is 
positively related to the level of uncertainty about firm value and price uncertainty 
plays a significant role in SEO pricing. Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) also found strong 
evidence that stock return volatility is positively related to the SEO discount.  
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Volatility of secondary market return is widely used as a control variable in recent 
studies. For instance, Chemmanur et al. (2009) define volatility as the standard 
GHYLDWLRQRIWKHLVVXHUV¶VWRFNUHWXUQGXULQJWKHSUHYLRXVWUDGLQJGD\VHnding 42 
trading days before the offering. They found that the volatility was significantly 
positively related to SEO discount in all regressions. Similarly, Huang and Zhang 
(2011) define the volatility in the same way as Corwin (2003) and found that volatility 
was significantly positively associated with SEO discount. 
 
3.6.3.3. Price Pressure 
Price pressure refers to the effects of more outstanding shares. The effects can be 
either permanent or temporary. According to the discussions in Corwin (2003), if the 
demand curve for the shares of the issuing firm is downward sloping, the increase in 
supply will result in a permanent decrease in stock price. This is called downward-
sloping demand or permanent price pressure. As pointed out by some studies (Scholes, 
1972; Mikkelson and Partch, 1985), a permanent stock price decrease may not take 
place on the issue day. As for the temporary price pressure, since a seasoned offer 
brings a temporary liquidity shock, a discount is required to compensate investors for 
absorbing the additional shares (Corwin, 2003).  
 
Price pressure is often measured by the offer size or relative offer size. Hansen (2001) 
documents that underpricing increases with the relative amount of IPOs. Altinkilic and 
Hansen (2003) define relative amount as the gross proceeds with regard to the market 
value of equity, measured one week before the offer day. They found that discounting 
is higher for relatively larger amounts. Chemmanur and Jiao (2011) use a similar 
definition to Altinkilic and Hansen (2003). Although they report a positive 
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relationship between relative offer size and SEO discount, the coefficients are 
insignificant.  
 
Corwin (2003) and Huang and Zhang (2011) define relative offer size as the number 
of shares offered over the total number of shares outstanding before the offer. Both 
studies report that the relative offer size is significantly positively associated with 
SEO discount. Corwin (2003) also recorded a significant price drop in the days prior 
to the offer and a significant price recovery following the offer. Thus, there is little 
evidence to support permanent price pressure. But the results of the empirical test 
strongly support the hypothesis that SEO underpricing reflects temporary price 
pressure.  
 
3.6.3.4. Short-selling and Manipulative Trading 
Barclay and Litzenberger (1988) proposed the short-selling hypothesis. Using intraday 
price data during 1981-1983, they recorded a price pattern, that is, an average 1.5% 
price decline accompanied by abnormally high trading volume in a short period (15 
minutes) after an announcement. The price drop was followed by a significant 
recovery of 1.5% after the issue day. This provides some evidence for the argument 
that investors depress stock prices through short-selling to affect the offer price of new 
equity issues. Moreover, Gerard and Nanda (1993) point out that this manipulative 
trading might reduce the informativeness of secondary market prices before the 
offering and force the firm to offer a high discount in order to market its new shares.  
 
Corwin (2003) divides the research period into two parts by the implementation of 
Rule 10b-21. This study found no evidence that large price drop prior to the offer date 
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led to more underpricing before Rule 10b-21 was implemented. After the 
implementation of Rule 10b-21, it records that large price moves in either direction 
led to more underpricing. Corwin attributes this pattern to the increased short sale 
restrictions and more uncertainty. This conclusion is also supported by Kim and Shin 
(2004). They claim that after exhausting all possible explanations, they still found that 
there was a significant increase of SEO underpricing between the periods before and 
after the implementation of Rule 10b-21. Therefore, they conclude that the 
implementation of Rule 10b-21 reduced the informativeness of market prices, leading 
to more risks and higher SEO underpricing.  
 
However, Mola and Loughran (2004) argue that if manipulative pressures exist, the 
inefficiency is expected to be eliminated after the offering. They then examined the 
distributions of 1TP , TP  and 1TP , where 1TP  is the prior closing price, TP is the 
closing price of the issue day, and 1TP  is the day after. These three distributions are 
quite similar, thus the results of effects of manipulative pressures are mixed in the 
literature.  
 
3.6.3.5. Price Clustering and Investment Banking Power 
Some studies suggest that equity offer pricing is significantly affected by price 
clustering. That is, offer prices are likely to be set at integers. Lee et al. (1996) 
document a tendency to set offer prices down to the nearest eighth or integer value. 
Bradley et al. (2004) found that IPOs priced at integer generate higher first-day returns 
than those priced on dollar fractions. This might reflect the desire of the underwriter to 
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reduce the costs of negotiation. Moreover, they argue that clustering at integers is a 
way to compensate the underwriter for increased uncertainty.  
 
Corwin (2003) tested the effects of price rounding by examining the relationship 
between underpricing and price level. If price rounding is important, underpricing is 
expected to be negatively related to price level. The empirical test found strong 
evidence that offer prices tend to be rounded to even dollar amounts or $0.25 
increments. Mola and Loughran (2004) confirm that SEOs priced at integer have a 
larger average discount than those priced at fractions. Moreover, their empirical test 
showed the use of integer offer prices in IPOs increased over time during 1986-1999. 
IPOs priced at integer had an average first-day return of 21.4% while those priced at 
fractions had an average first-day return of 8.9%.  
 
In contrast with prior studies, Mola and Loughran (2004)  include the clustering of 
SEO prices as evidence of increased investment banking power. Mola and Loughran 
add that analyst coverage is an important explanation of increased SEO discounting. 
Their study also discussed characteristics that determine the subsequent underwriter 
SEO market share. They document the evidence in market concentration in the SEO 
underwriting industry. The underlying idea is that big banks have more influential 
analysts and have more customers in other areas. Firms prefer to choose familiar 
analysts who will issue favourable and influential reports. As a result, big banks are 
taking more market shares and have more pricing power in SEOs, but Altinkilic and 
Hansen (2003) found that the discounting is smaller for issues having a more reputable 
bank leading the underwriting syndicate.  
 
Chapter 3                                                                                              Literature Review 
90 
 
Price clustering at integer is recognised as an important control variable by a number 
of studies. For instance, Chemmanur et al. (2009), Jeon and Ligon (2011), Autore 
(2011) and  Huang and Zhang (2011) all include a dummy variable that equals one if 
an offer is priced at an integer and zero otherwise. The coefficients of this variable are 
strongly significant in regressions in all of the above studies.  
 
3.6.3.6. NASDAQ-Listed Firms  
Firms listed in NASDAQ and NYSE differ in many aspects. For example, NYSE 
listed firms are often larger and their shares are traded more actively. Corwin (2003) 
points out that NYSE issues represent a smaller fraction of the existing firm. In his 
sample, NYSE offered shares took an average 16% of pre-issue shares outstanding 
while NASDAQ offered shares averaged 26.8% of pre-issue shares outstanding. 
Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) also included a NASDAQ dummy into their empirical 
model and conclude that expected SEO discounting is larger for NASDAQ firms. 
Mola and Loughran (2004) also suggest that NASDAQ-listed issues are associated 
with greater discounts. In their sample, a NASDAQ dummy was significant through 
all the sub sample periods.  
 
Recent studies report insignificant influences of the NASDAQ dummy on SEO 
discount or underpricing. For instance, Jeon and Ligon (2011) found weak evidence 
that issuers listed on the NASDAQ have higher SEO underpricing than others. Autore 
(2011) also reports an insignificantly positive relation between the NASDAQ dummy 
and SEO discount in his sample. Huang and Zhang (2011) used a similar dummy that 
equals one if issuers are listed on NYSE or AMEX and zero otherwise. They also 
report that the dummy is insignificantly related to SEO discount.  
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3.7. Liquidity Shocks, Liquidity and Liquidity Risk  
As mentioned in the previous section, one determinant of SEO underpricing-price 
pressure needs more discussion. As suggested by Corwin (2003), a seasoned offer 
could be viewed as both permanent price pressure and temporary liquidity shock that 
must be absorbed by the market. Moreover, Corwin argues that permanent price 
effects should occur on the announcement day rather than the issue day due to market 
efficiency. Thus, it is reasonable to refer to the seasoned offer as a temporary liquidity 
shock to be absorbed by investors. This idea is consistent with Scholes (1972) and 
Mikkelson and Partch (1985). Under that rationale, liquidity shocks can be viewed as 
the extension of price pressure to some extent. In this section, we discuss the 
differences between liquidity shocks, liquidity and liquidity risk.  
 
In the literature, there are various concepts of liquidity shocks. For instance, studies on 
mutual funds or hedge funds often regard cash withdrawals or fund inflows as 
liquidity shocks (e.g. Ding et al., 2009). Studies on liquidity premium refer to a 
liquidity shock as a sudden drop in wealth or a surprise need for funding (e.g.  Huang, 
2003). Some studies on liquidity of stock markets assume that liquidity shocks are 
caused by selling large amounts of assets immediately (e.g.  Da and Gao, 2010; Coval 
and Stafford, 2007). Under this rationale, liquidity shocks can be regarded as a 
temporary imbalance between supply and demand of the underlying securities. 
Because this definition is consistent with Corwin (2003), we adopt it.  
 
It is worth distinguishing liquidity shocks, liquidity and liquidity risks. Liquidity can 
affect the cross-sectional differences of asset return through two channels (Lee, 2011). 
One is to refer to liquidity as a characteristic. Studies referring to liquidity as a 
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characteristic investigate the relationship between the expected return and the liquidity 
of the underlying shares. For instance, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) used the bid-
ask spread to measure the liquidity and found that market-observed average return is 
an increasing function of the spread. Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) estimated 
measures of illiquidity from intraday transaction data. They found a significantly 
positive relationship between required rates of return and measures of illiquidity after 
adjusting for the Fama and French risk factors and also after accounting for the effects 
of stock price level.  
 
Amihud (2002) proposed a novel measure of illiquidity ± the average across stocks of 
the daily ratio of absolute stock return to dollar volume. The advantage of that 
measure is its availability, since the measure can be easily obtained from daily stock 
data for long time series in most stock markets. The study shows that expected market 
illiquidity positively affects ex ante stock excess return. The other channel is to regard 
liquidity as a risk factor (e.g.  Pástor and Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and Pedersen, 
2005; Liu, 2006; Sadka, 2006; Watanabe and Watanabe, 2008). These studies use 
market wide liquidity as a state variable that affects expected stock returns.  
 
Liquidity risk cannot be observed directly. For instance, after sorting the portfolio 
based on the specific liquidity measure, the return difference between the least liquid 
decile and the most liquid decile remains significant, indicating the possible existence 
of liquidity premium. If the liquidity premium cannot be explained by the asset pricing 
model (e.g. CAPM or Fama-French three-factor model), the liquidity premium is 
shown to exist, and there should then be liquidity risks which are compensated by 
liquidity premium. In short, liquidity and liquidity risks are related but they are 
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different terms. Liquidity is used to measure some characteristic of the underlying 
shares and liquidity risk is the risk caused by market wide liquidity which should be 
compensated by liquidity premium.   
 
3.8. Immediacy Cost and SEO Underpricing 
Butler, Grullon and Weston (2003) investigated the effects of liquidity on investment 
EDQNV¶ IHHs. In their study, they assume that the investment bank's role is similar in 
spirit to that of the market makers who line up buyers and sellers to facilitate the 
intermediation process. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that underwriters face 
similar inventory risks as market makers do. Chacko et al. (2008) suggest that such 
inventory risks can be compensated by the immediacy cost and they propose a limit 
order model which is derived from real options modelling. By developing such a 
model, they raise the possibility of calculating the immediacy cost accurately at for the 
first time in the literature. In this section, we introduce the limit order model and 
discuss its assumptions41.  
 
3.8.1. Introduction of the Limit Order Model 
If the demand flow of an order can be estimated accurately, then the immediacy cost 
paid by the transaction initiator can be calculated by the limit order model proposed 
by Chacko et al. (2008). The underlying idea of the model is to incorporate option 
theory into the transaction cost calculation. That is, a limit order can be viewed as an 
American call option. In a transaction, the seller of shares (investor) is the option 
                                                 
41
 We attempt to apply the limit order model in SEO pricing. However, the results are not favourable. 
Detailed discussions are attached in the Appendix 3. 
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writer and the seller of shares (market maker) is the option owner. The seller can sell 
the shares through two ways. One is to sell the shares to the market maker; the other is 
to sell the shares to other investors in the market. However, the opposite flow from 
other investors arrives stochastically. Therefore, it cannot be regarded as a reliable 
source for transaction.  
 
If the seller requires an immediate transaction, the seller should set a price much lower 
than the current price. The buyer can accept this price or wait for the opposing order in 
the market and so the limit order is effectively an American call for buyer of shares. If 
the buyer accepts the bid, the buyer indeed takes the option and receives the 
underlying asset, while the seller sends the option and transfers the underlying asset. 
The market maker then absorbs these shares and resells them in the market.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-3 Real option in limit order model 
 
 
An Investor 
Other Investors 
Market Makers 
Opposite flow arrives 
stochastically 
(This is unreliable for 
immediate transaction) 
Option 
Writer 
Option 
Owner 
A limit 
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In this way, the seller obtains liquidity and the market maker should be rewarded for 
providing liquidity. At the same time, the seller (option writer) must offer a price at 
which it is currently optimal for the option owner to exercise the option immediately. 
If the transaction occurs, the option writer (investor) sells the stock immediately and 
transfers all the price risk to the buyer. The buyer assumes all the price risk. Because 
the model is structured through a limit order, it is also called limit order model. This 
process is illustrated in Figure 3-3.  
 
Table 3-10 Comparison between traditional option and real option in limit order 
 Traditional Option Real Option in Limit Order 
Underlying Asset 
Shares  
or Other Financial Assets 
Shares 
The Option Type 
American Call 
In/At/Out the Money 
American Call 
In the Money 
The Option Writer 
Sell the option, 
receive the premium (option price) 
and assume the upward price risk 
Investors 
send the option, 
and assume the upward price risk 
The Option Owner 
Buy the option, 
pay the premium (option price) 
and hedge the upward price risk 
Market Maker 
receive the option, 
and hedge the upward price risk 
Period 
Different time period (e.g. 3 months, 6 
months) 
Immediacy 
At exercise time, 
the Option Owner 
Receive the payoff from the option 
writer if option is exercised,  
loss premium if option is yet exercised 
 
Take and Exercise option at the 
same time. Receive the underlying 
asset and pay discounted price 
(strike price). 
 
At exercise time, 
the Option Writer 
Assume the loss if option exercised, 
obtain the premium if option is yet 
exercised. 
Send and exercise option and 
receive at the same time. Transfer 
underlying asset and receive 
discount price (strike price). 
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3.8.2. Comparison between Traditional Option and Real Option in Limit Order 
In Table 3-10, a comparison is made between a straightforward option and real option 
in limit order. The most obvious difference is the time period of the option. The real 
option in limit order requires immediate exercise. The difference arises due to the 
different roles between two kinds of options. Plain options are used to hedge risk, 
while the real option in limit order is mainly use to provide liquidity for the seller. For 
plain options, size or volume is not a pricing factor. However, for the limit order 
model, offer size and arrival rate of opposing order are critical for pricing.  
 
3.8.3. Assumptions of Limit Order Model 
The limit order model has several assumptions that need to be considered in order to 
apply it in this study. First of all, it requires a price-driven market structure. A price-
driven market is a market where market makers maintain an inventory of securities 
and continuously quote prices at which they will buy (the bid price) and sell (the ask 
price). Customers choose the best price quotes, and the competition among the market 
makers promotes the best price. The US NASDAQ is a price-driven market. The 
NYSE, the biggest market in the world, is a combination of an order-driven and price-
driven system. The monopolist position provides a market maker the privilege of 
meeting the limit order at the first time. Although the option is available to both the 
market maker and opposing order flow, only the market maker can be regarded as a 
reliable source to supply immediacy at any given time because opposing order flow 
arrives stochastically.  
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The second assumption is that the opposing order arrival rate is stochastic. In other 
words, the study does not assume time-varying arrival rate. The instantaneous 
probability of observing a Q-share buy (sell) imbalance during the next instant is 
given by dtQ)(O . The arrival rate of opposing order flow is a function of the order 
quantity Q. In particular, it applies a simple assumption about arrival rate. That is, the 
expected waiting time for the completion of a Q-share order is precisely Q times 
larger than the corresponding waiting time for a one-share order. This is a relatively 
strong assumption but can bring advantages in model estimation.  
 
The third assumption is the impatience of the trader initiator. This assumption is 
critical for the model. When a seller has no patience in the transaction, the biggest 
discount is given to ensure an immediate transaction. Moreover, Chacko et al. (2008) 
point out that only when zero patience is assumed can the model give analytic results. 
7KHDVVXPSWLRQRILPSDWLHQFHDOVRLPSOLHVWKH³RQH-VKRWH[HFXWLRQ´7KDWLVLWLVQRW
possible for a limit order to be filled by a sequence of partial fills. This simplification 
also facilitates the calibration of the mean inter-arrival time of opposing orders. 
 
The final assumption is that the limit order writer cannot cancel the limit orders. Due 
to this assumption, the option becomes perpetual. Cancellation occurs when the limit 
order is filled by the opposing order. This seems a demanding assumption, however, it 
also brings the advantage of generating analytic results. 
 
Chapter 3                                                                                              Literature Review 
98 
 
3.8.4. Model Discussion 
The limit order model42 depends on three factors: (1) market structure; (2) arrival rate 
of opposing order; (3) the evolution of the fundamental value. Because these factors 
have complex dynamics in reality, the limit order model is constructed in a reduced-
form. The model gives the percentage immediacy cost as follows: 
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where tV is the fundamental value of the shares, )0,(  DQKB  is the bid price for the 
Q shares when sellers has zero impatience 
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where r is the risk free rate, V is stock return volatility, )(QBO is the opposing arrival 
rate for Q shares. 
 
According to the second assumption,  1)1()(  QQ BB OO  (the expected waiting time 
for the completion of a Q-share order is precisely Q times larger than the 
corresponding waiting time for a one-share order). In particular, whenever: 
 
rQB !!)(O ,  V
OOI )(2)( Q
B
B | .  
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 The derivation of the model is given in Appendix 3.  
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So the percentage immediacy cost )1(2)( B
QQp OV| .                                            (3.13) 
 
This approximate formula illustrates the relationship between immediacy cost and 
those variables. The bid-ask spreads increase with the volatility of the underlying 
shares. Larger transactions (larger Q) effectively require the immediacy demander to 
write longer maturity and therefore more valuable options, which translates into 
greater transaction costs. In particular, when order flow arrives at an infinite rate, the 
liquidity in the market is infinite. The monopolist position of the market maker 
collapses and the price of immediacy is zero for any quantities. All these predictions 
could find some support from empirical evidence.  
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CHAPTER 4: DATA AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
 
In this chapter, the data used in this thesis are discussed. Because sampling procedures 
have important effects on the results, the sampling procedures employed in several 
studies are discussed first, and then the sampling procedures of this study are proposed. 
After that, the offer date correction problem in the SDC data base is discussed, and 
then the differences in the concept of underpricing among various studies are 
discussed. Finally, descriptive statistics are presented.  
 
4.1. Sampling Procedures used by Several Important Studies 
As discussed in Chapter Two, this study focuses on seasoned equity offerings in the 
US market. There are some differences in the sample selections made by several 
important studies on SEO underpricing (discount) in the US market. In this section, 
these differences are presented, and then the possible impacts on results are discussed. 
 
Mola and Loughran (2004) used a sample of 4,814 US SEOs from the period 1986-
1999.43 Their sample selection began with all common stock seasoned equity offerings 
by US operating companies from January 1986 to December 1999 provided by the 
Securities Data Company (SDC) 44 , then closed-end investment funds, real estate 
investment trusts (REITs) and unit investment trusts, beneficial interests, limited 
                                                 
43
 In the regression analysis, only 4,417 US SEOs were available due to the missing data for some 
variables. 
44
 The database is also referred to as SDC Platinum in some studies. 
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partnership and American Depository Receipts (ADRs), rights and unit issues were 
excluded.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, closed-end investment funds and real estate investment 
trusts (REITs) and unit investment trusts are different from the common offerings and 
the deletion is reasonable. As for ADRs, they are often issued by foreign companies. 
Due to the differences in regulations and operational environments between countries, 
ADRs are often excluded from the sample. Rights issues are exclusive to the existing 
shareholders, which is different from the common issues that any investors in the 
market can buy. Therefore, it is reasonable to exclude rights issues from the sample. 
Since unit issues are a combination of different classes of shares, the pricing 
mechanism is also different from common shares.  
 
After excluding the above types of equity offerings, the sample is further constrained 
on offerings made by firms listed on the NYSE, Amex, or NASDAQ. In other words, 
the offerings issued on the OTC markets and small exchanges in the US are 
excluded45. The reason for this exclusion is that shares traded in those markets are 
often less liquid than the major markets and the issuer qualities are often low. These 
characteristics could affect the pricing of the offerings. Finally, due to missing SDC 
closing prices on the day before the issue, 222 offerings are excluded. 
 
The sample selected by Mola and Loughran (2004) contained a large number of 
offerings. However, two points remain unclear about the selection. First, primary 
                                                 
45
 Those small exchanges include, for instance, the Boston and Chicago Exchange. 
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stock offerings and combination primary-secondary stock offerings, and pure 
secondary stock offerings are all included in the sample. As discussed in Chapter Two, 
pure secondary stock offerings do not bring any cash for the issuing firm46. This sort 
of offering does not serve the purpose of raising capital. Many studies into SEOs (e.g., 
Corwin, 2003; Kim and Shin, 2004) exclude pure secondary stock offerings due to this 
consideration. Second, the study does not mention whether data from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data were used. In the SDC database, trading 
information for the shares, such as price, volume, bid, and ask price, is only available 
on the issue day or not available at all. It is impossible to calculate some important 
variables, such as volatility and bid-ask spread. More importantly, as will be discussed 
in Section 4.4., without daily trading information it is difficult to identify the 
uncorrected issue dates in the SDC database. 
 
Corwin (2003) began his sample selection with the full sample of US common stock 
offerings from January 1st 1980 to December 31st 1998. He excluded IPOs, units, 
rights, mutual conversions, and issues by non-US firms, closed-end funds and utilities. 
The criteria are similar to those of Mola and Loughran (2004). However, Mola and 
Loughran included utilities in their sample. Other studies, for example Altinkilic and 
Hansen (2003), did not include utilities. After the above selection, Corwin (2003) 
obtained additional data from the CRSP. In that database, the daily trading 
information (such as price, volume and SIC code) about the shares of the issuing firm 
is available.  
                                                 
46
 Bortolotti et al. (2008) note that most empirical studies screen out pure secondary offers due to either 
deliberate choice (to examine only shares issued by firms) or an inherent objective of examining 
capital-raising choices (as in studies of rights offerings or shelf registrations). 
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Corwin excluded issues that had fewer than 30 days of trading data prior to the offer 
on CRSP. He screened out all pure secondary offers and only considered offerings 
with shares listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ. Offerings with an offer price less than 
$3.00 and more than $400.00 were excluded from the sample. Due to the need to 
investigate the effects of cumulative market-adjusted returns (CAR) on SEO 
underpricing, the offers for which a stock split occurred during the 11-day window 
surrounding the offer date were excluded. Moreover, Corwin (2003) pointed out the 
possible data mistakes made by SDC and proposed a method to deal with outliers. In 
the sample, issues with underpricing of more than 60% were regarded as outliers. This 
method is also adopted by Bowen et al. (2008), who excluded offers with absolute 
value of underpricing more than 50%. 
 
Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) collected two samples of SEOs. One sample included 
SEOs from 1990 to 1997 and the other, SEOs from 1980-1984. The criteria of sample 
selection were the same for both samples. Only firm-underwritten, syndicated offers 
were included. They included utility firms but excluded all regulated firms and 
financial firms47. They also excluded shelf offers and offers that had warrant, and unit 
offers. Small issues with proceeds under $10 million were excluded from the sample. 
Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) also collected daily transaction data from CRSP. 
However, the study does not mention whether their sample excluded pure secondary 
offerings or offerings made by non-US firms (their first sample contained 1703 
offerings).  
 
                                                 
47
 In their sample, regulated firms are defined as SIC codes equal to 400s and financial firms are 
defined as SIC codes equal to 600s. 
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Kim and Shin (2004) used a sample of 3304 SEOs from 1983 to 1998. The starting 
point was chosen as 1983 because SEC filing dates are only reported for offerings 
since 1983. In their sample, IPOs, right issues, unit offerings, simultaneous 
international offerings, shelf-registered offerings, and offerings made by private firms, 
financial firms and utilities firms were excluded. It is worth mentioning that they 
included offerings that filed one of three registration forms. As a result, the final 
sample only contains SEOs issued to the public for external financing. 
 
Jeon and Ligon (2011) selected the sample based on all completed SEOs and 
withdrawn SEOs from 1997 through 2007. They screened out non-US firms, REITs, 
limited partnership, units, ADRs, rights offerings, pure secondary offers, offers by 
firms not listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ, offers with an offer price of less than 
$3 or greater than $ 400, offers by financial and utility firms, and offers without price 
and financial data in CRSP and COMPUSTAT. The final sample has 2071 completed 
and 183 withdrawn SEOs.  
 
In Huang and Zhang (2011),  the sample contains 3000 US SEOs from January 1995 
to December 2004. In the initial screening, they excluded rights, REITs, units, limited 
partnerships, mutual conversions, spinoffs, ADRs, closed-end funds, pure secondary 
offers and offers with no link to the CRSP database. They then screened out offers 
without gross spread or total number of shares offered, offers with an offer price of 
less than $3 or greater than $400, offers without relative CRSP data, CDA Spectrum 
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(13f) data and IBES data48. Regarding the offer day correction, Huang and Zhang 
(2011) follow the correction method in the literature (e.g. Altinkilic and Hansen, 2003; 
Corwin, 2003). 
 
In sum, most SEO studies exclude pure secondary offerings and issues made by non-
US firms. Often issues in the OTC market or from private firms are excluded due to 
their different characteristics (low liquidity or high risk). Also often excluded are unit 
offerings and rights offerings. All these exclusions make the samples from different 
studies more comparable. It is worth mentioning that some studies completely exclude 
issues made by financial firms while some include the majority of issues made by 
financial firms. The complete exclusion of issues from financial firms suggests that 
those studies focus on capital-raising choices. However, the exclusion also reduces the 
sample size and might ignore the possible impacts on the SEO market made by 
offerings of financial firms. Some studies exclude utility offerings. Including utility 
offerings keeps up the sample size and it is also possible to identify their effects by 
adding dummy variables in the analysis49. 
 
4.2. Sample Selection 
In this thesis, two samples are selected. Sample 1 is selected by following the 
procedures used by Corwin (2003). Sample 2 is selected using the criteria set by Mola 
and Loughran (2004). Sample 1 is mainly used to investigate the possible explanations 
                                                 
48
 Both the CDA Spectrum (13f) and the IBES recommendation database are products from Thomson 
Financial. The CDA Spectrum (13f) provides data of institutional ownership and the IBES provides 
analyst recommendations for each SEO.  
49
 For instance, Mola and Loughran (2004) included utility offerings and added a utility dummy in their 
analysis. 
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for SEO underpricing proposed in this thesis (and covers a longer time span than the 
other). The second sample is mainly employed to check the investment banking power 
hypothesis made by Mola and Loughran (2004). As discussed in Chapter Two, the 
hypothesis is supported by evidence drawn from a database without offer date 
correction, therefore a thorough investigation is needed. Both offer dates in Sample 1 
and Sample 2 are adjusted based on the methods discussed in Section 4.4.. 
 
4.2.1. Sample 1 
The sample selection uses procedures similar to those used by Corwin (2003). This 
sample is also used in the next chapter for the analysis of the Rule 10b-21 hypothesis 
because Kim and Shin (2004) used a similar sample selection procedure to Corwin 
(2003). The data include all common stock seasoned equity offerings by US 
companies occurring between January 1987 and December 2009 provided by the SDC. 
We obtained a total of 11,183 SEOs. The following restrictions are imposed on the 
sample: 
1. Rights and issues from mutual conversions, closed-end funds and REITs are 
excluded50.  
2. Only US issues are included in the sample51.  
3. The issues should include at least some primary shares and the issuing firm 
must be traded on the NYSE or NASDAQ.  
                                                 
50
 5LJKWVDUHGHILQHGDVLVVXHVZLWK2))(57(&+LQ6'&ODEHOOHGDV³5,*+76´,VVXHVIURPPXWXDO
conversions, closed-end funds and REITs are defined as offerings with SIC code equal to 6978 and 
6726. 
51
 ,VVXHVZLWK1DWLRQODEHOOHGDV³8QLWHG6WDWHV´LQ6'&DUHNHSW 
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4. Only common shares, class A shares and class B shares are included in the 
sample52. These issues should have at least 30 days of trading data prior to the 
offer from CRSP.  
5. Issues should have an offer price of at least $3.00 and less than $400. 
6. Exclude offers where stock split occurred during the 11-day window 
surrounding the offer date. 
7. To avoid possible data errors in the SDC database, 1% extreme value (the 
highest 0.05% and the lowest 0.05%) of SEO discounts are excluded from the 
sample. 
Therefore, Sample 1 includes 5347 SEOs from 1987 to 2009. To facilitate further 
analyses, we divide the sample into three subperiods, namely 1987-1995, 1996-2001 
and 2002-2009. Each subsample has similar numbers of observations after considering 
missing data for some issues. 
 
4.2.2. Sample 2 
Sample 2 is a replication of the sample in Mola and Loughran (2004). However, in 
order to adjust offer dates stated by SDC, the sample requires data from CRSP. 
Therefore, there are some slight differences between Sample 2 and the original sample 
in Mola and Loughran (2004). We collected 6719 seasoned equity offerings in the 
SDC all US Public New Issues from January 1st 1986 to December 31th 1999. The 
following sample selection procedures are implemented to obtain Sample 2: 
                                                 
52
 This restriction deletes those uncommon types of shares (such as  Class A/B Sub Voting Shares) 
which compose a small portion of the whole sample. 
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1. Rights and issues from closed-end investment funds and real estate investment 
trust are excluded. 
2. Only common shares, class A shares and class B shares are included in the 
sample. The issues should have at least 30 days of trading data prior to the 
offer from CRSP because the offer day correction requires trading data from 
CRSP. 
3. The issuing firm must be traded on the NYSE, Amex or NASDAQ. 
4. The issues with the missing prior closing price are also deleted. To avoid 
possible data errors in the SDC database, issues with the absolute value of 
SEO discounts defined by Mola and Loughran (2004) of more than 50% are 
deleted. The issues with the missing prior closing price are also deleted.  
Sample 2 includes 4419 SEO issues from the period 1986-1999. 
 
4.2.3. Additional Data for Both Samples 
Besides the sample selection, we also collected data from three other sources. Daily 
stock prices, trading volume, the number of shares outstanding, closing bid and ask 
prices were collected from CRSP. We did not have access to the intra-day transaction 
daWDZKLFKFDQEHFROOHFWHGIURP1<6(¶V7UDGHVDQG4XRWHV7$4GDWDEDVH&RUZLQ
(2003) collected intraday and closing quote data from this database - but the data in 
TAQ are only available from January 1st 1993. We used the closing bid and ask prices 
collected from CRSP instead. Therefore, our closing quote data had a longer time span 
than those of Corwin (2003). We also collected the XQGHUZULWHUUDQNLQJVIURP5LWWHU¶V
website http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. As for the Top-tier analyst 
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ranking used by Mola and Loughran (2004), we collected the ranking information 
from the magazine Institutional Investor.  
 
4.3. Clarification of SEO Underpricing and Discount 
It is important to distinguish the concept of SEO underpricing from that of IPO 
underpricing. There is a clearly unified measure of IPO underpricing ± the difference 
between the offer price and the closing price at first trading day divided by the offer 
price. However, this is not the case in the SEO studies, where the underpricing 
actually has two different definitions. One is close-to-offer return, the other offer-to-
close return. Close-to-offer return is measured as the ratio of the offer price to the pre-
offer close minus one53. In this section, we follow the definition proposed by Kim and 
Shin (2004) and call close-to-offer return underpricing (R0).  
 
Close-to-Offer Return: ݑ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ሺܴ ?ሻ ൌ ௉௥௜௢௥஼௟௢௦௜௡௚௉௥௜௖௘ିை௙௙௘௥௉௥௜௖௘௉௥௜௢௥஼௟௢௦௜௡௚௉௥௜௖௘   
 
Some studies of SEO underpricing take close-to-offer return to define the underpricing 
(e.g. Kim and Shin, 2004; Corwin, 2003; Bowen et al., 2008). The reason is that, for 
seasoned equity offerings, the prior closing price on the secondary market already 
provides a benchmark and adjustment may be made based on that price. As a result, 
this measure is consistent with the pricing practice in an SEO transaction. Close-to-
offer return is also called SEO discount in some studies (e.g. Autore, 2011; Huang and 
                                                 
53
 Many studies times this ratio by negative one to make it positive and more comparable with 
underpricing (R1) 
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Zhang, 2011) in order to distinguish close-to-offer return underpricing from offer-to-
close return underpricing. 
 
Offer-to-close return is defined as the ratio of a closing price on the issue day to the 
offer price, minus one. We call offer-to-close return underpricing (R1). 
 
Offer-to-Close Return: ݑ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ሺܴ ?ሻ ൌ ஼௟௢௦௜௡௚௉௥௜௖௘௢௡௧௛௘ூ௦௦௨௘ௗ௔௬ିை௙௙௘௥௉௥௜௖௘ை௙௙௘௥௉௥௜௖௘  
 
Several studies of SEO underpricing take offer-to-close return as underpricing 
(Altinkilic and Hansen, 2003; Kim and Park, 2005; Bortolotti et al., 2008; Jeon and 
Ligon, 2011) 54 . They argue that this definition can provide relevant evidence to 
compare the underpricing of SEOs and IPOs. Some studies have already proven that 
differences in underpricing definition may have non-substantial impacts on the 
conclusion55.  
 
The difference between the definitions of underpricing may cause ambiguity. In this 
thesis, we follow the definition used by Corwin (2003) and refer to SEO underpricing 
as the close-to-offer return (underpricing (R0) or SEO discount). The empirical 
models in Chapters Six and Seven are developed specifically for the underpricing 
defined by the close-to-offer return (or SEO discount). 
 
                                                 
54
 Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) define underpricing as the logarithm of the ratio of the offer-day close 
to the offer price and discounting as the logarithm of the ratio of the close price prior to the offering to 
the offer price. These definitions are qualitatively the same as R0 and R1. 
55
 For instance Kim and Park (2004) use the sensitivity analyses to prove that the conclusion base on 
R(1) can also hold for R(0). 
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Mola and Loughran (2004) define SEO discount as: 
 ܵܧܱܦ݅ݏܿ݋ݑ݊ݐሺܵܦܥሻ ൌ ܲݎ݅݋ݎܥ݈݋ݏ݅݊݃ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ െ ܱ݂݂݁ݎܲݎܱ݂݂݅ܿ݁݁ݎܲݎ݅ܿ݁  
 
We call this definition Discount (SDC) because this discount is provided by the SDC 
GLUHFWO\ DV ³Percent Change Stock Price 1 Day Before Offer to Offer Price´
(PCT1DAYBEF)56. This definition is different from both R(0) and R(1) but is closer 
to R(0). Both R(0) and Discount (SDC) involve the closing price prior to the issue. 
Therefore, R(0) and Discount (SDC) are analogous. In Chapter Five, the discussion 
for the investment banking hypothesis is based on Discount (SDC). 
 
4.4. Offer Date Correction 
Almost all studies in SEO underpricing point out the necessity of offer date 
corrections in the SDC database. Lease, Masulis, and Page (1991) discovered that 
offer dates reported by the SDC database are often inappropriate for analysing price 
effects because some offers that take place after the close of trading are recorded as 
taking place on that day. These offers should be recorded as taking place on the day 
after the stated offer dates. After examining time stamps from the Dow Jones News 
Service (DJNS), they found that 25% of offers from 1981 to 1983 took place after the 
close. Eckbo and Masulis (1992) also found that 20% of offers from 1963 to 1981 
took place after the close. They used the offer prospect date to identify the offer date. 
7KHODVWVDOHVSULFHLVWKHVKDUH¶VFORVLQJSULFHRQWKHGDWHUHFRUGHGRQWKHSURVSHFWXV
                                                 
56
 This definition is calculated as ((PR1DB ± USPR) / USPR)*100.  USPR is the offer price and 
PR1DB is the prior closing price. It is only applied to secondary common stock issues. 
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If the date coincides with the prospectus date, then the offer date should be recorded 
as the following day. Eckbo and Masulis began to use DJNS to identify the offer dates 
for issues that occurred from 1980 onward.  
 
Chemmanur, He and Hu (2009) used Factiva, a comprehensive business news archive 
service, to identify the correct offer dates and found that about 70% of Factiva offer 
dates differ from SDC offer dates between 1999 and 2004. Safieddine and Wilhelm 
(1996) further note that even time stamps from the DJNS may not identify the true 
offer dates. To deal with the problem, they applied a volume-based correction method. 
Following Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996), Corwin (2003), Kim and Shin (2004), Kim 
and Park (2005) and Huang and Zhang (2011) all applied a volume-based offer date 
correction in their studies57.  
 
In this thesis, we follow the volume-based correction method. If the trading volume on 
the following day is (1) more than twice the trading volume on the reported SDC offer 
date and (2) more than twice the average daily volume over the previous 250 trading 
days, then the day following the SDC offer day is chosen as the offer date; otherwise, 
the reported offer date is used. The accuracy of the volume-based correction method is 
confirmed by Altinkilic and Hansen (2003). They checked the time stamps from DJNS 
and compared the dates with those obtained from the volume-based correction method.  
In their sample, the two procedures identified the same offer day for 98% of all the 
issues. In the sample of this thesis, 53.6% of offer dates are changed under the 
volume-based correction method. 
                                                 
57
 Kim and Shin (2004) determined the offer date by checking only whether the trading volume on the 
following day is more than twice the trading volume on the reported SDC offer date. 
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4.5. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Panel A Rate of Underpricing (R0) From 1987-
2009 
Panel B Rate of Underpricing (R0) From 1987-
1995 
Panel C Rate of Underpricing (R0) From 1996-
2001 
Panel D Rate of Underpricing (R0) From 2002-
2009 
Figure 4-1 Panels of magnitudes of SEO underpricing (R0) 
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Table 4-1 Descriptive statistics of underpricing R(0) and underpricing R(1) 
Year No. of Obs. Mean of R(0) Median of R(0) Mean of R(1) Median of R(1) 
1987 172 0.0090 0.0000 0.0090 0.0025 
1988 70 0.0083 0.0000 0.0113 0.0000 
1989 128 0.0126 0.0052 0.0148 0.0000 
1990 102 0.0139 0.0064 0.0137 0.0014 
1991 297 0.0205 0.0097 0.0194 0.0082 
1992 274 0.0238 0.0127 0.0230 0.0098 
1993 384 0.0249 0.0137 0.0224 0.0094 
1994 216 0.0244 0.0159 0.0274 0.0150 
1995 349 0.0275 0.0184 0.0261 0.0137 
1996 402 0.0342 0.0200 0.0348 0.0152 
1997 356 0.0279 0.0192 0.0282 0.0132 
1998 223 0.0225 0.0130 0.0237 0.0119 
1999 267 0.0269 0.0163 0.0312 0.0118 
2000 279 0.0314 0.0209 0.0444 0.0150 
2001 207 0.0363 0.0237 0.0418 0.0265 
2002 192 0.0329 0.0263 0.0290 0.0216 
2003 219 0.0319 0.0215 0.0395 0.0210 
2004 242 0.0273 0.0201 0.0281 0.0130 
2005 189 0.0299 0.0208 0.0290 0.0129 
2006 180 0.0317 0.0222 0.0298 0.0184 
2007 154 0.0277 0.0215 0.0229 0.0080 
2008 130 0.0489 0.0348 0.0436 0.0133 
2009 315 0.0599 0.0491 0.0441 0.0264 
Period1 1987-1995 1,992 0.0212 0.0112 0.0207 0.0084 
Period2 1996-2001 1,734 0.0301 0.0192 0.0339 0.0147 
Period3 2002-2009 1,621 0.0375 0.0263 0.0339 0.0171 
p-value for diff(2)-(1) 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
p-value for diff(3)-(2) 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.4950 0.4099 
Underpricing R(0) is defined as  ((P-OP)/P)*100, where P is the prior offer closing price and OP is the offer 
price. Underpricing R(1) is defined as ((P1-OP)/OP)*100, where P1 is the closing price on the issue day and OP 
is the offer price. p-values for difference within subsample means (medians) are from standard t-tests 
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test) 
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There are 5347 SEOs in Sample 1, all from the period 1987 to 2009. The descriptive 
statistics are based on this sample of 5347 SEOs. Because some variables are missing 
for some SEOs, these SEOs are excluded from the regression analysis, reducing the 
sample size to 475658. However, we replicate descriptive statistics for this reduced-
size sample and find all the conclusions drawn for the full sample still hold for the 
reduced sample. The figure and table of descriptive statistics for the reduced sample 
are presented in Appendix 4 and 5.  
 
According to Figure 4-1, Panel A reflects a skewed distribution of SEO underpricing 
(R0). Clearly, an SEO is more likely to be discounted than overpriced. Panel B in the 
first period shows more than 40% of SEOs in the first period are discounted at 1% or 
less and fewer than 20% of SEOs are discounted at 1% to 2%. However, Panel C and 
Panel D show the trend of increase in SEO underpricing (R0). In the second period, 
the percentage of SEOs with 1% or less underpricing (R0) declines to around 30%. In 
the third period, the percentage of SEOs with 1% or less underpricing (R0) further 
declines to below 20%. These panels clearly show the increase of SEO underpricing 
(R0) over the sample period from 1987 to 2009. 
 
Table 4-1, Figure 4-2 and Figure 4-3 further confirm the increase of SEO underpricing 
in the sample period. All p-values for difference within subsample means (medians) 
are statistically significant for underpricing (R0). These results provide solid evidence 
for the increase in SEO underpricing during the past two decades. However, the 
pattern of SEO underpricing (R1) is slightly different from underpricing (R0). For 
                                                 
58
 Those missing variables are closing bid and ask price, number of shares outstanding from CRSP and 
gross spread from SDC. 
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underpricing (R1), there is no statistically significant increase from Period 2 to Period 
3. Only the increase in R(1) from Period 1 to Period 2 is reported as statistically 
significant. 
 
Figure 4-2 Mean and median of SEO underpricing (R0) 
 
 
Figure 4-3 Mean and median of SEO underpricing (R1) 
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CHAPTER 5: EXPLANATIONS FOR THE INCREASE OF 
SEO UNDERPRICING 
 
In this chapter several important existing explanations for the increase of SEO 
underpricing are thoroughly discussed and re-examined. These explanations are the 
hypothesis of Rule 10b-21 (Kim and Shin, 2004), the hypothesis of investment 
banking power (Mola and Loughran, 2004), the changing issuer composition 
hypothesis (Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Mola and Loughran, 2004) and leaving a good 
taste hypothesis (Jegadeesh et al., 1993). The hypothesis of Rule 10b-21 is tested 
using the first sample selected in Chapter Four, while the other hypotheses are tested 
using the second sample in Chapter Four, which follows the sampling procedures of 
Mola and Loughran (2004). 
 
5.1. Implementation of Rule 10b-21 Hypothesis 
Kim and Shin (2004) argue that the implementation of Rule 10b-21 by the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on August 25, 1988 is the reason for the 
increase of SEO underpricing. Before the implementation of the rule, there were 
significant temporary price declines in the days prior to seasoned offers. Therefore, 
the rule is supposed to minimise price manipulation by imposing restraints on the 
covering of short sales using shares obtained from seasoned equity offerings59. 
                                                 
59
 In 1997, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) replaced Rule 10b-21 with Rule 105 of  
Regulation M, under which the restricted period is limited to the five business days prior to the offering. 
Since then, the restraint falls under Rule 105 of Regulation M. For simplicity, the rule is referred to as 
Rule 10b-21 throughout the thesis. 
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5.1.1. Underlying rationale of Rule 10b-21 Hypothesis 
Parsons and Raviv (1985) developed a theoretical model to explain the underpricing 
of SEOs. The model assumes two types of investor according to expectation of the 
share value in the market. The underwriter sets an optimal market price, and then the 
two types of investor react to this choice according to their own circumstances. The 
study points out that the underpricing is the result of the potential for oversubscription 
and the rationing that will follow. The study emphasises that restriction against short 
selling is a critical assumption in the model, illustrating that short-sale restrictions 
make existing share prices less informative and cause the underwriters to give larger 
discounts to counteract the uncertainty.  
 
Following this idea, Kim and Shin (2004) suggested that traders took short position 
before the SEO and drove down the market price and after the offering the same 
traders used the shares acquired from the offering to cover the short positions. When 
Rule 10b-21 was implemented, the above trading strategy became restricted. Rule 
10b-21 was intended to minimise manipulative short selling prior to SEOs. Thus the 
expected effects would be less negative abnormal return of the underlining shares 
prior to the offerings if the rule was successful.  
 
However, Corwin (2003) and Kim and Shin (2004) found that abnormal negative 
returns even increased after the implementation of Rule 10b-21, indicating the failure 
of the intention of Rule 10b-21. Indeed, Rule 10b-21 restricted informational short 
sales and reduced the informativeness of prices, thereby increasing required 
underpricing. Empirical results from both Kim and Shin  (2004) and Corwin  (2003) 
prove that the implementation of Rule 10b-21 had positive effects on SEO 
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underpricing. Kim and Shin (2004) exhausted all the possible explanations they could 
find and argue that none can explain the puzzling increase of SEO underpricing. As a 
result, they attribute the implementation of Rule 10-b21 as the reason for the increase 
of SEO underpricing.  
 
5.1.2. Evidence Inconsistent with the Hypothesis of Rule 10b-21 Implementation 
As pointed out by Corwin (2003), the increase of underpricing was gradual over time 
in his sample, and the variation through time cannot be captured by a simple shift in 
the regression intercept following the implementation of Rule 10b-21. To illustrate the 
behaviour of SEO underpricing over time, we adopt the estimation method in 
Chambers and Dimson (2009).  
 
First, the following empirical model of SEO underpricing is employed. ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ ൌ ܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܥܽ݌ ൅ ܾଶܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ ൅ ܾଷܴ݈݁݋݂݂݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁ ൅ܾସܥܣܴܲ݋ݏ ൅ ܾହܥܣܴܰ݁݃ ൅ ܾ଺ܮ݊ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ ൅ ܾ଻ܥ݈ݑݏݐ݁ݎ ൅ ଼ܾܻܰܵܧܦݑ݉݉ݕ ൅ܾଽܫܱܷܲ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ ൅ ܾଵ଴ܷ݊݀݁ݎݓݎ݅ݐ݁ݎ ൅ ܾଵଵܻ݁ܽݎ ൅ ߝ.                                      (5.1) 
 
The model is based on Corwin (2003). MarketCap is defined as the prior closing price 
multiplied by the shares outstanding on the day prior to the offer. Reloffersize is 
defined as the ratio of the number of shares offered to the total number of outstanding 
shares prior to the offer. Volatility is represented by the standard deviation of daily 
close-to-close returns over the 30 trading days ending 11 days prior to the offer60. 
CARPos(Neg) is defined as the cumulative market-adjusted return over the 5 days 
                                                 
60
 The definition is the same as that in Corwin (2003). 
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prior to the offer and it equals zero if the return is positive (negative), where market 
return is defined as the return on the CRSP value weighted index. LnPrice is the 
logarithm of closing price on the day prior to the offer, and Cluster is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the offer price is set at integer and equal to zero otherwise.  
 
 
Figure 5-1 Coefficients of the year dummy 
 
NYSEDummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer is listed on NYSE and 
equal to zero otherwise. IPOUnderpricing is the average monthly IPO underpricing 
available from Ritter's website. Underwriter is a dummy which equals one if one of 
the lead underwriters has the reputation rank equal to or greater than 8 and zero 
otherwise. Year is the dummy variable of the calendar year in which the offer is made. 
The ranking is made by Ritter, and both the average monthly IPO underpricing and 
underwriter ranking are available at http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. 
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The model is estimated with the data in Sample 1. In the sample, we have more than 
4500 SEOs from the period 1987 to 2009. Then the estimation method in Chambers 
and Dimson (2009) is then employed. Specifically, with the exception of year, all 
other explanatory variables are demeaned in order to assist economic interpretation of 
the year coefficients. Each year coefficient represents the level of SEO underpricing in 
a given year by an SEO with characteristics in line with average values for the sample. 
 
Figure 5-1 illustrates the coefficients of the year dummy. The Rule 10b-21 took 
effects on August 25, 1988, but we find that there seems to be no strong evidence for a 
jump in SEO underpricing in 1988, after controlling for changing risk composition as 
well as the influence of underwriter reputation. The coefficient of Year dummy for 
1988 was -0.16%, a slight dip from 0 for 1987. According to Figure 5-1, there was an 
increase in the SEO underpricing from 1988 but the increase was gradual from 1988 
to 1996. Therefore, although we cannot rule out the effects of Rule 10b-21, the 
gradual increase in the SEO underpricing suggests that Rule 10b-21 at least is unlikely 
to explain the pattern of the SEO underpricing during the 1990s. 
 
5.2. Investment Banking Power Hypothesis 
Besides the Rule 10b-21 hypothesis, Mola and Loughran (2004) proposed that the 
reason for the increase of SEO underpricing is investment banking power, which 
increased during the 1990s. To support their argument, they point out two pieces of 
evidence: 1) the rise in integer offer prices set at least one dollar below the prior close 
price; 2) offerings underwritten by banks with top tier analysts show greater SEO 
underpricing than others. 
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5.2.1. Setting Offer Price at Integer 
As discussed in Chapter Four, it is highly likely that Mola and Loughran (2004) did 
not adjust the offer day provided by the SDC database. Therefore, it is worth checking 
their findings with the adjusted database in this section. In the previous chapter, the 
pattern of SEO underpricing was discussed. This section checks 1) the distribution of 
closing prices on the day before the SEO and 2)  whether there is a rise in integer offer 
prices set at least one dollar below the prior close price.  
 
 
Figure 5-2 Trend of clustering in integer offer price 
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On April 9, 2001, the US Securities and Exchange Commission ordered all US stock 
markets to convert to decimals. Before that date the shares were priced by dollar 
fractions. There were five classes of dollar fractions, namely zero, even-eighths, odd-
eighths, odd-sixteenths and other. After adjusting the offer dates, Figure 5-2 shows 
two opposite trends. One trend is the decrease in the ratio of issues with the integer 
prior closing price to all issues in each sub period. The ratio in 1986-1989 was 23.22%, 
but it declined to 17.47% in 1996-1999. The other trend is that the ratio of issues with 
an integer offer price to all issues rose. The ratio in 1986-1989 was 29.38% and it rose 
substantially to 43.43% in 1996-1999. 
 
Based on this sharp comparison, it might be concluded that there is a trend for 
investment banks to set offer prices at integer deliberately rather than just set the offer 
price at the prior closing price. This result is consistent with Mola and Loughran 
(2004), suggesting the trend still holds after adjusting offer dates. Among those issues 
with an integer offer price, there is also a trend that more offer prices are set at the 
next lower integer or other lower integers. This trend is confirmed by Figure 5-3. 
These results obtained with the adjusted database are similar to the results reported by 
Mola and Loughran (2004).   
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Figure 5-3 Integer offer price clustering relative to the prior closing price 
categorised by subperiods (with offer dates adjusted) 
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The sample consists of 1601 SEOs with an integer offer price from 1986-1999. The offer 
dates are adjusted. The offerings are classified relative to the prior closing price. For 
instance, if the closing price on the day before the issue is $10.25, the integer offer price 
might be $10 (Next Lower Integer), or $9 or $8 etc. (Other Lower Integers), or $11 (Next 
Higher Integer), or $12 or $13 etc.(Other Higher Integers). If the prior closing price and the 
offer price are the same integer, the offer price is recorded as Same Integer (No Discount). 
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5.2.2. Analyst Coverage and SEO Underpricing 
³:KDWDOORZVXQGHUZULWHUVWRURXQGGRZQRIIHUSULFHVPRUHRIWHQLQWKHVWKDQLQ
the 1980s? Alternatively, why do issuers allow bankers to price offerings down, and 
WKXVOHDYHPRUHPRQH\RQWKHWDEOHIRULQYHVWRUV"´(Mola and Loughran, 2004, p14). 
Mola and Loughran (2004) hypothesise that issuers are willing to accept more SEO 
discount or underpricing because they place more importance on analyst coverage. 
Thus investment banks use analyst coverage to assist in extracting rents from issuers 
via clustering of offer price. In other words, issuers purchase analyst coverage with 
SEO underpricing. Mola and Loughran (2004) call this hypothesis the investment 
banking power hypothesis. 
 
The investment banking power hypothesis in Mola and Loughran (2004) is not new in 
the literature of equity underpricing. For IPO underpricing, the analyst coverage is 
often considered as a determinant. For instance, Loughran and Ritter (2004) 
hypothesise that there was an increased emphasis on analyst coverage during their 
sample period. As issuers placed more weight on hiring a lead underwriter with a 
highly reputable analyst team to cover the firm, they became less concerned about 
avoiding underwriters with a reputation for excessive underpricing. Cliff and Denis 
(2004) also report that IPO underpricing is positively related to analyst coverage by 
the lead underwriter and to the presence of an all-star analyst on the research staff of 
the lead underwriter. Moreover, Liu and Ritter (2011) included all-star analyst 
coverage in their models and found that all-star analyst coverage is positively and 
significantly related to IPO underpricing. 
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To capture the quality of analyst groups, Mola and Loughran (2004) used a dummy 
variable TOP-TIER ANALYSTj, T-1 which equals one when the underwriter has an 
analyst group among the top 10 bankers selected by Institutional Investor in October 
of each year61. The definition of analyst coverage is similar to that in Cliff and Denis 
(2004)62 and Liu and Ritter (2011)63. Mola and Loughran (2004) expected this dummy 
variable to have a significantly negative relation with SEO discount (SDC).  
 
However, as mentioned previously, this conclusion is highly likely to have been 
drawn based on the sample without offer date correction. This study presents the 
comparison of two sets of regression results in Table 5-1. Model 3 is the original 
regression results presented by Mola and Loughran (2004) 64 . Model 1 is our 
UHSOLFDWLRQRI0RODDQG/RXJKUDQ¶VPRGHOZLWKRXWRIIHUGDWHDGMXVWPHQW 
 
According to Table 5-1, the results of Model 1 and Model 3 are qualitatively the same. 
Specifically, in both patterns, the coefficients of TOP-TIER ANALYSTT-1 are positively 
related to SEO underpricing and statistically significant level at conventional levels. 
The coefficient means in Model 1 show that if the issue is underwritten by an 
investment bank with a top-tier analyst team, the issuer has to give around 40 basis 
points to the SEO underpricing. This result is almost the same as the 47 basis points 
suggested by the original regression results. Besides that, almost all other variables in 
                                                 
61
 In their study, the underwriter means book manager in SDC database. 
62
 Cliff and Denis (2004) match an IPO to an all-star if the lead underwriter has an al-star (first-, 
second-, or third-team) in the same industry as the issuer in the year of the issue or the prior year. 
63
 Liu and Ritter (2011) define the all-star analyst coverage variable as a dummy that equals one if an 
all-star analyst (top three) from a lead underwriter has covered the stock within a year after its IPO, and 
zero otherwise. For IPOs in year t, they use the October Issue of II for year t-1 to classify IPOs as to 
whether coverage from a lead underwriter was provided by an all-star analyst. 
64
 The full regression results of Mola and Loughran (2004) can be found in Table 6, p18, VOL 39, NO. 
1, March 2004, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 
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Model 1 and Model 3 have the same sign and similar scale. These results suggest that 
the regression test in Mola and Loughran (2004) is highly likely done without offer 
date adjustment. 
 
Table 5-1 Mola and Loughran's OLS models of SEO discount (SDC) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
NASDAQ Dummy 0.0060*** 0.0054*** 0.0062*** 
  (3.71) (3.85) (4.04) 
PROCEEDS/MKT 0.0086 0.0086* 0.0095 
  (1.61) (1.87) (1.37) 
UTILITY Dummy -0.0072*** -0.0076*** -0.0041* 
  (-2.65) (-3.27) (-1.72) 
TECH Dummy 0.0059*** 0.0031** 0.0069*** 
  (3.38) (2.10) (3.32) 
LNPRICE -0.0120*** -0.0122*** -0.0105*** 
  (-7.73) (-9.13) (-5.04) 
GROSS SPREAD 0.0029*** 0.0028*** 0.0058*** 
  (3.77) (4.26) (5.34) 
PRIOR SEO Dummy -0.0018 -0.0011 -0.0029 
  (-0.81) (-0.55) (-1.63) 
UNDERWRIER REPUTATION Dummy -0.0066*** -0.0066*** -0.0052** 
  (-3.41) (-3.99) (-2.40) 
TOPTIER ANALYSTT-1 0.0040** 0.0006 0.0047*** 
  (2.47) (0.40) (2.74) 
CLUSTER Dummy 0.0142*** 0.0105*** 0.0150*** 
  (9.99) (8.66) (9.36) 
Constant 0.0416*** 0.0423*** 0.0224** 
  (5.33) (6.31) (2.17) 
No. of Obs. 4342 4347 4417 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1062 0.1320 0.11 
Model 1 is the replication of Mola and Loughran (2004). Model 3 is the original results of Mola and Loughran 
(2004). Model 2 is the replication of the model based on the corrected offer date. All variables are exactly the same 
as in Mola and Loughran (2004). The dependent variable, SEO underpricing, is computed as [((PT-1-OP)/OP)] OP is 
the offer price and PT-1 is the prior closing price. NASDAQ is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuing firm is 
listed on Nasdaq, and zero otherwise. PROCEEDS/MKT is a ratio of issue proceeds and issuer market value. UTILITY 
and TECH are dummies equal to one if the issuer operates, respectively, in the two-digit SIC industry of 49 and in 
SIC codes specified in Loughran and Ritter (2002). LNPRICE is the natural logarithm of the closing price of the day 
before the issue in dollars. GROSS SPREAD is the total fee of underwriters, expressed as a percentage of the issue 
proceeds. PRIOR SEO is a dummy equal to one if the firm issued seasoned equity in the prior year. UNDERWRITER 
REPUTATION is a dummy equal to one if the lead manager has a reputation rank equal to or greater than eight, as 
determined in Loughran and Ritter (2002) and zero otherwise. TOP-TIER ANAYSTT-1 is a dummy equal to one if the 
SEO underwriter (book managers) has an analyst group ranked among the top 10 groups selected by institutional 
investor each October of the prior calendar year and zero otherwise. CLUSTER is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the offer price is set at integers or zero if the offer price is set in dollar fractions. PROCEEDS/MKT and LNPRICE are 
ǁŝŶƐŽƌŝǌĞĚĂƚ ƚŚĞ  ?йĂŶĚ  ? ?й ůĞǀĞůƐ ?tŚŝƚĞ ?ƐŚĞƚĞƌŽƐŬĞĚĂƐƚŝĐŝƚǇ-adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. ***,**, 
and* represent 1% 5% and 10% significance, respectively. 
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After adjusting the offer dates, the main difference between Model 2 and Model 1 is 
the coefficient of TOP-TIER ANALYSTT-1. Although the sign of the coefficient remains 
positive, it is no longer significant. After the adjustment of offer dates, issues 
underwritten by investment banks with high reputations are priced at fewer discounts 
than others while controlling for other factors. CLUSTER Dummy and LNPRICE are 
also important factors. The significantly negative coefficient of LNPRICE suggests 
that issues with high price in the secondary market often have less underpricing after 
controlling other factors. This result partially proves that offer price rounding is 
positively related to SEO underpricing.  
 
Moreover, in the original results, rounding offer price adds 142 basis points to the 
SEO underpricing after controlling for other factors. After the adjustment, rounding 
offer price adds 105 basis points. This comparison suggests that pricing at integers is 
an important factor in determining SEO underpricing even after the adjustment. 
Indeed, the variable CLUSTER Dummy is the most economically and statistically 
significant variable in the regression. In Table 5-2, the regression results of the three 
sub-periods are reported using the sample with offer dates adjusted65. Three sub-
periods are the same as in Mola and Loughran (2004). The coefficient of CLUSTER 
Dummy is statistically insignificant in the first period. This result suggests that the 
practice of setting offer prices at integers was becoming popular in the 1990s. None of 
the coefficients of TOP-TIER ANALYSTT-1 during the three sub-periods are 
statistically significant.  
                                                 
65
 The original results reported by Mola and Loughran (2004) can be found in Table 7, p20, VOL 39, 
NO. 1, March 2004, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 
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Table 5-2 Mola and Loughran's OLS models of SEO discount (SDC) over three 
subperiods 
  
1986-1989 1990-1995 1996-1999 
NASDAQ Dummy -0.0040 0.0071*** 0.0048* 
  (-1.20) (3.94) (1.89) 
PROCEEDS/MKT 0.0004 0.0001 0.0112 
  (0.03) (0.01) (1.47) 
UTILITY Dummy -0.0045 -0.0087*** -0.0064 
  (-0.89) (-3.09) (-1.20) 
TECH Dummy -0.0079* 0.0014 0.0065*** 
  (-1.86) (0.74) (2.68) 
LNPRICE 0.0014 -0.0166*** -0.0194*** 
  (0.36) (-9.38) (-8.39) 
GROSS SPREAD 0.0040** 0.0022*** 0.0071*** 
  (2.51) (2.68) (5.13) 
PRIOR SEO Dummy -0.0021 -0.0017 0.0004 
  (-0.36) (-0.69) (0.14) 
UNDERWRIER REPUTATION Dummy -0.0031 -0.0097*** 0.0012 
 
(-0.70) (-4.58) (0.42) 
TOPTIER ANALYSTT-1 -0.0012 0.0018 0.0025 
  (-0.37) (0.99) (1.03) 
CLUSTER Dummy 0.0010 0.0077*** 0.0148*** 
  (0.31) (4.82) (7.18) 
Constant -0.0067 0.0628*** 0.0401*** 
  (-0.36) (7.34) (3.21) 
No. of Obs. 837 1999 1511 
Adjusted R2 0.0183 0.1979 0.2032 
The dependent variable, SEO underpricing, is computed as [((PT-1-OP)/OP)] OP is the offer price and PT-1 is the 
prior closing price. NASDAQ is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuing firm is listed on Nasdaq, or zero if 
the issuing firm is listed on NYSE or Amex. PROCEEDS/MKT is a ratio of issue proceeds and issuer market 
value. UTILITY and TECH are dummies equal to one if the issuer operates, respectively, in the two-digit SIC 
industry of 49 and in SIC codes specified in Loughran and Ritter (2004). LNPRICE is the natural logarithm of 
the closing price of the day before the issue in dollars. GROSS SPREAD is the total fee of underwriters, 
expressed as a percentage of the issue proceeds. PRIOR SEO is a dummy equal to one if the firm issued 
seasoned equity in the prior year. UNDERWRITER REPUTATION is a dummy equal to one if the lead manager 
has a reputation rank equal to or greater than eight, as determined in Loughran and Ritter (2002). TOP-TIER 
ANAYSTT-1 is a dummy equal to one if the SEO underwriter (book managers) has an analyst group ranked 
among the top 10 groups selected by institutional investor each October of the prior calendar year. CLUSTER 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the offer price is set at integers or zero if the offer price is set in dollar 
fractions. PROCEEDS/MKT and LNPRICE arĞǁŝŶƐŽƌŝǌĞĚĂƚƚŚĞ ?йĂŶĚ ? ?йůĞǀĞůƐ ?tŚŝƚĞ ?ƐŚĞƚĞƌŽƐŬĞĚĂƐƚŝĐŝƚǇ-
adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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The insignificant coefficients of TOP-TIER ANALYSTT-1 suggest that banks with a 
prestigious analyst team do not press issuers to give more issue discounts (SDC). As 
analyst coverage is only one proxy of investment banking power, the insignificant 
coefficients of analyst coverage cannot rule out the possibility that investment banking 
power can be captured by other proxies. Therefore we cannot rule out the hypothesis 
that investment banking power is the reason for the increase of SEO underpricing or 
discount. Our findings suggest that for SEOs, there is no solid evidence supporting 
that analyst coverage is significantly and positively related to SEO underpricing.  
 
5.3. Changing Issuer Composition Hypothesis 
Issuer characteristics have an important role in deciding the underpricing of SEOs. 
This argument is already supported by many empirical studies (e.g. Chemmanur et al., 
2009; Autore, 2011; Huang and Zhang, 2011). In Table 5-1, the regression results also 
show that NASDAQ issues have higher SEO underpricing than exchange issues after 
controlling other factors. SEOs issued by utility firms have lower underpricing than 
others due to the low risk for utility firms. Therefore, the changing issuer composition 
hypothesis proposed by Loughran and Ritter (2004) and Mola and Loughran (2004) is 
a possible explanation for the increase of SEO underpricing.  
 
This hypothesis was checked by Mola and Loughran (2004), who concluded that the 
changing issuer composition hypothesis can partially explain the increase of SEO 
underpricing. However, as mentioned earlier, the conclusion was highly likely based 
on an unadjusted database. In this section, we re-examine the hypothesis with the 
adjusted database. 
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Mola and Loughran (2004) categorised issues by the exchange,  relative issue size, 
utility and high tech industry66. In this section, the fifth proxy for uncertainty-volatility 
is added67. The first proxy for uncertainty is the primary exchange where the shares of 
the issuing firm are traded. As discussed in previous chapters, NASDAQ firms are 
generally different from firms listed on the NYSE or Amex in terms of age, 
capitalisation, and risk level. The second proxy is the relative size of SEOs. This 
variable is calculated by the proceeds divided by the market value of outstanding 
shares prior to the offering.  
 
Higher relative size means more price pressure and greater uncertainty associated with 
the issue (Scholes, 1972). Mola and Loughran (2004) define this proxy as high when 
the relative size is equal to or greater than the median of the sample distribution. The 
third and fourth proxies are utilities and tech industries. If the firm is regarded as 
utility (tech) firm, it is often regarded as less (more) risky than others. Last but not 
least, volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of daily close-to-close returns 
over 30 trading days ending 11 days prior to the offer68. This number is regarded as 
high if the volatility equals or exceeds the median of the sample distribution. 
 
According to the results in Table 5-3, although the percentage of issues associated 
with high uncertainty is increasing (for instance, the percentage of NASDAQ issues to 
all issues increases from 55.09% in period 1 to 67.47% in period 3), SEO underpricing 
has generally increased for both riskier and less risky issues. For example, high 
                                                 
66
 High tech firms are defined as firms with SIC codes as follows: 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578, 3661, 
3663, 3669, 3674, 3812, 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829, 3841, 3845, 4812, 4813,4899, 7370, 7371, 
7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378 and 7379. 
67
 The volatility commonly used in literature is not included by Mola and Loughran (2003). 
68
 This definition is used by Corwin (2003) 
Chapter 5                                         Explanations for the Increase of SEO Underpricing 
132 
 
volatility issues report an average underpricing increasing from 1.45% in period 1 to 
3.69% in period 3, while the average underpricing for low volatility issues increases 
from 0.93% to 1.95%. Although the increase is more substantial for riskier issues, the 
p-value for diff (d)-(b) suggests that all issues experienced a statistically significant 
increase in SEO underpricing except for utility issues. These results are consistent 
with similar tests made by Mola and Loughran (2004). Therefore, it is safe to 
conclude that after the adjustment of offer date, the changing composition hypothesis 
still cannot completely explain why the SEO underpricing has increased. 
 
5.4. Leaving a Good Taste Hypothesis 
The leaving a good taste hypothesis was proposed by Jegadeesh et al. (1993). The 
hypothesis was inspired by several theoretical models such Allen and Faulhaber 
(1989), Welch (1989), and Chemmanur (1993). These models assume that the issuers 
possess superior information and take into account the possibility of future equity 
offerings in deciding IPO prices. High quality firms deliberately underprice their IPOs 
more substantially than low quality firms in order to raise more funds. After checking 
a sample of 1985 IPOs from 1980 to 1986, Jegadeesh et al. (1993) found a positive 
relationship between IPO underpricing and the probability and size of subsequent 
seasoned offerings. However, the economic significance was weak in their test. Spiess 
and Pettway (1997) found no evidence that firms cover the cost of an underpriced IPO 
in either higher issue proceeds or in greater wealth for WKHILUP¶VLQLWLDORZQHUV 
 
For SEOs, the leaving a good taste hypothesis is already examined in Table 5-1 and 
Table 5-2. The variable PRIOR SEO Dummy is equal to one if the firm issued an SEO 
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in the prior year, and zero otherwise. If the hypothesis holds for SEO underpricing, we 
expect a significant positive relationship between PRIOR SEO Dummy and SEO 
underpricing. However, the insignificant coefficients in Table 5-1 and Table 5-2 
suggest that there is little support for the leaving a good taste hypothesis in our sample. 
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Table 5-3 Average SEO discount (SDC) categorised by proxies of uncertainty 
 
Overall 1986-1989 1990-1995 1996-1999 
 
Proxies 
Discount 
(a) 
N Percent 
Discount 
(b) 
N Percent 
Discount 
(c) 
N Percent 
Discount 
(d) 
N Percent 
p-value 
for Diff 
( c )-( b ) 
p-value 
for Diff 
( d )-( c ) 
p-value 
for Diff 
( d )-( b ) 
Primary Exchange 
               
NASDAQ Issues 2.98% 2,710 61.23% 1.19% 465 55.09% 3.18% 1,187 58.94% 3.53% 1,058 67.47% 0.0000 0.0264 0.0000 
NYSE/Amex Issues 1.45% 1,716 38.77% 1.03% 379 44.91% 1.43% 827 41.06% 1.82% 510 32.53% 0.0364 0.0195 0.0006 
Relative size 
               
High (PROCEEDS/MKT) 3.02% 2,214 50.02% 1.44% 387 45.85% 3.11% 1,030 51.14% 3.67% 797 50.83% 0.0000 0.0037 0.0000 
Low (PROCEEDS/MKT) 1.75% 2,212 49.98% 0.85% 457 54.15% 1.78% 984 48.86% 2.26% 771 49.17% 0.0000 0.0023 0.0000 
Utility Industry 
               
Utility Issues 0.71% 334 7.55% 0.39% 85 10.07% 0.78% 183 9.09% 0.93% 66 4.21% 0.0958 0.3377 0.6473 
Non-Utility Issues 2.52% 4,092 92.45% 1.20% 759 89.93% 2.63% 1,831 90.91% 3.06% 1,502 95.79% 0.0000 0.0012 0.0000 
Tech Industry 
               
Tech Issues 2.80% 941 21.26% 0.53% 122 14.45% 2.74% 396 19.66% 3.51% 423 26.98% 0.0000 0.0078 0.0000 
Non-Tech Issues 2.27% 3,485 78.74% 1.22% 722 85.55% 2.39% 1,618 80.34% 2.77% 1,145 73.02% 0.0078 0.0053 0.0000 
Volatility 
               
High (Volatility) Issues 3.30% 2,218 50.11% 1.45% 309 36.61% 3.51% 988 49.06% 3.69% 921 58.74% 0.0000 0.1913 0.0000 
Low (Volatility) Issues 1.47% 2,208 49.89% 0.93% 535 63.39% 1.45% 1,026 50.94% 1.95% 647 41.26% 0.0015 0.0003 0.0000 
The sample is obtained from the sampling procedures 2 in Chapter Four. Discount (SDC) is defined as [((PT-1-OP)/OP)] OP is the offer price and PT-1 is the prior closing price. The sample consists of 4426 
SEOs during the 1986-1999 time period with the offer dates adjusted. Proceeds/MKT is the ratio of the domestic proceeds to the market value. Market value is defined as the number of shares greater 
than the median value of the distribution. Utility issues are offerings whose firm has a two-digital SIC industry code of 49. Tech issues are defined by using the SIC codes in Loughran and Ritter (2004). 
Volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of daily close-to-close returns over 30 trading days ending 11 days prior to the offer. Volatility is high when the number is equal to or greater than the 
median value of the distribution 
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CHAPTER 6: LIQUIDITY SHOCKS AND SEO 
UNDERPRICING OVER THE LONG RUN 
 
In this chapter we hypothesise that liquidity shocks caused by certain market 
conditions can affect the demand for SEO stocks and therefore increase SEO 
underpricing69. We test the hypothesis with our sample and find that market volatility 
is significantly and positively related to SEO underpricing after controlling for other 
factors. We then examine the behaviour of SEO underpricing over the sample period 
from 1987 to 2009 using an estimation method proposed by Chambers and Dimson 
(2009).  
 
6.1. Hypothesis of Liquidity Shocks caused by Certain Market Conditions 
The hypothesis of liquidity shocks is not new for studies of SEO underpricing. In a 
typical SEO underwriting contract, a syndicate of investment banks guarantees to buy 
DQLVVXHU¶VHQWLUHHTXLW\RIIHULQJDWDIL[HGSULFH7his means that once the contract is 
signed the banks have to bear the entire price risk associated with reselling the shares 
to the public. Corwin (2003) suggests that a seasoned offer could be viewed as both 
permanent price pressure and temporary liquidity shocks that must be absorbed by the 
market. He also argues that permanent price effects should occur on the announcement 
day rather than the issue day due to market efficiency. Thus, it is reasonable to refer to 
the seasoned offer as temporary liquidity shocks that must be absorbed by investors. 
This idea is consistent with Scholes (1972) and Mikkelson and Partch (1985).  
                                                 
69
 Unless otherwise stated, underpricing refers to the close-to-offer return in this chapter. 
Chapter 6                           Liquidity Shocks and SEO Underpricing over the Long Run 
136 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Three, there are various concepts of liquidity shocks in the 
literature. For instance, research on mutual funds or hedge funds often interpret cash 
withdrawn or fund inflows as liquidity shocks (e.g.  Ding et al., 2009). Some studies 
on stock market liquidity assume that liquidity shocks are caused by selling a large 
amount of asset immediately (e.g. Da and Gao, 2010; Coval and Stafford, 2007). 
Under this rationale, liquidity shocks can be regarded as the temporary imbalance 
between supply and demand of the underlying securities. Indeed, the above definition 
that interprets liquidity shocks as an imbalance between supply and demand is 
consistent with Corwin (2003), and we therefore adopt that definition in this study. 
 
For temporary liquidity shocks, Corwin (2003) uses relative offer size, which is the 
ratio of new issues to shares outstanding prior to the issue, as the proxy and reports 
positive effects on the underpricing at a statistically significant level. Besides 
&RUZLQ¶V VWXG\ $OWLQNLlic and Hansen (2003), Mola and Loughran (2004), 
Chemmanur et al. (2009) and Huang and Zhang (2011) use relative offer size as a 
control variable in their models and report mixed results.  
 
In this study, the hypothesis of liquidity shocks is extended by considering market 
conditions. We hypothesise that aggregate issues with large proceeds, large market 
declines and market volatility could cause liquidity shocks that will consequently 
increase SEO underpricing.  
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6.1.1. Discussions of Three Scenarios of Market Conditions 
We propose three scenarios of market conditions, namely aggregate issues with large 
proceeds, large market declines and market volatility. Regarding aggregate issues with 
large proceeds, we assume that aggregate issues with large proceeds during a certain 
period could draw excessive funding in the market, causing a shortage of funding in 
the SEO market. Specifically, if issues are regarded as temporary liquidity shocks that 
must be absorbed by the market, there is a chance that investors will face a funding 
constraint after engaging in previous offerings with large proceeds during a short 
period. As a result, the underwriters have to set more issue discounts to attract 
investors. 
 
Liquidity shocks could also be caused by large market declines and market volatility. 
Recently, several theoretical studies have tried to explain why market declines cause 
asset illiquidity. Different theoretical models tell the story of illiquidity after market 
declines in a variety of ways. There are three main types of model in the literature:  
collateral-based models (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Garleanu and Pedersen, 
2007),  limits-to-arbitrage models (Kyle and Xiong, 2001; Xiong, 2001), and 
coordination failure models (Bernardo and Welch, 2004; Stephen Morris and Shin, 
2004).  
 
Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan (2010) conducted empirical tests and document 
economically significant returns to supplying liquidity after large market declines. The 
SEO market is slightly different from the secondary market in terms of market 
participants. However, since investors in both markets provide liquidity to the sellers 
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(issuers), we follow the notion of Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan (2010) that 
assumes liquidity shocks can be caused by large market declines and market volatility.  
 
Specifically, Garleanu and Pedersen (2007) proposed a theoretical model to explain 
the relationship between market liquidity and risk management by institutions. 
According to their model, in market downturns and market volatility, tighter risk 
management restricts the security position of institutions. If every institution uses a 
tight risk management strategy, then market liquidity is lowered. Moreover, tighter 
market liquidity further tightens risk management, causing a spiral.  
 
In the SEO market, there are two types of investors: retail investors and institutional 
investors, and the importance of institutional investors in equity offerings has 
increased dramatically in recent years (Chemmanur et al., 2009). Thus, it can be 
expected that risk management by institutional investors accompanied by large market 
declines and market volatility reduces the liquidity for the market of seasoned equity 
offerings. The underwriters therefore have to give more discounts during market 
declines. 
 
6.1.2. Proxies of Liquidity Shocks caused by Certain Market Conditions 
For liquidity shocks caused by aggregate issues with large proceeds, we use the ratio 
of aggregate SEO proceeds over the 90 trading days ending 1 day before the offer to 
the overall market capitalisation prior to the offer day.  
 
Chapter 6                           Liquidity Shocks and SEO Underpricing over the Long Run 
139 
 
ܴܣܲݎ݋ܿ݁ݏݏ ? ?ܵܧܱ ൌ  ? ܵܧܱܲݎ݋ܿ݁݁݀ݏଽ଴௧ିଽଵܱݒ݁ݎ݈݈ܽܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܥܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ݅ݖܽݐ݅݋݊௧ିଵ 
 
where t is the offer date and overall market capitalisation is the overall capitalisation 
in CRSP Stock Market Indexes (NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ/ARCA). SEO proceeds is 
calculated as the product of number of shares offered and the offer price. 
 
Liquidity shocks caused by market declines are measured by the interaction of market 
return Rmarket and dummy variable of market downturn Dmarket.  
 ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ ? ? ?ൌ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௠௔௥௞௘௧ כ ܦ௠௔௥௞௘௧ 
 
Rmarket is the accumulated return over the 250 trading days ending 1 day before the 
offer. Dmarket is a dummy that equals 1 if Rmarket is negative and zero otherwise. The 
proxy of liquidity shocks caused by market declines is similar to that in Hameed, 
Kang and Viswannathan (2010). Hameed, Kang and Viswannathan (2010) use 5 
trading days to define market decline since their research focuses on trading in the 
secondary market, but SEOs occur in the primary market and the average transaction 
size is far more than that in the secondary market. Moreover, in the primary market, 
given the fact that institutions are often long-term investors, market conditions in the 
long run should be taken into account instead of in the short run.  
 
Liquidity shocks caused by market volatility are measured by the standard deviations 
of daily returns, computed using equal-weighted portfolios of all firms listed on 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ/ARCA for the 21-trading-day returns ending at day t-1, 
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where t is the offer day. The definition is similar to the time-series return volatility 
measure in Lowry et al. (2010). 
 
6.2. Model Specification and Control Variables 
In the literature of SEO underpricing, several studies have already proposed possible 
explanations for SEO underpricing. In this section, we summarise those explanations 
that have already been proven to have statistically significant effects on SEO 
underpricing and incorporate them into the multivariate analysis. 
 
6.2.1. Uncertainty and Asymmetric Information 
Several existing studies document that both ex ante price uncertainty and information 
asymmetry have positive effects on SEO discounts. This is because investors require 
more compensation when it is difficult to value the firm (Rock, 1986). In this study, 
two proxies are employed to capture the uncertainty and asymmetric information. One 
is volatility, defined as the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the 30 trading 
days 11 days prior to the issue70. Volatility directly represents price uncertainty and is 
associated with levels of asymmetric information. The other proxy is market 
capitalisation of the underlying issuing firm. Large firms often suffer less information 
asymmetry than small firms. Therefore market capitalisation is employed as a control 
variable by a number of studies (e.g. Autore, 2011; Huang and Zhang, 2011). 
 
                                                 
70
 This definition of volatility is the same as that in Corwin (2003). 
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Corwin (2003) suggests that, even in the absence of information asymmetry, the time 
lag between offer pricing and distribution may still cause a significant relationship 
between uncertainty and underpricing. For instance, if the offer price is set after the 
close on day t and the shares are distributed on day t+1, there is still a good chance 
that the share price may drop significantly prior to completion of the offering. In order 
to make the offering attractive, the underwriter may tend to set the offer price below 
the most recent market price. The existing literature has shown a positive relationship 
between volatility and SEO underpricing (e.g. Corwin, 2003; Autore, 2011; Huang 
and Zhang, 2011). 
 
6.2.2. Manipulative Trading: Preoffer Price Moves 
Besides the effects of Rule 10b-21 71 , manipulative trading can still reduce the 
informativeness of the secondary market. Gerard and Nanda (1993), Corwin (2003) 
and Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) mention that preoffer return may reflect 
manipulative trading by investors who attempt to depress the offer price by selling in 
the preoffer secondary market. This manipulation reduces the informativeness of 
secondary market prices and increases SEO underpricing. However, Gerard and 
Nanda (1993) propose an opposing effect related to preoffer price changes. If 
underwriters account for these temporary preoffer price changes, temporary price 
increase (decline) in the days prior to the offer may lead to a larger (smaller) size of 
SEO underpricing.  
 
                                                 
71
 The effects of Rule 10b-21 have been thoroughly discussed in Chapter Five. 
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Moreover, Kim and Park (2005) propose that positive preoffer price moves reduce 
issuers¶ willingness to bargain over offer price with underwriters. The empirical 
results of Corwin (2003), Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) and Kim and Park (2005) 
show that a positive relationship between preoffer price movement and SEO 
underpricing. Corwin (2003) and Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) further point out that 
both higher positive preoffer price moves and negative preoffer price moves are 
related to higher SEO underpricing. 
 
6.2.3. Underwriter Pricing Practice 
In this section, we discuss two types of underwriter pricing practice. One practice is 
setting offer prices at next lower integer or other lower integers. The other is setting 
offer price at the closing bid. The first practice has become prevalent since the 1990s, 
while the latter one was popular during the 1990s and then diminished in the 2000s. 
 
6.2.3.1. Setting Offer Price at Integer 
Several studies document the increasing effects of investment banking practice on 
SEO discounts. Two significant practices have been reported. One is the increasing 
clustering of setting offer prices at integer values. The other is the practice of setting 
offer prices at the closing bid price prior to the offer. Mola and Loughran (2004) 
propose the argument that the tendency for underwriters to set offer prices at an 
integer more frequently than before is evidence of increased investment banking 
power. Other studies (e.g. Chemmanur et al., 2009) at least regard cluster of offer 
price as an underwriting practice.  
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In our sample, the cluster of integer offering price is again confirmed. Overall, there 
are 1902 issues with integer offer prices in our sample of 5347 issues, indicating that 
35% of all issues had integer offer prices. Figure 6-1 illustrates the trend for clustering 
in offer price. In 1987-1995, there were 397 issues with integer closing price, 
representing about 20% of all issues. In the same period, 634 issues or 32% of all 
issues had an integer offer price. The difference between the two ratios illustrates that 
underwriters already had the practice of setting offer prices at an integer.  
 
 
Figure 6-1 Trend of cluster in integer offer prices 
 
This practice is again documented in the second period in our sample. In 1996-2001, 
although the number of issues with integer closing price declined to 279 (16% of all 
issues), the number of issues with integer offer price increased to 795 (46% of all 
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issues). This comparison suggests that the practice of setting offer prices at integer 
was gaining prominence among underwriters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-2 Integer offer price clustering relative to the prior closing price 
categorised by subperiods 
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The sample consists of 1902 SEOs with an integer offer price from 1987-2009. The offer dates 
are adjusted. The offerings are classified relative to the prior closing price. For instance, if the 
closing price on the day before the issue is $10.25, the integer offer price might be $10 (Next 
Lower Integer), or $9 or $8 etc. (Other Lower Integers), or $11 (Next Higher Integer), or $12 or 
$13 etc.(Other Higher Integers). If the prior closing price and the offer price are the same integer, 
the offer price is recorded as Same Integer (No Discount). 
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In the third period, there was a major change in the external conditions for setting 
prices at integer. On April 9, 2001, the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
ordered all US stock markets to convert to decimals. As a result, we can observe a 
substantial decline of issues with integer closing price. Only 53 issues had integer 
closing prices among 1621 issues from 2002-2009, representing 3.27% of the sub 
sample. Still, we can observe that 473 issues in 2002-2009 were priced at integer (29% 
of the sub sample). 
 
This result suggests that setting integer offer prices is still popular among underwriters.  
Figure 6-2 provides further evidence for the practice of setting offer prices at integer. 
In 1987-1995, around 70% of issues with integer offer prices had their prices set at 
next lower integer or other lower integers. However, this ratio increased to 89% in 
1996-2001 and 95% in 2002-2009, representing 707 and 455 issues, respectively. 
 
6.2.3.2. Setting Offer Price at the Closing Bid 
As for setting offer prices at the closing bid, this practice, as documented by Lee et al. 
(1996) and Corwin (2003), was quite common for NASDAQ offers in the 1990s. 
Particularly, setting offer prices at the closing bid was quite common for NASDAQ 
offers but not common for NYSE offers during the 1990s. According to Corwin 
(2003), this NASDAQ-only practice is confirmed by market professionals. The reason 
why this practice is so largely implemented on the NASDAQ market is the different 
information reflected by closing prices on the two markets.  
 
Closing price on the NYSE is a centralised closing price and is likely to reflect the 
aggregate supply and demand of the security because each security is assigned to a 
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single specialist who handles the majority of order flow, whereas trading on the 
NASDAQ is dealt with by multiple market makers and closing price is the last 
reported trade from a single market maker, which does not necessarily reflect 
information available across all NASDAQ market makers. As a result, the closing bid 
is perceived as a better indicator of selling price than the closing trade price for 
NASDAQ securities.  
 
Table 6-1 Pricing at the prior closing price and the prior closing bid 
Panel A 1987-2009       
  All Cases Prior Closing Price!=Prior Closing Bid 
  
Offer Price=Prior Closing 
Price 
Offer Price= Prior Closing 
Bid 
Offer Price=Prior Closing 
Price 
Offer Price= Prior Closing Bid 
All Issues 635 1089 295 760 
4761 13.34% 22.87% 6.20% 15.96% 
NYSE 251 109 208 66 
1326 18.93% 8.22% 15.69% 4.98% 
NASDAQ 373 980 87 694 
3435 10.86% 28.53% 2.53% 20.20% 
Panel B 1987-1995       
  All Cases Prior Closing Price!=Prior Closing Bid 
  
Offer Price=Prior Closing 
Price 
Offer Price= Prior Closing 
Bid 
Offer Price=Prior Closing 
Price 
Offer Price= Prior Closing Bid 
All Issues 390 673 170 453 
1500 26.00% 44.87% 11.33% 30.20% 
NYSE 141 65 107 31 
276 51.09% 23.55% 38.77% 11.23% 
NASDAQ 249 608 63 422 
1224 20.34% 49.67% 5.15% 34.48% 
Panel C 1996-2001       
  All Cases Prior Closing Price!=Prior Closing Bid 
  
Offer Price=Prior Closing 
Price 
Offer Price= Prior Closing 
Bid 
Offer Price=Prior Closing 
Price 
Offer Price= Prior Closing Bid 
All Issues 212 405 107 300 
1660 12.77% 24.40% 6.45% 18.07% 
NYSE 93 37 86 30 
393 23.66% 9.41% 21.88% 7.63% 
NASDAQ 119 368 21 270 
1267 9.39% 29.04% 1.66% 21.31% 
Panel D 2002-2009       
  All Cases Prior Closing Price!=Prior Closing Bid 
  
Offer Price=Prior Closing 
Price 
Offer Price= Prior Closing 
Bid 
Offer Price=Prior Closing 
Price 
Offer Price= Prior Closing Bid 
All Issues 22 11 18 7 
1601 1.37% 0.69% 1.12% 0.44% 
NYSE 17 7 15 5 
657 2.59% 1.07% 2.28% 0.76% 
NASDAQ 5 4 3 2 
944 0.53% 0.44% 0.44% 0.22% 
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Corwin (2003) used the percentage difference between the closing transaction price 
and the closing bid quote (CloseBidDiff) to test the practice of pricing at the bid quote. 
If SEO underpricing is completely explained by that practice, the coefficient of 
CloseBidDiff will be one. Corwin (2003) reports the coefficient of CloseBidDiff at 
about 0.7, which empirically proves the practice of pricing at the bid quote. 
 
Table 6-1 provides an overall picture of setting offer price at the closing bid prior to 
the offer in our sample. Among 4761 issues, 1089 issues were set with offer price at 
the closing bid prior to the offer, representing 22.87% of all issues72. 635 or 13.34% of 
all issues had offer prices set at the closing transaction price on the day prior to the 
offer. For the cases where the prior closing price is not equal to prior closing bid, 760 
or 15.96 % of all issues were priced at prior closing transaction price.  
 
Consistent with the literature, this practice is especially popular among NASDAQ 
issues. 28.53% of all NASDAQ issues were priced at prior closing bid. Even for the 
cases with the prior closing price different from prior closing bid, 20.20% of all 
NASDAQ issues were priced at prior closing bid. However, this practice lost its 
prominence over time. In 1987-1995, 49.67% of all NASDAQ issues were priced at 
prior closing bid. However, this ratio drops to 29.04% for the period 1996-2001. 
Moreover, this practice seems to have been completely abandoned by underwriters in 
the third period. The change can be partially explained by the gradual popularity of 
integer offer prices. As more and more issues were priced at integer, the practice of 
                                                 
72
 We exclude issues without bid, ask price at CRSP so that the sample size reduces to 4761. 
Chapter 6                           Liquidity Shocks and SEO Underpricing over the Long Run 
148 
 
setting offer prices at prior closing bid was apparently losing its prominence for 
NASDAQ issues. 
 
6.2.4. Underwriter Quality: Underwriter Rankings and Top-tier Analyst 
For studies of IPO underpricing, underwriter quality is widely considered to be 
important. Carter and Manaster (1990) first proposed the reputation ranking of 
underwriters. The ranking for the most prestigious underwriters is 9 and least 
prestigious is 1. This reputation ranking system was extended by Carter, Dark and 
Singh (1998). Loughran and Ritter (2004) updated the rankings to 2004, loosely based 
on the previous two rankings.  
 
7KH UDQNLQJ XSGDWHG WR  FDQ EH GRZQORDGHG IURP -D\ 5LWWHU¶V ZHE SDJH DW
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm 73 . The hypothesis of underwriter 
reputation is that more prestigious underwriters can attract more investors and thereby 
less SEO underpricing is needed. In the literature on SEO underpricing, Mola and 
Loughran (2004) constructed an underwriter reputation dummy based on the 
reputation ranking. The dummy equals one if one of the lead underwriters has a 
reputation rank equal to or greater than 8 and zero otherwise. Their study found a 
significantly negative relationship between reputation dummy and SEO underpricing.  
 
                                                 
73
 5LWWHU¶VUDQNLQJLVVOLJKWO\GLIIHUHQWIURP&DUWHUDQG0DQDVWHUPRVWSUHVWLJLRXVXQGHUZULWHUVDUH
and least prestigious are 1.1. 
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Figure 6-3 SEO underpricing by underwriter category 
 
Similarly, Kim and Shin (2004) used the rankings directly in their regression and 
found that the reputation rankings are negatively related to SEO underpricing at a 
statistically significant level after controlling for other factors. Chemmanur, He and 
Hu (2009) constructed a reputation dummy equal to one if the highest lead 
XQGHUZULWHUV¶UHSXWDWLRQ dummy was 9.1 and zero otherwise74. In their regression, the 
dummy was negatively related to SEO underpricing at a statistically significant level.  
 
In our study, we construct the underwriter reputation dummy using the method used 
by Mola and Loughran (2004). Figure 6-3 illustrates effects of underwriter reputation 
on SEO underpricing. Issues underwritten by investment banks with prestigious 
reputations are substantially less underpriced than others over time. This difference in 
underpricing suggests that prestigious investment banks may attract more investors 
and therefore help issuers to reduce the underpricing. 
                                                 
74
 The reason why 9.1 is used is because Chemmanur HWDOXVH5LWWHU¶VUDQNLQJ 
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Two studies of SEO underpricing take account of analyst coverage but their 
conclusions are inconsistent. Mola and Loughran (2004) constructed a dummy 
variable Toptier dummy equal to one if the analyst team of the underwriters was the 
top ten team ranked by Institutional Investors in the prior year. They claim a 
significantly positive relationship between the dummy and SEO underpricing. This 
finding is used to support their hypothesis of investment banking power, since they 
argue that banks with top-tier analysts can press issuers to leave more money on the 
table. However, as we discussed earlier in Chapter Five, their conclusion was highly 
likely based on a database without offer date correction.  
 
 
Figure 6-4 SEO underpricing by top-tier category 
 
The conclusion from Bowen, Xia and Qiang (2008) strengthens the doubt. They 
hypothesised that analyst coverage can mitigate the information asymmetry and 
thereby reduce SEO underpricing. In their study, they used an offer date correction 
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method similar to Corwin¶V (2003). They defined dummy variable lead underwriter 
coverage as equal to one if an analyst from the lead underwriter team covered the 
issuer in the year prior to the offer. They also defined a dummy variable high-ability 
analyst coverage that equalled one if at least two analysts following the issuer in the 
year prior to the SEO were Institutional Investor All-American team analysts or 
experienced analysts75. Both the variables had statistically negative effects on SEO 
underpricing.  
 
In our study, we define the dummy variable Toptier analyst in the same way as Mola 
and Loughran (2004). Figure 6-4 presents SEO underpricing by top-tier category. 
Issues underwritten by banks with top-tier analysts are less underpriced than others. 
Given that the majority of banks with high reputation rankings actually have top-tier 
analyst teams, this result is reasonable and is consistent with Bowen, Xia and Qiang 
(2008).  
 
6.2.5. NASDAQ Dummy and Pre-offer Price 
Two factors are often used as control factors in studies of SEO underpricing. Both 
factors usually have statistically significant effects on SEO underpricing. However, 
there are few theoretical explanations for these two factors, therefore, we categorise 
them as factors from empirical evidence.  
 
                                                 
75
 In Bowen et al. (2008), an analyst is considered to be an experienced analyst in a given year if the 
JHQHUDOH[SHULHQFHRIWKHDQDO\VWLVLQWKHWRSTXDUWLOHRIDQDO\VWV¶JHQHUDOH[SHULHQFHLQWKDW\HDU$Q
DQDO\VW¶VJHQHUDOH[SHULHQFHLVPHDVXUHGDVWKHnumber of quarters between the first earnings forecast 
issued by the analyst (for any firm) and the offer date of the SEO. The relative data are obtained from 
I/B/E/S Detailed Earning s Forecast file. 
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The first factor is the market where the share is listed. Almost all studies on SEO 
underpricing document the differences in SEO underpricing between NASDAQ and 
NYSE firms. For instance, Corwin (2003) reported a 0.92% discount for NYSE offers 
and 2.72% discount for NASDAQ offers during his sample period. Altinkilic and 
Hansen (2003) also reported differences in underpricing between NYSE and 
NASDAQ offers. A possible explanation is the differences in characters between the 
two groups of issuers. NYSE issuers tend to be larger, more actively traded firms, 
while NASDAQ issuers are smaller firms with higher volatility of their shares.  
 
Figure 6-5 illustrates the increase of SEO underpricing for both NASDAQ and NYSE 
issues. The increase of NASDAQ issues is more rapid than that of NYSE issues. The 
changing composite hypothesis suggests that the increase in SEO underpricing is 
caused by the increase of the ratio of NASDAQ issues to all issues. However, as both 
NASDAQ and NYSE issues experienced increase in SEO underpricing, the changing 
composite hypothesis obviously cannot fully explain the increase of SEO underpricing. 
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Figure 6-5 SEO underpricing by exchange category 
 
The other factor is the price of the underlying shares. Nearly all studies of SEO 
underpricing suggest preoffer price is an important control factor in the regression 
analysis. One possible explanation is that offer price is often set at a level which gives 
a relatively small range of difference between offer price and price on the day prior to 
the offer. However, there is also no formal hypothesis about this factor. Corwin (2003)  
suggests that for issues with lower preoffer prices, the practice of setting the offer 
price at integer would have more effect on SEO underpricing. Butler et al. (2005) also 
mention that institutions prefer to shun low price shares, making it more difficult for 
underwriters to place low price shares. The results of empirical tests (e.g., Corwin, 
2003; Kim and Park, 2005) suggest that preoffer price has significantly negative 
effects on SEO underpricing. 
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6.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6-2 Definitions of explanatory variables 
RAProceeds90SEO 
the ratio of aggregate SEO proceeds over the 90 trading days ending 1 day before the offer to 
the overall market capitalisation prior to the offer day. 
MarketVolatility 
the standard deviations of daily returns, computed using equal-weighted portfolios of all 
firms listed on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ/ARCA for the 21-trading-day returns ending one day 
before the offer day. 
Market250 
the proxy of liquidity shocks caused by market decline, MarketN=MarketReturnN*Dmarket, 
where MarketReturnN is the return on CRSP index over the prior N trading days and Dmarket 
equals one if MarketReturnN>0 and zero otherwise. 
Volatility 
the standard deviation of daily close-to-close returns over the 30 trading days ending 11 days 
prior to the offer 
MarketCap 
the logged pre-issue market capitalization, measured as the price multiplied by the total 
number of shares outstanding at the market close before the offer. 
CARPos(Neg) 
as the cumulative market-adjusted return over the 5 days prior to the offer and it equals zero 
if the return is positive (negative), where market return is defined as the return on the CRSP 
value weighted index 
LnPrice LnPrice is the logarithm of closing price on the day prior to the offer 
CLUSTER a dummy variable equal to one if the offer price is set at integer and equal to zero otherwise 
CloseBidDiffNY 
CloseBidDiffNY is (closing transaction price-closing bid quote)/closing transaction price and is 
zero if the issuer is listed on NYSE 
CloseBidDiffNas 
CloseBidDiffNas is (closing transaction price-closing bid quote)/closing transaction price and is 
zero if the issuer is listed on NASDAQ 
NASDAQDummy a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer is listed on Nasdaq and zero otherwise 
Underwriter 
a dummy equals one if one of the lead underwriters has the reputation rank equal to or 
greater than 8 and zero otherwise. The ranking is made by Ritter and available on 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm    
Toptier 
a dummy equal to one if the SEO underwriter (book manager) has an analyst group ranked 
among the top 10 groups selected by Institutional Investor each October of the prior calendar 
year 
Reloffersize the ratio of the No. of shares offered to the total No. of outstanding shares prior to the offer 
 
Table 6-2 presents the definitions of all explanatory variables. The first three variables 
are proxies of liquidity shocks and the remaining variables are control variables that 
have been employed in the literature. Due to data limitations 76 , for variables 
CloseBidDiffNY and CloseBidDiffNas, there are only 4761 observations and there are 
                                                 
76
 Some bid and ask data are missing in CRSP, especially for data before the 1990s. 
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5339 observations for variable Volatility, whilst for others there are 5347 observations. 
In sum, there are 4756 SEOs without any missing value for all explanatory variables. 
 
Table 6-3 Summary statistics for SEOs 
 
Means of 
All issues (N=4756) 
Means of 
NYSE Issues 
(N=1326) 
Means of 
NASDAQ Issues 
(N=3430) 
p-value 
Underpricing 3.04% 2.22% 3.35% 0.0000 
MarketCap 19.89 21.04 19.45 0.0000 
Volatility 3.75% 2.77% 4.12% 0.0000 
CARPos 2.27% 1.92% 2.41% 0.0035 
CARNeg -4.24% -3.24% -4.63% 0.0000 
LnPrice 3.04 3.23 2.96 0.0000 
CloseBidDiff 0.89% 0.47% 1.06% 0.0000 
Reloffersize 20.39% 14.98% 22.49% 0.0000 
Underwriter 72.96% 89.74% 66.47% 0.0000 
Toptier 52.44% 81.00% 41.40% 0.0000 
Cluster 36.19% 28.51% 39.15% 0.0000 
The sample includes 4756 SEOs from the period 1987-2009. The definition of the variables can be found at Table 6-
2. The p-value is from a test of the restriction that means are equal across market based on an analysis of variance. 
 
Table 6-3 provides a general description for all issues, NYSE issues and NASDAQ 
issues77 . We can observe clear differences between NYSE and NASDAQ issues. 
NASDAQ issues are generally smaller in terms of prior closing price, market 
capitalisation and expected proceeds. They are underwritten by less prestigious banks 
more frequently. Shares of NASDAQ issues have higher volatility than shares of 
NYSE issues. Moreover, NASDAQ issues often have larger relative offer size than 
NYSE issues and setting offer prices at integer is also more popular among NASDAQ 
                                                 
77
 We only include SEOs without missing values for all explanatory variables. Therefore there are only 
4756 SEOs in Table 6-3 
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issues than NYSE issues. Among all issues, around 40% of all NASDAQ issues have 
integer offer prices while about 30% of all NYSE issues have integer offer prices. 
 
Table 6-4 Underpricing by category 
Panel A Underpricing 
 
Low 
  
High 
Quartile 1 2 3 4 
MarketCap 4.01% 3.22% 2.51% 2.40% 
Volatility 1.70% 2.63% 3.57% 4.24% 
LnPrice 4.94% 2.92% 2.29% 1.99% 
CAR5 3.43% 2.61% 2.54% 3.56% 
Reloffersize 2.56% 2.76% 3.05% 3.78% 
RAProceedsSEO90 2.83% 2.78% 2.77% 3.76% 
MarketVolatility 2.36% 2.77% 2.84% 4.18% 
Panel B   Underpricing   
  if Market250=0 if Market250<0 
Underpricing 
1987-2007 
2.77% (3883 observations) 4.21% (873 observations) 
Underpricing  
1987-1995 
2.38% (1414 observations) 1.97% (85 observations) 
Underpricing   
1996-2001 
2.84% (1454 observations) 3.83% (203 observations) 
Underpricing 
2002-2009 
3.22% (1015 observations) 4.66% (585 observations) 
The definitions of the variables can be found at Table 6-2. The sample includes 4756 SEOs from 
the period 1987-2009. 
 
Table 6-4 presents two panels with univariate analysis. For each control variable, 
Panel A lists the average underpricing in each quartile. Volatility and relative offer 
size seem to be positively associated with underpricing while market capitalisation,  
pre-offer price seem to be negatively related to underpricing. The U-shape for 
cumulative abnormal return is consistent with the empirical evidence that underpricing 
is positively related to absolute value of CAR. All of this is consistent with the 
literature. 
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Regarding proxies of liquidity shocks, the magnitudes of average underpricing in the 
first three quartiles remains stable for RAProceeds90SEO and MarketVolatility seems 
to be positively associated with underpricing. In Panel B, Market250 represents the 
liquidity shocks. The average underpricing when Market250 is less than zero is larger 
than that when Market250 is zero. For all issues, issues offered during market 
downturn have higher underpricing (4.21%) than others (2.77%).  
 
Table 6-5 presents descriptive statistics of all the control variables by subperiods. 
Most control variables did not change consistently over the three subperiods. As for 
Volatility and LnPrice, there is an increase in the value from Period 1 to Period 2 and 
then a decrease from period 2 to period 3. Both CARPos(Neg) and 
CloseBidDiffNY(Nas) have similar patterns. As discussed earlier, CLUSTER 
represents the practice of setting offer prices at integer. In Period 1, 32.76% of issues 
have integer offer prices. This ratio increases to 46.11% in period 2. Apparently, 
setting offer price at integer contributed to the increase of SEO underpricing over 
Period 1 and Period 2, however the ratio decreases to 29.13% in Period 3, indicating 
that other factors may have effects on SEO underpricing over time. 
 
Additionally, relative offer size is relatively stable during Period 1 and Period 2. The 
previous univariate analysis already suggests that both variables are positively related 
to SEO underpricing. The underwriter dummy, which represents the reputation of 
underwriters, is almost constant over time, indicating that the ratio of issues 
underwritten by high reputation underwriters is stable over time. The ratio of issues 
underwritten by banks with top-tier analyst teams increases from period 2 to period 3, 
indicating that more offers are underwritten by banks with a top-tier analyst team. 
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Table 6-5 Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables by subperiods 
 
1 (1987-
1995) 
2 (1996-
2001) 
3 (2002-
2009) 
P-value(2)-(1) P-value(3)-(2) 
Volatility 3.42% 4.40% 3.38% 0.0000 1.0000 
  3.12% 3.74% 2.90% 0.0000 0.0000 
MarketCap 19.06 20.03 20.54 0.0000 0.0000 
  18.98 19.92 20.35 0.0000 0.0000 
CARPos 1.77% 2.65% 2.34% 0.0000 0.9347 
  - - -   
CARNeg -3.67% -5.27% -3.71% 1.0000 0.0000 
  - - -   
LnPrice 2.91 3.27 2.90 0.0000 1.0000 
  2.94 3.27 2.98 0.0000 0.0000 
CLUSTER 32.76% 46.11% 29.13% 0.0000 1.0000 
  - - -   
CloseBidDiffNY 0.13% 0.20% 0.06% 0.0000 1.0000 
  - - -   
CloseBidDiffNas 1.54% 0.69% 0.11% 1.0000 1.0000 
  - - -   
NASDAQDummy 81.72% 76.10% 59.06% 0.9999 1.0000 
  - - -   
Underwriter 69.78% 77.61% 71.13% 0.0000 1.0000 
  - - -   
Toptier 41.69% 49.97% 65.06% 0.0000 0.0000 
  - - -   
Reloffersize 22.81% 21.06% 17.44% 0.9984 1.0000 
  19.97% 17.36% 14.07% 0.0000 0.0000 
No. of Obs. 1499 1657 1600   
The sample includes 4756 SEOs from the period 1987-2009. The definitions of these variables are listed 
in Table 6-2. Means (medians) are listed in the first (second) line for each variable. p-values for 
difference within subsample means (medians) are from standard t-tests (Wilcoxon rank-sum test). 
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6.4. Regression Results of SEO Underpricing 
In this section, the multivariate tests are conducted. The base model is listed below by 
including all control variables discussed earlier, then proxies of liquidity shocks are 
incorporated and comprehensive analysis is conducted.  
 ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܥܽ݌ ൅ ߚଶܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ ൅ ߚଷܥܣܴܲ݋ݏ ൅ ߚସܥܣܴܰ݁݃ ൅ ߚହܮ݊ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ ൅ߚ଺ܥܮܷܵܶܧܴ ൅ ߚ଻ܥ݈݋ݏ݁ܤ݅݀ܦ݂݂ܻ݅ܰ ൅ ߚ଼ܥ݈݋ݏ݁ܤ݅݀ܦ݂݂݅ܰܽݏ ൅ ߚଽܰܣܵܦܣܳܦݑ݉݉ݕ ൅ߚଵ଴ܷ݊݀݁ݎݓݎ݅ݐ݁ݎ ൅ ߚଵଵܶ݋݌ݐ݅݁ݎ ൅ ߚଵଶܴ݈݁݋݂݂݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁.                                                           (6.1) 
 
We include three variables of liquidity shocks into the base model and test the effects 
of these variables on underpricing. Panel A and Panel B in Table 6-6 report the results 
from estimating multiple regressions using different sets of variables across the 1987 
to 2009 sample period. The only difference between the two panels is that Panel B 
includes year dummies in all regressions. 
 
In Panel A, proxies of liquidity shocks from Model 2 to Model 4 are consistent and 
have the expected sign and the coefficients of these proxies of liquidity shocks are 
statistically significant at conventional levels. In Model 5, when three proxies are 
included, only MarketVolatility is statistically and positively associated with the SEO 
underpricing. Market250 exhibits a weak negative link with SEO underpricing while 
there seems to be no incremental link between RAProceeds90SEO and SEO 
underpricing.  
 
In Panel B, year dummies are added into the regressions. Although proxies of liquidity 
shocks still have the expected signs in Model 2 to Model 5, coefficients of 
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RAProceeds90SEO and Market250 are statistically insignificant. Comparison of  these 
results with those in Panel A suggests that the effects of RAProceeds90SEO and 
Market250 might be captured by year dummies. Only the MarketVolatility coefficient 
is significant. The MarketVolatility coefficient indicates that, holding other things 
equal, underpricing will increase by 0.5% if MarketVolatility increases by about 1%.  
 
Table 6-6 OLS Regression results for SEO underpricing 
Panel A 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
MarketCap 0.0067*** 0.0066*** 0.0058*** 0.0050*** 0.0050*** 
 
(12.25) (12.14) (10.48) (9.01) (8.95) 
Volatility 0.2248*** 0.2028*** 0.1898*** 0.1650*** 0.1618*** 
 
(10.00) (8.93) (8.40) (7.30) (7.12) 
CARPos 0.0767*** 0.0746*** 0.0743*** 0.0731*** 0.0727*** 
 
(7.81) (7.61) (7.63) (7.56) (7.52) 
CARNeg -0.0152* -0.0090 -0.0142 -0.0028 -0.0035 
 
(-1.67) (-0.99) (-1.58) (-0.31) (-0.38) 
LnPrice -0.0212*** -0.0206*** -0.0191*** -0.0187*** -0.0185*** 
 
(-23.92) (-23.26) (-21.18) (-21.03) (-20.56) 
CLUSTER 0.0122*** 0.0120*** 0.0119*** 0.0116*** 0.0116*** 
 
(12.44) (12.26) (12.19) (12.01) (11.98) 
CloseBidDiffNY 0.3642*** 0.3970*** 0.4764*** 0.4866*** 0.5017*** 
 
(2.88) (3.15) (3.78) (3.90) (4.01) 
CloseBidDiffNas 0.5445*** 0.5363*** 0.5717*** 0.5962*** 0.5950*** 
 
(15.30) (15.11) (16.16) (16.93) (16.81) 
NASDAQDummy 0.0041*** 0.0052*** 0.0060*** 0.0060*** 0.0064*** 
 
(2.87) (3.58) (4.14) (4.22) (4.42) 
Underwriter -0.0080*** -0.0077*** -0.0073*** -0.0061*** -0.0061*** 
 
(-6.19) (-5.98) (-5.66) (-4.75) (-4.78) 
Toptier -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0010 
 
(-0.64) (-0.52) (-0.78) (-0.83) (-0.82) 
Reloffersize 0.0130*** 0.0133*** 0.0126*** 0.0119*** 0.0120*** 
 
(3.98) (4.09) (3.89) (3.70) (3.73) 
RAProceeds90SEO 
 
0.0032*** 
  
0.0004 
  
(5.93) 
  
(0.64) 
Market250 
  
-0.0593*** 
 
-0.0144* 
   
(-9.31) 
 
(-1.73) 
MarketVolatility 
   
1.4704*** 1.2774*** 
    
(12.76) (8.64) 
Constant -0.0579*** -0.0620*** -0.0480*** -0.0411*** -0.0413*** 
 
(-5.54) (-5.94) (-4.60) (-3.96) (-3.95) 
Year Dummy No No No No No 
N 4756 4756 4756 4756 4756 
Adjusted R
2
 0.2462 0.2516 0.2596 0.2711 0.2715 
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Panel B 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
MarketCap 0.0014** 0.0014** 0.0014** 0.0014** 0.0014** 
 
(2.36) (2.41) (2.34) (2.30) (2.38) 
Volatility 0.1769*** 0.1747*** 0.1753*** 0.1681*** 0.1701*** 
 
(7.65) (7.54) (7.52) (7.22) (7.29) 
CARPos 0.0660*** 0.0659*** 0.0659*** 0.0664*** 0.0668*** 
 
(6.94) (6.93) (6.93) (6.99) (7.03) 
CARNeg -0.0034 -0.0020 -0.0033 -0.0014 -0.0003 
 
(-0.38) (-0.22) (-0.36) (-0.16) (-0.03) 
LnPrice -0.0151*** -0.0151*** -0.0151*** -0.0150*** -0.0151*** 
 
(-15.58) (-15.60) (-15.57) (-15.51) (-15.52) 
CLUSTER 0.0113*** 0.0112*** 0.0112*** 0.0112*** 0.0112*** 
 
(11.90) (11.86) (11.88) (11.80) (11.81) 
CloseBidDiffNY 0.6698*** 0.6726*** 0.6719*** 0.6632*** 0.6562*** 
 
(5.29) (5.31) (5.30) (5.24) (5.18) 
CloseBidDiffNas 0.7204*** 0.7210*** 0.7202*** 0.7195*** 0.7207*** 
 
(19.91) (19.93) (19.90) (19.91) (19.94) 
NASDAQDummy 0.0055*** 0.0056*** 0.0056*** 0.0058*** 0.0057*** 
 
(3.86) (3.94) (3.90) (4.07) (3.97) 
Underwriter -0.0026** -0.0026** -0.0026** -0.0025** -0.0025** 
 
(-2.04) (-2.02) (-2.04) (-1.97) (-1.96) 
Toptier -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0018 
 
(-1.58) (-1.58) (-1.58) (-1.54) (-1.54) 
Reloffersize 0.0034 0.0036 0.0035 0.0038 0.0038 
 
(1.08) (1.13) (1.10) (1.20) (1.21) 
RAProceeds90SEO 
 
0.0011 
  
0.0008 
  
(1.40) 
  
(1.04) 
Market250 
  
-0.0046 
 
0.0170 
   
(-0.52) 
 
(1.54) 
MarketVolatility 
   
0.4444*** 0.5405*** 
    
(3.14) (3.26) 
Constant 0.0004 -0.0017 0.0005 -0.0010 -0.0035 
 
(0.04) (-0.15) (0.05) (-0.09) (-0.31) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4756 4756 4756 4756 4756 
Adjusted R
2
 0.3079 0.3081 0.3078 0.3092 0.3094 
Underpricing is defined as ((P-OP)/P)*100, where P is the prior offer closing price and OP is the offer price. Volatility is the standard 
deviation of daily close-to-close returns over the 30 trading days ending 11 days prior to the offer. MarketCap is the logged pre-issue 
market capitalization, measured as the price multiplied by the total number of shares outstanding at the market close before the offer. 
CARPos (CARNeg) is defined as the cumulative market-adjusted return over the 5 days prior to the offer and it equals zero if the return 
is negative (positive), where market return is defined as the return on the CRSP value weighted index. CLUSTER is a Dummy equal to 
one if the offer price is set at integer. CloseBidDiffNYSE (CloseBidDiffNas) is Closing transaction price-closing bid quote)/closing 
transaction price and is zero if the issuer is list on NASDAQ (NYSE). NASDAQDummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer is list 
on NASDAQ. Toptier is a dummy equal to one if the SEO underwriter (book manager) has an analyst group ranked among the top 10 
groups selected by Institutional investor each October of the prior calendar year. Underwriter is a dummy equals one if one of the lead 
underwriters has the reputation rank equal to or greater than 8 and zero otherwise. The ranking is made by Ritter and available on 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. Reloffersize is the ratio between the shares offered to the outstanding shares prior 
to the offer. RAProceeds90SEO is the ratio of aggregate SEO proceeds over the 90 trading days ending 1 day before the offer to the 
overall market capitalization prior to the offer day. MarketVolatility is the standard deviations of daily returns, computed using equal-
weighted portfolios of all firms listed on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ/ARCA for the 21-trading-day returns ending one day before the offer 
day. Market250 the proxy of liquidity shocks caused by market decline, Market250=MarketReturn250*Dmarket, where MarketReturn250 
is the return on CRSP index over the prior 250 trading days and Dmarket equals one if MarketReturn250>0 and zero otherwise. The value 
of t statistics is in brackets. ***,**, and* represent 1% 5% and 10% significance, respectively. 
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Among other variables in Panel A and Panel B, all variables are of the expected sign 
except two, namely MarketCap and Top-tier. MarketCap is the proxy of information 
asymmetry. SEO made by firms with large market capitalisations suffer less from the 
problem of information asymmetry. Therefore, the expected sign for MarketCap 
should be negative. In our regressions, however, all coefficients of MarketCap are 
significantly positive. This result indicates that SEOs suffer less from information 
asymmetry than IPOs, which is consistent with the literature (e.g. Chemmanur et al., 
2009).  
 
Regarding Top-tier analyst, this variable equals one if one of lead underwriters has a 
top-tier analyst team ranked by Institutional Investors in the last year, and zero 
otherwise. The coefficients of this variable in all regressions are insignificantly 
negative. The results are consistent with what we found in Chapter Five. Again, there 
is no evidence suggesting that issues underwritten by a syndicate with a top-tier 
analyst team would be underpriced more than others, ceteris paribus. However, an 
insignificant coefficient of the Top-tier variable does not necessarily mean that there is 
no evidence of investment banking power. What we find here only suggests that the 
variable Top-tier dummy may be not an appropriate proxy of investment banking 
power in the case of SEO underpricing. 
 
CLUSTER equals one if the offer price is set at integer, and zero otherwise. In all 
regressions, the coefficients on CLUSTER are positively significant. For instance, in 
Model 5 Panel B, the coefficient suggests that if an issue is priced at integer, the SEO 
underpricing will be 1.12% higher than one with a non-integer offer price, all else 
being equal. As for the pricing practice of setting offer prices at closing bid, both 
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CloseBidDiffNY and CloseBidDiffNas have significant coefficients with the expected 
sign. In model 1-5 Panel B, the CloseBidDiffNY coefficient is around 0.66, while the 
CloseBidDiffNas coefficient is around 0.7, suggesting that the practice has substantial 
effects on SEO underpricing in our sample. 
 
Volatility, CARPos and LnPrice, NASDAQDummy, and Underwriter all have 
significant coefficients with expected signs in all regressions. These results are in line 
with recent studies such as Chemmanur et al. (2009), Huang and Zhang (2011) and 
Autore (2011). The coefficients of CARNeg and Reloffersize are insignificant despite 
having the expected signs. This result is consistent with Chemmanur et al. (2009) 
 
6.5. The Behaviour of SEO Underpricing 
After discussing the regression results, we turn to the behaviour of SEO underpricing 
over our sample period from 1987 to 2009. In our model, we found some mixed 
evidence regarding the liquidity shocks hypothesis. One proxy, MarketVolatility, is 
significantly and positively associated with SEO underpricing in all sets of regressions, 
while two others, Market250 and RAProceeds90SEO, have insignificant coefficients 
when year dummies are included in regressions. In this section, we use model (6.2) to 
estimate coefficients on the year dummy variables, controlling for issue characteristics,   
firm characteristics, liquidity shocks caused by market conditions.  
 ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܥܽ݌ ൅ ߚଶܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ ൅ ߚଷܥܣܴܲ݋ݏ ൅ ߚସܥܣܴܰ݁݃ ൅ ߚହܮ݊ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ ൅ߚ଺ܥܮܷܵܶܧܴ ൅ ߚ଻ܥ݈݋ݏ݁ܤ݅݀ܦ݂݂ܻ݅ܰ ൅ ߚ଼ܥ݈݋ݏ݁ܤ݅݀ܦ݂݂݅ܰܽݏ ൅ ߚଽܰܣܵܦܣܳܦݑ݉݉ݕ ൅ߚଵ଴ܷ݊݀݁ݎݓݎ݅ݐ݁ݎ ൅ ߚଵଵܶ݋݌ݐ݅݁ݎ ൅ ߚଵଶܴ݈݁݋݂݂݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁ ൅ ߚଵଷܴܣܲݎ݋ܿ݁݁݀ݏܵܧܱ ? ?൅ ߚଵସܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ ? ? ?൅ߚଵହܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ.                                                                                                      (6.2) 
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The estimation method proposed by Chambers and Dimson (2009) has already been 
adopted in Chapter Five. First of all, all explanatory variables except for year 
dummies were demeaned. Then, the coefficients of year dummies were calculated 
using a regression with underpricing and all demeaned explanatory variables. Under 
this method, in model (6.2) each year dummy coefficient represents the level of 
underpricing experienced in a given year by an SEO with characteristics in line with 
average values for the sample.  
 
 
Figure 6-6 Year dummy coefficients in regression of underpricing on control 
variables 
 
Figure 6-6 illustrates the time series of year dummy coefficients from 1987 to 2009. 
We can observe an evident upward shift of SEO underpricing over time after 
controlling for issue and firm characteristics. If we divide the sample period into two 
subperiods, namely 1987 to 1997 and 1998 to 2009, we can weigh the coefficients by 
the number of SEOs in each year and calculate the number-weighted means of the 
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year dummy coefficients of the two subperiods. The weighted means of the year 
dummy coefficients for the two subperiods are 1.80% and 3.49%: an increase of 
1.69%. 
 
6.6. Effects of Rounding Offer Price at Integer 
As mentioned earlier, CLUSTER dummy equals one if the offer price is set at integer 
and zero otherwise. CLUSTER is the most economically and statistically significant 
variable in Table 6-6. The coefficient of CLUSTER is around 110 bps. This result 
means that if the offer price is set at integer, on average the underpricing is 1.1% 
higher than others, ceteris paribus. In Section 6.5., the demeaned CLUSTER is 
employed as the control variable in the regression. However, the variable CLUSTER 
only reflects the fact that the offer price is set at integer. For offers with integer offer 
prices equal to the prior closing price, the underpricing is zero. 
 
6.6.1. Lower Integer Offer Price and Upward Shift of SEO Underpricing 
Among the cases of integer offer price, only setting offer prices at next lower integer 
or other lower integer contributes to the increase of SEO underpricing. Therefore, one 
possible explanation for the upward shift of SEO underpricing is that more offers are 
priced at next lower or other lower integer.  
 
To examine this explanation, we can divide the sample into two subsamples. One only 
includes offers with next lower or other lower integer offer prices, the other has the 
remaining offers. For each sample, we estimate the coefficients of year dummy using 
the method proposed by Chambers and Dimson (2009). If the coefficients of year 
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dummy remain stable over time for the second sample, we could attribute the reason 
for the upward shift to the prevalence of pricing offers at next lower or other lower 
integers. 
 ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܥܽ݌ ൅ ߚଶܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ ൅ ߚଷܥܣܴܲ݋ݏ ൅ ߚସܥܣܴܰ݁݃ ൅ ߚହܮ݊ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ ൅ߚ଺ܥ݈݋ݏ݁ܤ݅݀ܦ݂݂ܻ݅ܰ ൅ ߚ଻ܥ݈݋ݏ݁ܤ݅݀ܦ݂݂݅ܰܽݏ ൅ ߚ଼ܰܣܵܦܣܳܦݑ݉݉ݕ ൅ ߚଽܷ݊݀݁ݎݓݎ݅ݐ݁ݎ ൅ߚଵ଴ܶ݋݌ݐ݅݁ݎ ൅ ߚଵଵܴ݈݁݋݂݂݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁ ൅ ߚଵଶܴܣܲݎ݋ܿ݁݁݀ݏܵܧܱ ? ?൅ ߚଵଷܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ ? ? ?൅ߚଵସܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ.                                                                                                                        (6.3) 
 
The regression model (6.3) is employed for two subsamples. In the first sample, only 
offers with next lower or other lower integer offer prices are included. Those offers 
that have integer offer prices equal to prior close prices are included in the second 
sample. The first sample has 1496 SEOs. For the second sample, we have 3260 SEOs. 
We graph the year dummy coefficients for two samples in Figure 6-7 and Figure 6-8 
respectively. 
 
Similar to Figure 6-6, both Figure 6-7 and Figure 6-8 show an upward shift in SEO 
underpricing. The difference between Figure 6-7 and Figure 6-8 is that coefficients in 
Figure 6-7 are more volatile than in Figure 6-8. The comparison of Figure 6-7 and 
Figure 6-8 suggests that offers with lower integer offer prices and the remaining offers 
share a similar upward shift in SEO underpricing over the sample period. 
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Figure 6-7 Year dummy coefficients for the subsample that only includes SEOs 
that are priced at lower integers 
 
 
Figure 6-8 Year dummy coefficients for the subsample that only includes SEOs 
that are not priced at lower integers 
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If we divide the sample period into two subperiods, 1987 to 1997 and 1998 to 2009, 
we can weigh the coefficients by the number of SEOs each year and calculate the 
number-weighted means of SEO underpricing for two subperiods. Figure 6-7 shows 
the coefficients of year dummy for the sample of SEOs with next lower and other 
lower integer offer prices. The number-weighted means for the subperiod 1987 to 
1997 and subperiod 1998 to 2009 are 1.56% and 3.36% respectively, reflecting an 
increase of 1.80%. In Figure 6-8, we have the number-weighted mean equal to 1.59% 
for the subperiod 1987 to 1997, and 3.06% for the subperiod 1998 to 2009: an increase 
of 1.47%. 
 
In sum, Figure 6-8 suggests that for those offers that are not priced at next lower or 
other lower integer price, there is still an upward shift in SEO underpricing, which is 
similar to offers with next lower integer offer prices. For the 3260 offers in Figure 6-8, 
setting offer prices at next lower or other lower integers seems not to be able to 
explain the upward shift in SEO underpricing. 
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6.6.2. Probit Analysis of Setting Offer Price at Lower Integers 
As discussed in section 6.2.3.1., setting offer prices at next lower or other lower 
integers becomes more prevalent over our sample period. In this section, we analyse 
which factors could contribute to the likelihood of setting offer prices at lower integers. 
The probit model (6.4) is employed. 
 ሺܱݐ݄݁ݎሻܮ݋ݓ݁ݎܫ݊ݐ݁݃݁ݎ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܥܽ݌ ൅ ߚଶܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ ൅ ߚଷܥܣܴܲ݋ݏ ൅ ߚସܥܣܴܰ݁݃ ൅ߚହܮ݊ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ ൅ ߚ଺ܥ݈݋ݏ݁ܤ݅݀ܦ݂݂ܻ݅ܰ ൅ ߚ଻ܥ݈݋ݏ݁ܤ݅݀ܦ݂݂݅ܰܽݏ ൅ ߚ଼ܰܣܵܦܣܳܦݑ݉݉ݕ ൅ߚଽܷ݊݀݁ݎݓݎ݅ݐ݁ݎ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܶ݋݌ݐ݅݁ݎ ൅ ߚଵଵܴ݈݁݋݂݂݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁ ൅ ߚଵଶܴܣܲݎ݋ܿ݁݁݀ݏܵܧܱ ? ?൅ ߚଵଷܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ ? ? ?൅ߚଵସܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ ൅ ߚଵହܯܶܪ ൅ ߚଵ଺ܦ݈݁ܿ݅݉ܽܦݑ݉݉ݕ.                                                    (6.4) 
 
The probit model (6.3) is developed from model (6.2). The main difference between 
them is that we add two explanatory variables, MTH and DecimalDummy. MTH is a 
time variable that equals one in January 1987 and increments by one each succeeding 
month. DecimalDummy reflects the conversion of the reporting of stock prices from 
fractions to decimals on April 9, 2001 in the US market. DecimalDummy is equal to 
one if the offer is offered on the date after April 9, 2001, and zero otherwise. 
 
In Model 1 Table 6-7, the dependent variable is OTHER LOWER INTEGER dummy. 
This binary variable is equal to one if the offer price is set at other lower integers 
relative to the prior closing price, and zero otherwise. For instance, assuming the prior 
closing price of an issue is $10.7, the OTHER LOWER INTEGER dummy is one if 
the offer price is set at $9 or lower integers ($ 8, 7, etc.). In Model 2, the dependent 
variable for this set is LOWER INTEGER dummy. The variable is set to one if the 
offer price is set at either next lower integer or other lower integers relative to the 
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prior closing price, and zero otherwise. Taking the above example again, the dummy 
is one if the offer price is set at $10 or lower integers ($9, 8, etc.). 
 
Table 6-7 Logit regressions of other lower integer dummy variable/next lower or 
other lower integer dummy variable 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
MarketCap -0.0578* 
 
-0.0470* 
 
(-1.67) 
 
(-1.78) 
Volatility 7.7358*** 
 
4.6627*** 
 
(6.66) 
 
(4.78) 
CARPos 0.6616 
 
0.0052 
 
(1.35) 
 
(0.01) 
CARNeg -1.7279*** 
 
-1.6117*** 
 
(-3.60) 
 
(-4.23) 
LnPrice 0.8076*** 
 
0.3336*** 
 
(13.38) 
 
(7.92) 
CloseBidDiffNY 2.2067 
 
10.9481* 
 
(0.26) 
 
(1.92) 
CloseBidDiffNas 15.5743*** 
 
9.3123*** 
 
(7.93) 
 
(6.00) 
NASDAQDummy 0.1749** 
 
0.2493*** 
 
(2.03) 
 
(3.91) 
Underwriter 0.1012 
 
0.1845*** 
 
(1.37) 
 
(3.33) 
Toptier -0.1725** 
 
-0.1987*** 
 
(-2.57) 
 
(-3.91) 
Reloffersize 0.3466* 
 
0.3534*** 
 
(1.95) 
 
(2.59) 
MTH 0.0055*** 
 
0.0045*** 
 
(5.93) 
 
(6.78) 
Decimaldummy -0.3687*** 
 
-0.3648*** 
 
(-3.03) 
 
(-3.96) 
RAProceeds90SEO 0.0108 
 
-0.0096 
 
(0.31) 
 
(-0.36) 
Market250 -0.7434 
 
-0.7821** 
 
(-1.49) 
 
(-2.04) 
MarketVolatility 5.7693 
 
3.7450 
 
(0.70) 
 
(0.56) 
Constant -4.1129*** 
 
-1.7757*** 
 
(-6.63) 
 
(-3.76) 
N 4756 
 
4756 
Pseudo R2 0.1637 
 
0.0586 
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In Model 1, the Dependent variable is Other Lower Integer Dummy which is equal to one if the offer price is set at the other lower 
integers relative to the prior closing price and zero otherwise. For instance, assuming the prior closing price of an issue is $ 10.7, the 
OTHER LOWER INTEGER dummy is one if the offer price is set at $ 9 or lower integers ($ 8, 7, etc.). Panel B The Dependent variable is Next 
Lower Integer or Other Lower Integer Dummy which is equal to one if the offer price is set at either the next lower integer or other lower 
integers relative to the prior closing price and zero otherwise. For instance, assuming the prior closing price of an issue is $ 10.7, the Next 
Lower Integer/OTHER LOWER INTEGER dummy is one if the offer price is set at $ 10 or lower integers ($ 9, 8, 7, etc.). Volatility is the 
standard deviation of daily close-to-close returns over the 30 trading days ending 11 days prior to the offer. MarketCap is the logged pre-
issue market capitalization, measured as the price multiplied by the total number of shares outstanding at the market close before the 
offer.CARPos (CARNeg) is defined as the cumulative market-adjusted return over the 5 days prior to the offer and it equals zero if the 
return is negative (positive), where market return is defined as the return on the CRSP value weighted index. CLUSTER is a Dummy equal 
to one if the offer price is set at integer. CloseBidDiffNYSE (CloseBidDiffNas) is Closing transaction price-closing bid quote)/closing 
transaction price and is zero if the issuer is list on Nasdaq (NYSE). NASDAQDummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer is list on 
Nasdaq. Toptier is a dummy equal to one if the SEO underwriter (book manager) has an analyst group ranked among the top 10 groups 
selected by Institutional investor each Octobor of the prior calendar year. Underwriter is a dummy equals one if one of the lead 
underwriters has the reputation rank equal to or greater than 8 and zero otherwise. The ranking is made by Ritter and available on 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. Reloffersize is the ratio between the shares offered to the outstanding shares prior to 
the offer. RAProceeds90SEO is the ratio of aggregate SEO proceeds over the 90 trading days ending 1 day before the offer to the overall 
market capitalization prior to the offer day. MarketVolatility is the standard deviations of daily returns, computed using equal-weighted 
portfolios of all firms listed on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ/ARCA for the 21-trading-day returns ending one day before the offer day. Market250 
the proxy of liquidity shocks caused by market decline, Market250=MarketReturn250*Dmarket, where MarketReturn250 is the return on 
CRSP index over the prior 250 trading days and Dmarket equals one if MarketReturn250>0 and zero otherwise. White's heteroskedasticity-
adjusted z-statistics are in parentheses. ***,**, and* represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance, respectively. 
 
In Model 1 and Model 2 Table 6-7, the majority of variables have coefficients with the 
expected signs, and many of them are statistically significant at the conventional 
levels. For instance, the coefficients of Volatility, CARNeg, LnPrice, NASDAQDummy, 
and CloseBidDiffNas have the expected signs and are statistically significant. Some 
variables, such as MarketCap and CARPos, have insignificant coefficients in the two 
models.  
 
In both models, the Toptier coefficients are significantly negative, suggesting that 
offers made by syndicates with top-tier analyst teams are less likely to be priced at 
lower integer offer prices. This result is consistent with that in Table 6-6. In Model 2, 
the underwriter coefficient is highly significant, with a sign which is inconsistent with 
the expectation. Almost all coefficients of liquidity shocks variables are insignificant, 
despite the fact that most of them have the expected signs. These results suggest that 
liquidity shocks caused by market conditions might not be a major concern when the 
underwriters decide to round the offer price.  
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The DecimalDummy has the expected sign and is significant at the 1% level in both 
models. The results show that the likelihood of setting offer prices at lower integers is 
reduced by the conversion of reporting stock price from fractions to decimals on April 
9, 2001, ceteris paribus. The dummy variable MTH is of the expected sign and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level in both models. These results indicate that there 
is a trend over time for underwriters to set offer prices at next lower or other lower 
integer prices, all else being equal. The trend might be regarded as evidence of 
increasing investment banking power. 
 
6.7. Discussions for the Upward Shift in SEO Underpricing 
In Section 6.5, annual underpricing dummies indicated that after controlling for 
changing risk composition, price practice, market conditions, the influence of 
underwriter reputation and analyst coverage, there was a substantial rise in annual 
underpricing over our sample period from 1987 to 2009. The results indicate that other 
influences might contribute to the rise in annual SEO underpricing. In this section, we 
borrow the investment banking power hypothesis from the literature and argue that the 
upward shift is the result of increasing investment banking power. 
 
A variety of investment banking power hypotheses have been proposed in the 
literature. In the US market, Chen and Ritter (2000) found that in the period from 
1995 to 1998, more than 90% of deals raising $20-80 million had spreads of exactly 
7%, three times the proportion of a decade earlier. They argue that several features in 
the IPO underwriting market, namely analyst coverage, buy recommendations and 
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underwriter prestige, enabled US underwriters to set spreads (direct IPO costs) above 
the competitive level.  
 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) proposed the analyst lust hypothesis to explain the 
increase of IPO underpricing over the period from 1980-2003. They argue that each 
issuer faces a local oligopoly of underwriters because 1) issuers placed more 
importance on hiring a lead underwriter with a highly ranked analyst team than before 
and 2) there is a limited number of all-star analysts. Liu and Ritter (2011) argue that 
the industry structure of equity underwriting is best characterised as a series of local 
oligopolies if issuers care about non-price dimensions of underwriting, and they find 
that a limited number of underwriters that can provide these non-price dimensions will 
acquire some market power and earn rents on the IPOs.  
 
After examining the behaviour of UK IPO underpricing over the very long period 
from 1917 to 1986, Chambers and Dimson (2009) hypothesised that investment banks 
exerted market power in UK IPOs after 1945, which could be regarded as a possible 
explanation for the rise in IPO underpricing over their sample period. They argue that 
despite the fact that issue methods emerged that mitigated underpricing before the Big 
Bang, banks together with institutional investors, stuck with the traditional fixed price 
method before the Big Bang and consequently were able to benefit by underpricing 
IPOs more78. 
 
                                                 
78
 The Big Bang refers to the deregulation of fixed brokerage commissions and the termination of 
restrictions on membership on the LSE. 
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In our study, we hypothesise that the increase in the market power of investment 
banks could contribute to the rise in annual underpricing dummies. As the structure of 
the underwriting industry transfers from a competitive market to an oligopoly market, 
underwriters are able to exert their market power to make issuers leave more money 
on the table.  
 
We have three findings related to the investment banking power hypothesis. First, 
different from the case of IPOs, we find no evidence that underwriters use analyst 
coverage as a non-price dimension to increase SEO underpricing. The results indicate 
that other non-price dimensions might be employed by underwriters to retain their 
oligopoly status. Second, we find that after controlling for other factors, the practice of 
setting offer prices at next or other lower integers has become more prevalent over 
time, which could be regarded as evidence for the increase of investment banking 
power. Last but not least, in our subsample tests, we find that the subsample of SEOs 
that are not priced at lower integer offer prices exhibited a rise in the annual 
underpricing dummies. The pattern of the annual underpricing dummies is similar to 
that of the subsample of SEOs with lower integer offer prices. This result indicates 
that the practice of setting offer prices at lower integers cannot fully explain the 
upward shift in SEO underpricing over time. 
  
6.8. Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we hypothesised that certain market conditions could cause liquidity 
shocks that would increase SEO underpricing consequently. We proposed three 
scenarios of market conditions, namely aggregate issues with large volume, large 
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market decline and market volatility. Empirical results show that market volatility is 
significantly and positively related to SEO underpricing after controlling for other 
factors.  
 
We included three proxies of liquidity shocks into our regression model and employed 
an estimation method proposed by Chambers and Dimson (2009) to examine the 
behaviour of SEO underpricing over our sample period from 1987 to 2009. We found 
that after controlling for changing risk composition, price practice, market conditions 
and the influence of underwriter reputation and analyst coverage, there was still an 
upward shift in SEO underpricing over the sample period. The number-weighted mean 
of the year dummy coefficients for 1987-1997 was 1.80% while it was 3.49% for 
1998-2009.  
 
We divided the sample into two subsamples based on whether the offer price was set 
at lower integer price or not. In both subsamples, we observed similar patterns of  year 
dummy coefficients. This result indicates that setting offer prices at lower integers 
cannot fully explain the upward shift of annual underpricing dummies. Moreover, by 
employing a probit model, we found that the practice of setting offer prices at lower 
integers has become more prevalent over time, ceteris paribus. 
 
We borrowed the investment banking power hypothesis from the literature and argued 
that the upward shift of SEO underpricing over the sample period could be explained 
by the increase of investment banking power. As the industry structure of 
underwriting transfers from a competitive market to an oligopoly market, banks use 
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non-price dimensions to gain market power and consequently increase SEO 
underpricing. 
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CHAPTER 7: LIQUIDITY AND SEO FLOTATION COST 
 
As discussed in the introduction, the effects of stock market liquidity on SEO 
underpricing have not been thoroughly investigated in the literature79. To fill the gap 
in the literature, we conduct a thorough investigation of the relationship, if any, 
between liquidity and SEO underpricing. Moreover, in this chapter, we examine the 
relationship between liquidity and underwriting spread (direct SEO cost) in our 
sample.  
 
7.1. Liquidity and SEO Underpricing 
Butler et al. (2005) document an inverse relationship between liquidity of underlying 
shares and investment banking fees (i.e. the gross spread). As discussed in Chapter 
Three, both investment banking fees and SEO underpricing belong to flotation costs. 
The main difference between them is that the former is a type of direct flotation cost 
and the latter is a type of indirect flotation cost. There is therefore a good chance that 
an inverse relationship also exists between liquidity of underlying shares and SEO 
underpricing.  
 
Several studies have already made attempts to incorporate liquidity measures into 
existing models to explain SEO underpricing. For instance, Corwin (2003) and Kim 
                                                 
79
 Unless otherwise stated, SEO underpricing refers to the close-to-offer return in this chapter. 
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and Park (2005) used bid-ask spread as the variable in their analysis80. However, 
interestingly, both interpret bid-ask spread as the proxy of information asymmetry and 
the results are mixed, probably due to them having used different sets of samples. Kim 
and Park (2005) did not include bid-ask spread in their multivariate regression but 
used it as a characteristic indicator to categorise issues. They expected a positive 
relationship between underpricing and bid-ask spread. Corwin (2003) argued that 
there is no significant relation between SEO underpricing and bid-ask spread after 
conducting a set of tests.  
 
Additionally, two working papers, Kalev et al. (2006) and Asem et al. (2009) point to 
an inverse relation between liquidity of the underlying shares and SEO underpricing 
for Australian SEOs. In this section, Sample 1 employed in Chapter Six is used to test 
whether there is a relationship between SEO underpricing and liquidity of the 
underlying shares. 
 
7.1.1. Hypothesised Inverse Relation between SEO Underpricing and Liquidity 
As discussed in Chapter Six, the hypothesis of price pressure or liquidity shocks 
proposed by Scholes (1972) and Corwin (2003) provides some theoretical support for 
the inverse relation between liquidity of underlying shares and SEO underpricing. The 
price pressure can be regarded as either permanent or temporary. In the former case, 
the impact on share prices is permanent.  
                                                 
80
 Corwin (2003) defines bid-ask spread as the time-weighted average of percentage quoted spread over 
30 days ending 2 days prior to the offer. The data are intraday data collected from Trade and Quote 
database (TAQ). Kim and Park (2005) use the same definition; however, it seems that their data are 
collected from CRSP. In CRSP only the closing bid and ask prices are available. 
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However, Corwin (2003) pointed out that, according to market efficiency theory, the 
permanent effects should take place on the announcement day rather than the issue 
day because investors will anticipate the change in the supply and take the expectation 
into consideration. As a result, the effect of price pressure is more likely to be 
temporary.  
 
Corwin (2003) further argues that the effects of price pressure would be more 
significant for shares with relatively inelastic demand. He uses average bid-ask spread 
to define demand elasticity. If the average bid-ask spread of one stock falls into the 
highest quartile of bid-ask spread, the share is regarded as a security with inelastic 
demand (few substitutes). This definition means that the higher the illiquidity of the 
underlying shares, the higher the demand inelasticity.  
 
As discussed, although the results from Corwin (2003) do not provide support for a 
relationship between bid-ask spread and demand elasticity, the hypothesised 
relationship is consistent with Hagerty (1991), who predicted that an increase in the 
QXPEHURIVXEVWLWXWHVRIVHFXULWLHV LQDPDUNHWZRXOGUHGXFH WKH OLTXLGLW\SURYLGHU¶V
ability to set high spreads. Moulton and Wei (2009) also found a narrower spread and 
more competitive liquidity provision for crossed listed shares when cross-listing and 
home market are both open (overlapping trading hours). In sum, the rationale for the 
hypothesis is that a higher bid-ask spread of stock means fewer substitutes and higher 
demand inelasticity that leads to higher price pressure and higher SEO underpricing.  
 
In the next section, besides average bid-ask spread, two other measures of liquidity are 
introduced. The following tests are used to examine whether there is a link between 
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the liquidity of the underlying securities and indirect flotation costs of equity issuance 
(SEO underpricing). The hypothesised link, however, does not rely on an equilibrium 
asset pricing model. In other words, the tests in this section do not check the effects of 
liquidity on required return.  
 
Empirical tests investigating the effects of liquidity on required return need to check 1) 
whether liquidity is priced; 2) that the asset pricing model used is correct. Because the 
tests in this chapter are not based on an equilibrium asset pricing model, the results 
obtained from the tests do not rely on the assumption that expected return, risk factors, 
and factor loadings are properly loaded. 
 
7.1.2. Measures of Liquidity 
According to data availability, three kinds of liquidity measure are selected for the 
tests. These measures are relative bid-ask spread, turnover and an illiquidity measure 
developed by Amihud (2002). Empirical studies prove that all of these measures 
represent the liquidity/illiquidity of the underlying shares.  
 
Relative Bid-ask Spread is used by many studies in asset pricing (e.g.  Amihud and 
Mendelson, 1986) . It is calculated as quoted average bid-ask spread over the 30 
trading days ending two days prior to the offer. Due to the inaccessibility of TAQ data, 
the bid and ask prices are collected from CRSP81.  
 
                                                 
81
 This measure is also adopted by Kim and Park (2005). 
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ܣݒ݃݌ܵ݌ݎ݀௝ǡ் ൌ  ? ? ? ෍ ܣݏ ௝݇ǡ௧ െ ܤ݅ ௝݀ǡ௧൫ܣݏ ௝݇ǡ௧ ൅ ܤ݅ ௝݀ǡ௧൯Ȁ ?ଷ଴௧ୀ்ିଷଶ  
 
where ܣݒ݃݌ܵ݌ݎ݀௝ǡ் represents the quoted average bid-ask spread, T is the issue date 
and ܣݏ ௝݇ǡ௧ and ܤ݅ ௝݀ǡ௧ are the closing ask and bid prices. 
 
Turnover is defined as the number of shares traded divided by the number of shares 
outstanding for that stock. This definition is also widely used in studies of asset 
pricing (e.g. Datar et al., 1998). However, one concern about constructing the trading 
volume should be mentioned. Butler et al. (2005) noticed that in dealer markets (such 
as NASDAQ) trades are often immediately turned around by the market maker, 
thereby causing double counting of trading volume. In order to compare the volume 
with that in auction markets (such as NYSE, Amex), trading volume in NASDAQ is 
divided by two. In this section, Turnover is calculated as the average turnover 120 
trading days (approximately six months) prior to the issue. Both the volume and the 
number of shares outstanding are collected from CRSP on a daily basis. 
 
ܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ்݁ݎ ൌ  ? ? ? ? ෍ ܣ݆݀ݑݏݐ݁݀ܸ݋݈ݑ݉݁௧ܱݑݐݏݐܽ݊݀݅݊݃ݏ݄ܽݎ݁ݏ௧ଵଶ଴௧ୀ்ିଵଶ଴  
 
ILLIQ is the third measure in this section and is an illiquidity measure proposed by 
Amihud (2002). A lot of fine measures of liquidity/illiquidity required for the 
calculation of microstructure data on transactions and quotes that are currently not 
available for this PhD study. In order to mitigate this data problem, the illiquidity 
measure proposed by Amihud (2002) is introduced. This measure can be regarded as a 
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supplement to the above two measures. The advantage of the measure is the low 
requirement for trading data. It does not require intra-daily transaction data and it is 
calculated from daily data on returns and volume that are readily available in CRSP.  
 
The illiquidity is defined as the daily absolute return divided by the trading volume in 
dollars on that day, หܴ௜௬ௗหȀܸܱܮܦ௜௬ௗ . หܴ௜௬ௗห is the absolute value of return on stock i 
on day d of year y and ܸܱܮܦ௜௬ௗ is the respective daily volume in dollars. This ratio 
reflects the absolute percentage change in price per dollar of daily trading volume, or 
the daily price impact of the order flow. Amihud (2002) suggests that this ratio 
follows the concept of illiquidity that refers to the response of price to order proposed 
by Kyle (1985) and the measure of thinness (Silber, 1975), defined as the ratio of 
absolute price change to absolute excess demand for trading. For each share i the 
annual average 
 
ܫܮܮܫܳ௜௬ ൌ  ?ܦ௜௬ൗ ෍หܴ௜௬ௗหȀܸܱܮܦ௜௬ௗ஽೔೤௧ୀଵ  
 
where ܦ௜௬ is the number of days for which data are available for stock i in year y. In 
this study, i is set as the day prior to the issue82 and ܦ௜௬ is set as at least 180 as the 
number of trading days per year83. The return is here defined as the daily return 
including dividend provided by CRSP. As discussed earlier, for NASDAQ issues, the 
daily volume is divided by two to make it comparable to that of exchange issues.  
                                                 
82
 In Amihud (2002) i is set as the last trading day of the year. In this study, it is set as the day prior to 
the issue because there is evidence that the issuance itself will change the liquidity of shares. 
83
 In Amihud 250 trading days are used, but because some issuers do not have data for 250 trading days 
prior to the issue, we relax this constraint to at least 180 days in order to obtain more observations. 
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Amihud (2002) found that the average illiquidity varies considerably over time. To 
solve this problem, ܫܮܮܫܳ௜௬ is replaced by its mean-adjusted value 
 ܫܮܮܫܳܯܣ௜௬ ൌ ܫܮܮܫܳ௜௬Ȁܣܫܮܮܫܳ௬ 
 
where ܫܮܮܫܳܯܣ௜௬ is the mean adjusted illiquidity and ܫܮܮܫܳ௜௬ is the illiquidity from 
the previous formula. ܣܫܮܮܫܳ௬ is defined as: 
 
ܣܫܮܮܫܳ௬ ൌ  ?Ȁ ௬ܰ෍ܫܮܮܫܳ௜௬ே೤௧ୀଵ  
 
where ௬ܰ is defined as the total number of issue in year y84. 
 
Table 7-1 Underpricing by liquidity 
 
Quartile 1 
(Lowest) 
Quartile 2 
 
Quartile 3 
 
Quartile 4 
(Highest) 
Relative Bid-Ask Spread 
Quartile 
3.30% 3.00% 2.31% 3.78% 
Turnover Quartile 2.77% 2.69% 2.79% 3.36% 
ILLIQMA Quartile 2.03% 2.45% 3.05% 4.04% 
Bid-ask spread is the average relative bid-ask spread over 30 trading days ending two 
days prior to the issue. Turnover is the average turnover 120 trading days 
(approximately six months) prior to the issue. ILLIQMA is the measure proposed by 
Amihud (2002). There are 4659, 5220, 4551 observations for relative bid-ask spread, 
turnover and ILLIQMA respectively. 
 
                                                 
84
 This definition is slightly different from Amihud (2002) in that Ny is the number of stocks in the 
whole sample satisfying the required conditions. However, in an SEO study, this is difficult to replicate 
due to the much larger sample size. Therefore, a modified definition is used instead of the original. 
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7.1.3. Empirical Test Results of Liquidity Measures 
Table 7-1 lists mean underpricing for quartiles of seasoned offers ranked according to 
three liquidity variables. Two of them, relative bid-ask spread and turnover, show no 
trend in SEO underpricing. The results of relative bid-Ask Spread even suggest a U 
shape for SEO underpricing, which has no theoretical support. Additionally, the 
descriptive statistics of three liquidity measures are listed in Table 7-285. A first glance 
at the statistics also suggests no apparent evidence to support the hypothesis that the 
liquidity of the underlying shares and the SEO underpricing are negatively related.  
 
Table 7-2 Descriptive statistics of three liquidity measures by subperiods 
Period 
Mean of Relative 
Bid-ask Spread 
No. of 
Obs. 
Mean of 
Turnover(10-3) 
No. of 
Obs. 
Mean of 
ILLIQMA 
No. of 
Obs. 
1 (1987-
1995) 
0.0284 1,461 3.7616 1,500 1.1873 1,260 
2 (1996-
2001) 
0.0166 1,604 5.3230 1,658 0.9231 1,347 
3 (2002-
2009) 
0.0039 1,588 8.0685 1,599 0.7102 1,505 
p-value 
(2)-(1) 
1.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.9979 
 
p-value 
(3)-(2) 
1.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.9938 
 
p-value 
(3)-(1) 
1.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.9973 
 
Bid-ask spread is the average relative bid-ask spread over 30 trading days ending two days prior to 
the issue. Turnover is the average turnover 120 trading days (approximately six months) prior to 
the issue. ILLIQMA is the measure proposed by Amihud (2002). There are 4659, 5220, 4551 
observations for relative bid-ask spread, turnover and ILLIQMA respectively. P-values for difference 
within subsample means are from standard t-tests. 
 
 
 
                                                 
85
 The number of observations for ILLIQMA is fewer than for the other two measures because of 
missing values in CRSP. 
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All three measures even show an increase of liquidity of the sample over the three 
periods. This trend is to some extent consistent with the increase in SEO underpricing 
over time as discussed in Chapter Four. All of this suggests that there is little evidence 
to prove the hypothesised inverse relationship between liquidity of underlying shares 
and SEO underpricing.  
 
As for multivariate tests, the OLS model used in this section is the base model 
proposed in Chapter Six. 
 ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܥܽ݌ ൅ ߚଶܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ ൅ ߚଷܥܣܴܲ݋ݏ ൅ ߚସܥܣܴܰ݁݃ ൅ ߚହܮ݊ܲݎ݅ܿ݁൅ ߚ଺ܥܮܷܵܶܧܴ ൅ ߚ଻ܥ݈݋ݏ݁ܤ݅݀ܦ݂݂ܻ݅ܰ ൅ ߚ଼ܥ݈݋ݏ݁ܤ݅݀ܦ݂݂݅ܰܽݏ൅ ߚଽܰܣܵܦܣܳܦݑ݉݉ݕ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܷ݊݀݁ݎݓݎ݅ݐ݁ݎ ൅ ߚଵଵܶ݋݌ݐ݅݁ݎ ൅ ߚଵଶܴ݈݁݋݂݂݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁൅ ߚଵଷܤ݅݀ െ ܽݏ݇ݏ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀ ൅ ߚଵସܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ ൅ ߚଵହܫܮܮܫܳܯܣ 
 
where liquidity refers to the liquidity measures discussed above and all other variables 
have been discussed previously. The regression results in Table 7-3 show that there is 
a significantly positive relationship between liquidity of underlying shares and SEO 
underpricing. The coefficient of Bid-ask spread is -0.13 at a statistically significant 
level. The coefficient of Turnover also shows that there is a positive relationship 
between liquidity and SEO underpricing. In the 7.1.1, the hypothesis predicts an 
inverse relationship between liquidity and SEO underpricing, the empirical results, 
however, indicate a reversed relationship. The results can possibly be explained by 
either 1) either the transaction cost saving hypothesis or 2) that there is no relation 
between liquidity and SEO underpricing.  
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Table 7-3 Regression results for SEO underpricing (with liquidity variables) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Bid-ask spread -0.1604*** 
  
 
(-3.27) 
  
Turnover 
 
0.3212*** 
 
  
(3.38) 
 
ILLIQMA 
  
-0.0000 
   
(-0.09) 
Volatility 0.1812*** 0.1438*** 0.1745*** 
 
(7.73) (5.72) (6.77) 
MarketCap 0.0010 0.0012* 0.0012** 
 
(1.58) (1.94) (1.96) 
CARPos 0.0673*** 0.0629*** 0.0707*** 
 
(7.01) (6.59) (6.64) 
CARNeg -0.0037 -0.0026 -0.0051 
 
(-0.40) (-0.29) (-0.51) 
LnPrice -0.0155*** -0.0153*** -0.0151*** 
 
(-15.60) (-15.68) (-14.65) 
CLUSTER 0.0112*** 0.0113*** 0.0113*** 
 
(11.72) (11.95) (10.95) 
CloseBidDiffNY 0.8043*** 0.6959*** 0.7357*** 
 
(5.60) (5.49) (5.58) 
CloseBidDiffNas 0.7845*** 0.7274*** 0.7569*** 
 
(19.11) (20.09) (17.30) 
NASDAQDummy 0.0053*** 0.0062*** 0.0060*** 
 
(3.56) (4.32) (4.01) 
Underwriter -0.0029** -0.0027** -0.0026* 
 
(-2.23) (-2.12) (-1.85) 
Toptier -0.0019 -0.0019* -0.0020 
 
(-1.62) (-1.66) (-1.60) 
Reloffersize 0.0042 0.0027 0.0048 
 
(1.32) (0.85) (1.34) 
Constant 0.0129 0.0050 -0.0004 
 
(1.08) (0.45) (-0.03) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
N 4650 4754 4110 
Adjusted R
2
 0.3077 0.3092 0.3195 
Underpricing is defined as ((P-OP)/P)*100, where P is the prior offer closing price and OP is the offer price. Bid-ask spread is the 
average relative bid-ask spread over 30 trading days ending two days prior to the issue. Turnover is the average turnover 120 
trading days (approximately six months) prior to the issue. ILLIQMA is a measure proposed by Amihud (2002). Volatility is the 
standard deviation of daily close-to-close returns over the 30 trading days ending 11 days prior to the offer. MarketCap is the 
logged pre-issue market capitalization, measured as the price multiplied by the total number of shares outstanding at the market 
close before the offer. CARPos (CARNeg) is defined as the cumulative market-adjusted return over the 5 days prior to the offer and 
it equals zero if the return is negative (positive), where market return is defined as the return on the CRSP value weighted index. 
LnPrice is the logarithm of closing price prior to the offer. CLUSTER is a Dummy equal to one if the offer price is set at integer. 
CloseBidDiffNYSE (CloseBidDiffNas) is Closing transaction price-closing bid quote)/closing transaction price and is zero if the issuer is 
list on NASDAQ (NYSE).  NASDAQDummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer is list on NASDAQ and zero otherwise. 
Toptier is a dummy equal to one if the SEO underwriter (book manager) has an analyst group ranked among the top 10 groups 
selected by Institutional investor each October of the prior calendar year and zero otherwise. Underwriter is a dummy equal to one 
if the book manager of the syndicate has a reputation rate more than 8 in the ranking proposed by Ritter 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm and zero otherwise. Reloffersize is the ratio between the shares offered to the 
outstanding shares prior to the offer. Expected proceeds are defined as the production of closing price prior to the offer and shares 
offered. The value of t statistics is in brackets. ***,**, and* represent 1% 5% and 10% significance, respectively. 
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7.1.4. Discussions about the Relation between Liquidity and SEO Underpricing 
Regarding the significantly negative relationship between illiquidity and SEO 
underpricing, one possible explanation is the transaction cost savings hypothesis 
proposed by Loderer et al. (1991). In an SEO transaction, investors do not need to pay 
commissions when buying from the underwriters, thus the one way transaction cost is 
saved for the investors. The underwriters can therefore set offer prices slightly above 
the preoffer price by the amount of the saved transaction costs.  
 
Regarding the regression result, the decrease in the bid-ask spread represents a 
decrease in transaction costs. This decline in the transaction costs would constrain the 
XQGHUZULWHUV¶DELOLW\WRVHW WKHRIIHUSULFHKLJKHU WKDQWKHSUHRIIHUSULFH As a result, 
the coefficients of bid-ask spread could be negative. This hypothesis seems to be able 
to explain the negative coefficient of the bid-ask spread in the regressions. However, 
there are two doubts related to this explanation. 
 
Firstly, if the increase in SEO underpricing is caused by the decrease of transaction 
costs, this scenario suggests that there should be some factors that caused the SEO 
underpricing to be high at the beginning. The SEO underpricing is kept low by the 
saving of one-way transaction costs in the issue. However, as discussed in Chapter Six, 
there is no evidence that the above scenario is the case. Indeed, empirical results 
suggest that in the early 1990s, the common practice for NASDAQ issues was to set 
the offer price at the closing bid prior to the offer. The prominence of such a practice 
clearly indicates that it is highly unlikely that some factors caused the increase in SEO 
underpricing in the first place. 
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The second doubt is that the regression results in Table 7-3 suggest that SEO 
underpricing is positively associated with liquidity when measured by all three kinds 
of variable. Therefore, even assuming that the transaction cost savings hypothesis is 
reasonable, the hypothesis is still unable to explain the results for two other variables; 
the empirical results further confirm the doubts regarding the transaction cost savings 
hypothesis.  
 
The above discussions suggest that the transaction cost saving hypothesis cannot 
explain the empirical results persuasively, thus another explanation is that there is 
indeed no relationship between SEO underpricing and liquidity of underlying shares. 
The empirical results only reflect the changed sample composite: with more and more 
firms with high market capitalisation issuing seasoned equity, the average liquidity of 
the sample consequently decreases. 
 
In other words, when an underwriter decides the offer price, liquidity of the 
underlying shares might not be a consideration. In sum, empirical evidence and 
discussions in this session suggest that 1) the average liquidity level of the shares in 
the sample is increasing over time; 2) the hypothesised inverse relationship between 
SEO underpricing and liquidity of underlying shares has little empirical support; 3) 
liquidity of the underlying shares may not be a consideration or determinant of SEO 
underpricing. The positive relation between SEO underpricing and liquidity is likely 
to be a reflection of the changed sample composite.  
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7.2. Liquidity and SEO Gross Spread
 In the previous section, we concluded that liquidity is probably not a consideration or 
determinant for SEO underpricing. In the literature, the liquidity of underlying shares 
is shown to have negative effects on SEO investment banking fees (gross spread). In 
this section, this relation is tested again using our sample. 
 
7.2.1. Model Specification 
The model used to estimate SEO gross spread is based on Butler et al. (2005). 
However, constrained by data availability, we modify the model to make it more 
suitable for our dataset. Sample 1 in Chapter Four is used to test the model. The model 
is presented as follows. Control variables include volatility, price level and the size of 
the firm, expected proceeds, underwriter reputation dummy and multiple-book runner 
dummy. Liquidity variables are the three liquidity variables introduced in 7.1. 
 
Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of daily close-to-close returns over 30 
trading days ending 11 days prior to the offer. Many studies use volatility as a proxy 
for risk or value uncertainty (e.g.  Jeon and Ligon, 2011; Lee and Masulis, 2009). 
High volatility means more risks for the underwriters. Therefore, consistent with the 
literature, we expect a positive relationship between volatility and gross spread.  
 
Size of the Issuer is used as the proxy for information asymmetry and is defined as 
log of market capitalisation. As suggested by many studies (e.g. Corwin, 2003; Lee 
and Masulis, 2009), firms with high capitalisation are more likely to draw attention 
from stock analysts, business news services, institutional investors and other market 
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participants. Therefore, there would be more information available about larger firms 
and less information asymmetry. Size of the issuer is expected to be negatively related 
to gross spread. 
 
Proceeds are defined as the natural logarithm of the number of issues multiplied by 
the prior closing price. This variable is used to describe the economy of scale effect in 
gross spread that was first documented by Smith (1977). The economy of scale has 
been confirmed by many studies such as Eckbo and Masulis (1992) and Hansen 
(2001). A negative relationship is expected between gross spread and proceeds. 
 
Price Level is defined as the natural logarithm of the closing price prior to the issue. 
Compared with other control variables, this variable is less frequently utilised by 
studies in investment banking fees. Butler et al. (2005) suggest that institutional 
investors tend to shun low-priced stocks, making it more difficult for investment 
banks to place low-priced issues. Thus we expect a negative relationship between 
price level and gross spread.  
 
NASDAQ Dummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the shares of the firm are 
listed on NASDAQ. As discussed in Chapter Six, firms listed on NASDAQ are often 
smaller and therefore riskier than those listed on NYSE. Corwin and Harris (2001) 
point out the possible reason that these firms can avoid expected delisting costs by 
choosing NASDAQ. Because NASDAQ firms are smaller and riskier, their 
shareholder base would be smaller, leading to more efforts to place the issues for 
underwriters. Therefore, NASDAQ Dummy and gross spread are expected to be 
positively related. 
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Underwriter Reputation Dummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the book 
managers of the issue have a ranking of more than 8.0. The ranking is provided by 
Ritter on his website http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. Puri (1999) 
argues that investment banks with higher reputations can charge higher fees because 
the underwriting market is oligopolistic. Butler et al. (2005) also suggest a positive 
relationship between underwriter reputation and the underwriting fees because 
prestigious banks work harder. However, Li and Masulis (2007) suggest a negative 
relationship between underwriter reputation and the underwriting fees by arguing that 
higher ranked underwriters have lower expected due diligence costs and, thus, they are 
able to charge lower costs in a competitive market.  
  
Multiple-book runner Dummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the issue is 
underwritten by multiple book managers. Butler et al. (2005) included this variable 
because they argue that multiple book managers may be more efficient in forming 
syndicates and selling shares than a single book manager. Therefore, a negative 
relationship is expected between this variable and gross spread. Jeon and Ligon (2011) 
also included this dummy in their study and but found a positive relationship between 
underwriting fees and this dummy variable. 
 
7.2.2. Regression Results for Gross Spread 
The regression results are presented in Table 7-4. Several findings can be drawn from 
the regression results. A first glance suggests that the explanation power of these 
models is impressive. All of them have an adjusted R2 of around 0.60. These numbers 
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are close to the adjusted R2 in Butler et al. (2005). Moreover, three findings in 
particular are discussed as follows.  
 
Table 7-4 OLS regression results for gross spread 
Model 1 2 3 4 
Bid-ask spread 
 
2.9724*** 
  
 
 
(3.08) 
  
turnover 
  
0.0194 
 
 
  
(1.41) 
 
ILLIQMA 
   
0.0079 
 
   
(1.21) 
Volatility 7.6119*** 7.0713*** 7.3098*** 7.4626*** 
 
(13.97) (12.47) (12.52) (11.90) 
MarketCap -0.6124*** -0.5834*** -0.6134*** -0.6314*** 
 
(-35.71) (-29.96) (-35.70) (-33.06) 
LnProceeds 0.0477** 0.0214 0.0432** 0.0641*** 
 
(2.28) (0.96) (2.05) (2.81) 
LnPrice -0.1122*** -0.0589** -0.1102*** -0.1074*** 
 
(-4.94) (-2.48) (-4.83) (-4.35) 
NASDAQDummy 0.4977*** 0.4604*** 0.4910*** 0.4916*** 
 
(16.92) (13.46) (16.41) (15.63) 
Underwriter -0.1067*** -0.0930*** -0.1082*** -0.0865*** 
 
(-3.63) (-3.08) (-3.67) (-2.64) 
MultiBook 0.3844*** 0.3816*** 0.3800*** 0.4109*** 
 
(11.82) (11.12) (11.59) (11.72) 
Constant 15.9963*** 15.7333*** 16.0894*** 16.0412*** 
 
(66.61) (50.38) (64.78) (59.30) 
N 5156 4593 5153 4478 
Adjusted R
2
 0.6160 0.5966 0.6159 0.6125 
GrossSpread is defined as a percentage of the issue proceeds. Bid-ask spread is the average relative bid-ask spread over 30 trading days 
ending two days prior to the issue. Turnover is the average turnover 120 trading days (approximately six months) prior to the issue. 
ILLIQMA is the measure proposed by Amihud (2002). Volatility is the standard deviation of daily close-to-close returns over the 30 trading 
days ending 11 days prior to the offer. MarketCap is the logarithm of the market value of the firm defined as the production of prior 
closing price and outstanding shares. LnPrice is the logarithm of closing price prior to the offer. NASDAQDummy is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the issuer is list on Nasdaq. LnProceeds is the logarithm of the expected proceeds that are defined as the production of closing 
price prior to the offer and shares offered. Underwriter is a dummy equal to one if the book manager of the syndicate has a reputation 
rate more than 8 in the ranking proposed by Ritter http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm, zero otherwise. MultiBook is a 
dummy equal to one if there are more than one book manager in the syndicate. The value of t statistics is in brackets. ***,**, and* 
represent 1% 5% and 10% significance, respectively. 
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First, the results confirm that liquidity is an important concern in deciding investment 
banking fees (gross spread). Two of the liquidity measures have the predicted relation 
with gross spread; the coefficient of Turnover is not statistically significant and has 
the wrong sign. These results can be explained by the rationale that shares with high 
liquidity are easier for underwriters to place than those with low liquidity (Butler et al., 
2005). Thus, underwriters charge higher gross spread for issues of low liquidity shares. 
In our study, despite the difference in sample settings [e.g. the length of the sample 
period (1987-2009) is much longer than that (1993-2000) in Butler et al. (2005)], our 
results are still consistent with Butler et al. (2005).  
 
Second, we confirm the effects of some factors on SEO gross spread indicated by 
Butler et al. (2005). Issues with higher risk shares (high volatility) tend to be charged 
at higher gross spread. And bigger firms (with higher capitalization) that have less 
information asymmetry enjoy lower gross spread. For NASDAQ issues, they are 
charged at higher gross spread due to their characteristics. The significant negative 
coefficients of LnPrice confirm that it is more difficult to place low price issues for 
underwriters.  
 
Finally, we find some results of the regression inconsistent to those claimed by Butler 
et al. (2005). The MultiBook Dummy shows positive effects on gross spread in all 
models, which is consistent with Jeon and Ligon (2011). This positive relationship 
suggests that multiple book runners do not necessarily mean high efficiency but might 
lead to high cost. The negative coefficients of Underwriter dummy variables indicate 
that the high reputation banks have lower expected due diligence and thus can afford 
to reduce the gross spread. This significantly negative relationship also implies that 
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the underwriting market is still a competitive market. The fact that the signs of the 
coefficients of LnProceeds are positive is inconsistent to the hypothesis of economy 
scale suggested by many studies. However, this relation can still be explained by the 
hypothesis of U-shape of economy scale proposed by Altinkiliç and Hansen (2000). 
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CHAPTER 8: ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 
The robustness tests in this chapter deal mainly with alternative specifications. 
Specifically, we check the sensitivity to the choice of control variables of the results 
reported in Chapter Six. For instance, due to the data limitations, some observations 
without closing bid quotes were removed from the multivariate tests in Chapter Six. It 
is therefore necessary to re-estimate the regressions with alternative specifications.  
 
8.1. Liquidity Shocks caused by Market Conditions 
The variable CloseBidDiffNas represents the practice of setting offer prices at the 
closing bid quote for NASDAQ issues. As mentioned in Chapters Four and Six, there 
are a number of missing bid and ask quotes in CRSP. Therefore, including the variable 
CloseBidDiffNas means some observations are excluded from the regressions. In this 
section, the regression analysis is conducted without CloseBidDiffNas. Moreover, we 
also remove the independent variable Toptier because the variable is not often 
employed in SEO underpricing studies. After excluding these variables, we re-
estimate the regressions using model (8.1) and check whether our previous results still 
hold.  
 
 ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܥܽ݌ ൅ ߚଶܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ ൅ ߚଷܥܣܴܲ݋ݏ ൅ ߚସܥܣܴܰ݁݃ ൅ ߚହܮ݊ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ ൅ߚ଺ܥܮܷܵܶܧܴ ൅ ߚ଻ܰܣܵܦܣܳܦݑ݉݉ݕ ൅ ߚ଼ܷ݊݀݁ݎݓݎ݅ݐ݁ݎ ൅ ߚଽܴ݈݁݋݂݂݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁ ൅ߚଵ଴ܴܣܲݎ݋ܿ݁݁݀ݏܵܧܱ ? ?൅ ߚଵଵܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ ? ? ? ൅ ߚଵଶܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕǤ                                  (8.1) 
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Table 8-1 OLS regression results for SEO underpricing 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
MarketCap 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 
  (1.11) (1.15) (1.09) (1.09) (1.15) 
Volatility 0.2008*** 0.1991*** 0.1989*** 0.1922*** 0.1938*** 
  (8.83) (8.74) (8.67) (8.40) (8.44) 
CARPos 0.0666*** 0.0666*** 0.0664*** 0.0670*** 0.0674*** 
  (6.96) (6.96) (6.94) (7.00) (7.04) 
CARNeg 0.0111 0.0122 0.0113 0.0131 0.0139 
  (1.25) (1.36) (1.26) (1.47) (1.54) 
LnPrice -0.0163*** -0.0163*** -0.0163*** -0.0162*** -0.0162*** 
  (-17.46) (-17.47) (-17.45) (-17.41) (-17.42) 
CLUSTER 0.0113*** 0.0113*** 0.0113*** 0.0113*** 0.0113*** 
  (12.27) (12.24) (12.25) (12.21) (12.21) 
NASDAQDummy 0.0054*** 0.0055*** 0.0055*** 0.0058*** 0.0058*** 
  (4.76) (4.82) (4.80) (5.04) (5.01) 
Underwriter -0.0061*** -0.0060*** -0.0060*** -0.0059*** -0.0059*** 
  (-5.44) (-5.42) (-5.42) (-5.32) (-5.32) 
Reloffersize 0.0133*** 0.0134*** 0.0133*** 0.0137*** 0.0137*** 
  (4.70) (4.74) (4.72) (4.84) (4.84) 
RAProceeds90SEO 
 
0.0008 
  
0.0006 
  
 
(1.13) 
  
(0.71) 
Market250 
  
-0.0062 
 
0.0129 
  
  
(-0.68) 
 
(1.17) 
MarketVolatility 
   
0.4427*** 0.5121*** 
  
   
(3.20) (3.23) 
Constant 0.0329*** 0.0314*** 0.0331*** 0.0308*** 0.0291*** 
  (3.37) (3.19) (3.39) (3.15) (2.93) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5339 5339 5339 5339 5339 
Adjusted R
2
 0.2632 0.2632 0.2631 0.2644 0.2644 
Underpricing is defined as ((P-OP)/P)*100, where P is the prior offer closing price and OP is the offer price. Volatility is the standard 
deviation of daily close-to-close returns over the 30 trading days ending 11 days prior to the offer. MarketCap is the logged pre-issue 
market capitalization, measured as the price multiplied by the total number of shares outstanding at the market close before the 
offer.CARPos (CARNeg) is defined as the cumulative market-adjusted return over the 5 days prior to the offer and it equals zero if the 
return is negative (positive), where market return is defined as the return on the CRSP value weighted index. CLUSTER is a Dummy equal 
to one if the offer price is set at integer. NASDAQDummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer is list on NASDAQ. Underwriter is a 
dummy equals one if one of the lead underwriters has the reputation rank equal to or greater than 8 and zero otherwise. The ranking is 
made by Ritter and available on http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. Reloffersize is the ratio between the shares offered to 
the outstanding shares prior to the offer. RAProceeds90SEO is the ratio of aggregate SEO proceeds over the 90 trading days ending 1 day 
before the offer to the overall market capitalization prior to the offer day. MarketVolatility is the standard deviations of daily returns, 
computed using equal-weighted portfolios of all firms listed on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ/ARCA for the 21-trading-day returns ending one day 
before the offer day. Market250 the proxy of liquidity shocks caused by market decline, Market250=MarketReturn250*Dmarket, where 
MarketReturn250 is the return on CRSP index over the prior 250 trading days and Dmarket equals one if MarketReturn250>0 and zero 
otherwise. The value of t statistics is in brackets. ***,**, and* represent 1% 5% and 10% significance, respectively. 
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In Table 8-1, regression results with alternative specifications are presented. The size 
of the sample increases to 5339 since many issues without closing bid quotes in CRSP 
are included in the regression analysis. The results are similar to those in Table 6-6. 
Specifically, the MarketVolatility coefficient has the predicted sign and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This result indicates that market volatility is positively 
associated with SEO underpricing after controlling for other factors. Moreover, 
Volatility, CARPos, LnPrice, CLUSTER, NASDAQDummy, Underwriter and 
Reloffersize are of the predicted sign and are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
  
Figure 8-1 Year dummy coefficients in regression of underpricing on control 
variables 
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8.2. The Behaviour of SEO Underpricing over Time 
In this section, we examine the behaviour of SEO underpricing over time by the 
estimation method proposed by Chambers and Dimson (2009). In Figure 8-1, the 
dummy year coefficients are estimated by model (8.1). In the regression, all 
explanatory variables except for the year dummies are demeaned. The figure shows an 
upward shift in annual SEO dummies, and if we divide the sample period into two 
subperiods 1987-1997 and 1998-2009, the number-weighted means of year dummy 
coefficients are 1.41% and 2.36% respectively: an increase of 0.95%. 
 
We next divide the sample into two subsamples. The first sample only includes SEOs 
that are priced at next lower or other lower integer prices. The second sample includes 
the remaining SEOs. For each sample, the coefficients of year dummy are estimated 
by model (8.2). The dummy year coefficients for the first sample are graphed in 
Figure 8-2. Again, we divide the sample periods into two subperiods 1987-1997 and 
1998-2009. The number-weighted mean of dummy year coefficients for 1987-1997 is 
1.39%. The number increases to 2.41% for 1998-2009. 
 ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܥܽ݌ ൅ ߚଶܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ ൅ ߚଷܥܣܴܲ݋ݏ ൅ ߚସܥܣܴܰ݁݃ ൅ ߚହܮ݊ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ ൅ߚ଺ܰܣܵܦܣܳܦݑ݉݉ݕ ൅ ߚ଻ܷ݊݀݁ݎݓݎ݅ݐ݁ݎ ൅ ߚ଼ܴ݈݁݋݂݂݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁ ൅ ߚଽܴܣܲݎ݋ܿ݁݁݀ݏܵܧܱ ? ?൅ߚଵ଴ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ ? ? ?൅ ߚଵଵܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ.                                                                                         (8.2) 
 
Figure 8-3 shows the pattern of dummy year coefficients for the second sample. The 
figure shows an upward shift of annual dummies over time. The number-weighted 
means of dummy year coefficients for 1987-1997 and 1998-2009 are 1.25% and 2.26% 
respectively: an increase of 1.01%. The result shows that SEOs that are not priced at 
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lower integer prices have a similar pattern of underpricing to that of SEOs with lower 
integer prices, indicating that setting the offer price at lower integers cannot fully 
explain the upward shift of SEO underpricing over time. 
 
 
Figure 8-2 Year dummy coefficients for the subsample that only includes SEOs 
that are priced at lower integer offer prices 
 
 
Figure 8-3 Year dummy coefficients for the subsample that only includes SEOs 
that are not priced at lower integer offer prices 
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8.3. The Logit Analysis of Setting Offer Price at Lower Integer 
We next conduct a logit analysis similar to Table 6-7 but with alternative 
specifications. The logit model is model (8.3). In Model 1, the dependent variable is 
OTHER LOWER INTEGER dummy. This binary variable is equal to one if the offer 
price is set at other lower integers relative to the prior closing price and zero otherwise. 
For instance, assuming the prior closing price is $10.7, the dummy is one if the offer 
price is set at $9 or lower integers ($8, 7, etc.).  
 ሺܱݐ݄݁ݎሻܮ݋ݓ݁ݎܫ݊ݐ݁݃݁ݎ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܥܽ݌ ൅ ߚଶܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ ൅ ߚଷܥܣܴܲ݋ݏ ൅ ߚସܥܣܴܰ݁݃ ൅ߚହܮ݊ܲݎ݅ܿ݁ ൅ ߚ଺ܰܣܵܦܣܳܦݑ݉݉ݕ ൅ ߚ଻ܷ݊݀݁ݎݓݎ݅ݐ݁ݎ ൅ ߚ଼ܴ݈݁݋݂݂݁ݎݏ݅ݖ݁ ൅ ߚଽܴܣܲݎ݋ܿ݁݁݀ݏܵܧܱ ? ?൅ߚଵ଴ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ ? ? ?൅ ߚଵଵܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ ൅ ߚଵଶܯܶܪ ൅ ߚଵଷܦ݈݁ܿ݅݉ܽܦݑ݉݉ݕǤ                         (8.3) 
 
In Model 2, the dependent variable for this set is LOWER INTEGER dummy. The 
variable takes one if the offer price is set at either next lower integer or other lower 
integers relative to the prior closing price, and zero otherwise. Taking the above 
example again, the dummy is one if the offer price is set at $10 or lower integers ($9, 
8, etc.) 
 
The results in both models are similar to those in Table 6-7. Specifically, the time 
variable MTH is positively and significantly related to the likelihood of setting the 
offer price at (other) lower integer after controlling for other factors. The results 
confirm that the practice of setting offer price at lower integer has become more 
prevalent over time. 
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Table 8-2 Logit regression of other lower integer dummy variable/next lower or 
other lower integer dummy variable 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
MarketCap -0.1042*** -0.0686*** 
 
(-3.28) (-2.88) 
Volatility 8.5379*** 5.2122*** 
 
(7.63) (5.57) 
CARPos 0.7312 0.0471 
 
(1.54) (0.12) 
CARNeg -1.3858*** -1.4090*** 
 
(-3.00) (-3.86) 
LnPrice 0.7581*** 0.2807*** 
 
(13.33) (7.13) 
NASDAQDummy 0.2550*** 0.2632*** 
 
(3.70) (5.25) 
Underwriter -0.0452 0.0492 
 
(-0.71) (1.04) 
Reloffersize 0.3921** 0.3898*** 
 
(2.57) (3.32) 
MTH 0.0043*** 0.0041*** 
 
(5.41) (7.13) 
decimaldummy -0.3640*** -0.4296*** 
 
(-3.30) (-5.13) 
RAProceeds90SEO 0.0391 -0.0019 
 
(1.17) (-0.08) 
Market250 -0.6279 -0.8294** 
 
(-1.32) (-2.27) 
MarketVolatility 3.7881 -0.5287 
 
(0.49) (-0.08) 
Constant -2.7871*** -1.0202** 
 
(-5.10) (-2.47) 
N 5339 5339 
Pseudo R
2
 0.1515 0.0553 
In Model 1, the Dependent variable is Other Lower Integer Dummy which is equal to one if the offer price is set at the other lower 
integers relative to the prior closing price and zero otherwise. For instance, assuming the prior closing price of an issue is $10.7, the 
OTHER LOWER INTEGER dummy is one if the offer price is set at $9 or lower integers ($8, 7, etc.). Panel B The Dependent variable is 
Next Lower Integer or Other Lower Integer Dummy which is equal to one if the offer price is set at either the next lower integer or other 
lower integers relative to the prior closing price and zero otherwise. For instance, assuming the prior closing price of an issue is $10.7, 
the Next Lower Integer/OTHER LOWER INTEGER dummy is one if the offer price is set at $10 or lower integers ($9, 8, 7, etc.). Volatility is 
the standard deviation of daily close-to-close returns over the 30 trading days ending 11 days prior to the offer. MarketCap is the logged 
pre-issue market capitalization, measured as the price multiplied by the total number of shares outstanding at the market close before 
the offer.CARPos (CARNeg) is defined as the cumulative market-adjusted return over the 5 days prior to the offer and it equals zero if 
the return is negative (positive), where market return is defined as the return on the CRSP value weighted index. CLUSTER is a Dummy 
equal to one if the offer price is set at integer. NASDAQDummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer is list on NASDAQ. 
Underwriter is a dummy equals one if one of the lead underwriters has the reputation rank equal to or greater than 8 and zero 
otherwise. The ranking is made by Ritter and available on http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. Reloffersize is the ratio 
between the shares offered to the outstanding shares prior to the offer. RAProceeds90SEO is the ratio of aggregate SEO proceeds over 
the 90 trading days ending 1 day before the offer to the overall market capitalization prior to the offer day. MarketVolatility is the 
standard deviations of daily returns, computed using equal-weighted portfolios of all firms listed on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ/ARCA for the 
21-trading-day returns ending one day before the offer day. Market250 the proxy of liquidity shocks caused by market decline, 
Market250=MarketReturn250*Dmarket, where MarketReturn250 is the return on CRSP index over the prior 250 trading days and Dmarket 
equals one if MarketReturn250>0 and zero otherwise. White's heteroskedasticity-adjusted z-statistics are in parentheses. ***,**, and* 
represent 1% 5% and 10% significance, respectively. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION 
 
9.1. Summary 
Inspired by: 1) the increase of seasoned equity offering underpricing during the past 
two decades; 2) some evidence inconsistent with the existing explanations for the 
increase of SEO underpricing; and 3) the neglect of liquidity, liquidity shocks and 
market conditions in the existing studies on SEO underpricing, in this PhD thesis, we 
have included market conditions into the empirical SEO underpricing models and 
examined the behaviour of SEO underpricing over the sample period from 1987 to 
2009. 
 
We hypothesised that certain market conditions could cause liquidity shocks that 
would consequently increase SEO underpricing. We developed three proxies to 
represent three scenarios of market conditions, namely aggregate issues with large 
volume, large market decline, and market volatility. Using a sample of more than 
5000 seasoned equity offerings in the US between 1987 and 2009, we found that 
market volatility was significantly and positively associated with SEO underpricing 
after controlling for other factors86.  
 
In our sample, we documented not only a substantial magnitude of SEO underpricing 
(including both close-to-offer return and offer-to-close return) but also a statistically 
                                                 
86
 Unless otherwise stated, the underpricing refers to the close-to-offer return in this thesis. 
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and economically significant increase in SEO underpricing over time. The average 
magnitude of underpricing over the sample period was 2.90%87, which means that a 
large amount of money was left on the table by issuers88. Moreover, we divided the 
sample into three sub samples and found that the average SEO underpricing increased 
from 2.12% in 1987-1995 to 3.01% in 1996-2001, then to 3.75% in 2002-2009. This 
increase in SEO underpricing is consistent with Altinkilic and Hansen (2003), Corwin 
(2003), Kim and Shin (2004), Mola and Loughran (2004) and Autore (2011). 
 
To examine the behaviour of SEO underpricing over the long run, we employed the 
estimation method proposed by Chambers and Dimson (2009). Under this method, all 
explanatory variables except year dummies are demeaned, then the coefficients of the 
year dummies are estimated using a regression model. The year dummy coefficients 
represent the magnitude of SEO underpricing after controlling for changing risk 
composition, price practice, market conditions and the influence of underwriter 
reputation and analyst coverage.  
 
We found an upward shift in the annual dummies over our sample period from 1987 to 
2009. The number-weighted means of the year dummy coefficients for 1987 to 1997 
and 1998 to 2009 were 1.80% and 3.49% respectively: an increase of 1.69%89. Then 
we divided the sample into two subsamples: one only included SEOs that were priced 
at next lower or other lower integer prices and the other included the remaining SEOs. 
The patterns of the year dummy coefficients in the two subsamples were similar, 
                                                 
87
 The underpricing refers to the close-to-offer return. 
88
 In our sample, the average amount of money left on the table by SEO underpricing/discount is $5.37 
million in the equivalent of 2009 US dollars for the period 1987-2009. 
89
 The coefficients of year dummies are weighted by the number of SEOs each year in the sample. 
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which indicated that setting offer prices at lower integers cannot fully explain the 
upward shift of annual underpricing dummies. 
 
We hypothesised that the upward shift in the annual dummies over our sample period 
could be explained by increasing investment banking power. In the literature, a 
number of studies have claimed that the industry structure of underwriting has 
transferred from a competitive market to an oligopoly market, and banks use non-price 
dimensions to gain market power and consequently increase SEO underpricing (e.g. 
Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Liu and Ritter, 2011). We also found some evidence of 
increasing investment banking power in our sample. By employing a probit model, we 
found that the practice of setting offer prices at lower integers has become prevalent 
over time, all else being equal. 
 
9.2. Future Work 
We borrowed the investment banking power hypothesis in the literature to explain the 
upward shift in the annual underpricing dummies in our sample. Studies in IPO 
underpricing have found strong evidence that underwriters use analyst coverage as a 
non-price dimension to gain more market power and consequently underprice IPOs 
more (e.g. Liu and Ritter, 2011). 
 
However, in our sample, we found no evidence that underwriters use analyst coverage 
as a non-price dimension to increase SEO underpricing. Specifically, after controlling 
for other factors, the toptier analyst dummy was insignificantly and negatively related 
to SEO underpricing over the sample period from 1987 to 2009. This result indicates 
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that analyst coverage might not be an appropriate proxy of investment banking power 
in SEO studies, and other non-price dimensions might be employed by underwriters to 
remain their oligopoly status. Therefore, future research could focus on other non-
price dimensions and examine whether some of them could serve as proxies of 
investment banking power in SEO underpricing. 
 
Moreover, by using the estimation method proposed by Chambers and Dimson (2009), 
we could examine the behaviour of IPO underpricing over time in the US market. If 
we can observe a similar pattern in the annual IPO underpricing dummies as that in 
SEOs, we can view the finding as indirect evidence of investment banking power. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 
 
Figure A-1 Global Seasoned Equity Offerings, Total deal Value by Type 
(Securities Data Corporation, 2004 cited in Bortolotti and Smart, 2008, p.38) 
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Appendix 2 
 
Table A-1 Top 10 Banks by Fees 
 
Fees 
Change in Fees % of Fees collected by product in 2010 
Top 10 Banks ($m) vs. Prev Period* M&A Equity Bonds Loans 
JP Morgan 5,533.85 -3% 25 27 31 17 
 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch 4,581.59 -1% 19 25 34 21 
 
Goldman Sachs 4,386.52 +11% 44 29 22 4 
 
Morgan Stanley 4,055.48 +13% 35 36 24 5 
 
Credit Suisse 3,379.12 +19% 30 27 33 10 
 
Deutsche Bank 3,286.80 +15% 25 24 38 12 
 
Citi 3,238.67 -11% 22 25 41 12 
 
Barclays Capital 2,864.44 +29% 24 20 42 14 
 
UBS 2,614.44 +6% 32 37 25 6 
 
BNP Paribas 1,433.89 -9% 21 11 39 29 
 
Total 83,356.94 +15% 37 26 24 13 
 
 (http://markets.ft.com/investmentBanking/tablesAndTrends.asp) 
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Appendix 3 
A 3.1. Limit Order Model Discussions 
In this section, a derivation of the limit order model from Chacko, Jurek and Stafford 
(2008) is summarized. According to the previous discussion, the baseline model 
depends on three factors: (1) market structure; (2) arrival rate of opposing order; (3) 
the evolution of the fundamental value. Because these factors have complex dynamics 
in reality, the limit order model is constructed as a reduced-form.  
 
For fundamental value, the dynamics are described by: 
t
t
t dZdt
V
dV VP  ,                                                                                                       (A1) 
where P and 2V are the instantaneous expected return and variance of the fundamental 
value, and tdZ is a standard Gauss-Wiener process.  
 
A limit order, ),( KQLi , specifies a quantity )(Q , price )(K , and direction of trade (i.e., 
buy or sell, ^ `SBi , ). The arrival rate of opposing order flow, )(QiO , is a function of 
the order quantity, Q .  
 
Let ),,,( tKQVL t  denote the time t  value of a Q-share limit order with a limit price of 
K.  
The evolution of the limit order¶s value is: 
»¼
º«¬
ª
'
' 'o' )),,,(0()),(1(
)),,,(),,,((),(
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Formula (A2) then can be deducted to  
0))(()(
2
1)( 2
,,
  LQrFLrFL itQFFtQF OV ,                                                          (A3) 
where ttQ VQF  ,  
The ODE is an equidimensional equation that has the solution calculated by a linear 
combination of power functions,  
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  II DD tQtQtj FFtKQVL ,1,0),,,( ,                                                                              (A4) 
0D  and 1D  are two constants of integration that can be determined from the boundary 
conditions. j is used to represent sell and buy limit orders (j=S means sell).  The value 
L depends on the quantity dependent arrival intensity, )(QiO , of buy (sell) market 
orders through the power coefficient, )( iOIr . 
 
To solve )( iOIr , substitute the guess I tQF ,  into (A4) 
IDD tQtj FtKQVL ,10 )(),,,(  ,                                                                                   (A5) 
 
Substitute (A5) into (A3) gives 
0))(()
2
(
2
2
2
2
  Qrr iOIVIV .                                                                         (A6) 
The power coefficients are given by the roots of this equation: 
2
2
22
))((2
2
1)
2
1()( V
O
VVOI
Qrrr ii ¹¸
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©¨
§ r r .                                                    (A7)           
 
Economic intuition allows us to exclude one of the two roots in the case of both a sell 
limit order and a buy limit order. In particular, since the value of a sell (buy) limit 
order is increasing (decreasing) in tQF , , we can exclude the negative (positive) root. 
 
The next is to identify 0D  and 1D , then the solution of L is obtained.  
The constants of integration, ( 0D , 1D ) can be identified by imposing the boundary 
conditions. Take S (sell limit order) for example.                       
The boundary conditions are: 
0lim
0
 p
S
V
L
t
                                                                                                                   (A8) 
)(lim KVQLS
VVt
 n                                                                                                   (A9) 
1lim  n
S
FVV
L
t
,                                                                                                               (A10) 
where V  is the optimal exercise thresholds for sell limit orders. 
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(A8) indicates that the call option becomes worthless as the value of the underlying 
tends to zero and requires that 01  D . 
 
(A9), (A10) correspond respectively to the value matching and smooth pasting 
conditions at the optimal exercise threshold, V . 
From (A9): )()(lim
,0 KVQF tQVVt  

n
ID , 
                    )()( *0 KVQQV  ID .                                                                    (A11) 
From (A10): 1lim  n
S
FVV
L
t
 
                    1)( 1*0  IID QV .                                                                                  (A12) 
Combining (A11) and (A12) gives 
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Substituting above equation into (A12) gives 10
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Substituting above equation into (A4) gives  
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And it is optimal for the market maker to exercise the implicit call option whenever 
fundamental value reaches the threshold ¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§
 

)1(
)(*
B
B
KV OI
OI
 from below. 
  
To induce immediate exercise of a sell limit order, the optimal exercise threshold price 
*V should be set equal to the prevailing fundamental value tV .  
 
Therefore from (A13), the bid price is  
¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§  


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B
tB VQK OI
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.                                                                                      (A15) 
 219 
 
The percentage immediacy costs for sales and purchases are given by 
)(
1)(
B
t
tB
V
VQK
OI 

.                                                                                          (A16) 
In particular, whenever rQi !!)(O , V
OOI )(2)( Q
i
i r|r .                           
Therefore, the percentage immediacy cost is 
 OV 2)(
QQp | .      
 
        
A 3.2. The Application of Limit Order Model in SEO Underpricing 
Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) divide the SEO discounting into expected and surprise 
FRPSRQHQWV DQG DUJXH WKDW WKH VXUSULVH FRPSRQHQW UHIOHFWV WKH OHDG EDQN¶V ILQDO
adjustment to the offer price. Similarly, Mola and Loughran (2004) find evidence that 
underwriters tend to set an offer price at the closing market price, but rounded down to 
a near but not necessarily the next integer. Chapter Five and Six in this PhD study also 
confirm that, even after offer dates adjustment, the trend of setting offer price at the 
next or other lower integer still holds. All these findings suggest that investment banks 
often make a final adjustment to the offer price based on the closing market price prior 
to the offer date. As discussed in Chapter Six, price pressure is a possible explanation 
for SEO underpricing. In this section, a new measure of price pressure, derived from 
the limit order model, is introduced. To apply the structure model to measure the price 
pressure, two hypotheses are required. The first hypothesis is discussed in the 
following section. 
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A 3.3. The Immediacy Cost and Price Pressure 
Hypothesis One: (part of) the price pressure faced by underwriters in a SEO 
transaction can be regarded as the immediacy cost for selling a block of shares, and 
part of SEO underpricing is used to compensate this immediacy cost. 
 
Hypothesis one has some support from both established hypotheses and empirical 
evidence. First, the role of underwriters in equity issuance is analogue to that of 
market makers in stock transactions. Butler, Grullon and Weston (2005) suggest that 
underwriters have a similar role to market makers who line up buyers and sellers to 
facilitate the intermediation process. Both market makers and underwriters face 
inventory risk. In stock transactions, market makers face this risk, especially when 
having to sell a block of illiquid shares. When the inventory risk is high, market 
makers would require a high bid-ask spread as compensation. Sellers (buyers) who are 
eager to sell (buy) their shares immediately would accept this charge. Therefore, the 
cost is regarded as immediacy cost by Chacko et al.(2008) and it might be estimated 
using the limit model discussed in Chapter Three. In an SEO transaction, when a firm-
commitment underwritten contract is signed, the underwriter is obliged to buy the 
shares at a fixed price. If there is an unexpected reduction in investor demand for the 
SEO, the investment banks will bear the inventory risk.  
 
In contrast with a market maker, the underwriter has two ways to cover this 
immediacy cost. One is underwriting spread or gross spread, which is a percentage of 
the offer price. The other is SEO underpricing. Butler et al. (2005) note that 
underwriting spreads have a significantly positive relation with the liquidity of 
underlying shares. The higher the liquidity is, the less the inventory risk and the 
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associated immediacy cost if the immediacy cost is covered by gross spread. This 
immediacy cost is regarded as the compensation for the inventory risk for the 
underwriter. However, the underwriting spread is charged based on the offer price. 
Before considering underwriting spread, the underwriter still can use the underpricing 
to cover part of the immediacy cost, only in this case the immediacy cost can be 
regarded as (part of) the effects of price pressure. Because the underpricing is directly 
related to the offer price that could affect the demand for the shares from investors, it 
might be a more efficient way to cover the immediacy cost.  
 
The empirical evidence is from the expression of immediacy cost derived from the 
limit order model. The analytical result of immediacy cost is OV 2
Q
 
, wKHUHıLVWKH
volatility of the underlying shares defined as the return standard deviation. As 
discussed in Chapter Two and Chapter Six, stock return volatility is proved to be 
positively related to SEO underpricing at statistically significant level (Altinkilic and 
Hansen, 2003; Corwin, 2003; Kim and Shin, 2004). This relationship is consistent 
with the limit order model in which the volatility also has positive effects on the 
immediacy cost. Furthermore, O2
Q is used to represent the impact of transaction size. 
4LVWKHWRWDOQXPEHURIWKHVKDUHVLQWKHRUGHUDQGȜLVWKHDUULYDOUDWHRIWKHRSSRVLWH
order. Chacko et al.(2008) and (2006) suggest that the arrival rate could be estimated 
using historical trading data. This suggestion coincides with an alternative measure of 
price pressure used by Corwin (2003) 90 . This measure is also regarded as an 
alternative proxy for relative offer size, defined as offered shares divided by average 
                                                 
90
 The alternative measure is mention in Footnote 12 in Corwin (2003). 
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daily (adjusted) trading volume. Corwin's conclusions are not affected by the use of 
WKLV PHDVXUH ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV WKH DOWHUQDWLYH SUR[\ 4Ȝ Kas a positive relation with 
6(2XQGHUSULFLQJ,QVXPERWKSDUWVRIWKHLPPHGLDF\FRVWıDQG O2
Q
 are positively 
related to SEO underpricing, indicating that SEO underpricing might include the 
immediacy cost. 
 
A 3.4.  Assumptions and Parameter Estimation of the Limit Order Model 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the limit order model requires several assumptions and 
four variables to calculate the immediacy cost 91 . After checking the underlying 
assumptions of the limit order model, it can be concluded that the SEO process 
satisfies the underlying assumptions to some extent. In this section, the assumptions of 
limit order model are discussed in the context of SEO process. The estimations of 
those variables are also discussed as follows. 
 
Assumption 1: Market structure. First of all, the market structure of a price driven 
system required by the limit order model is similar to the pattern in the SEO process. 
The issue of equity is set at the offering price; it is available for both investors and 
underwriters. However, the demand from each investor might vary according to other 
factors. The investment banks are in the position to provide reliable liquidity in a firm 
commitment contract. The monopolist position of market maker is similar to that of a 
syndicate in SEO pricing. As discussed previously, investment banks have the 
privileged position in an SEO process. They link the issuer and investors. If the 
                                                 
91
 In a simplified form, the model requires three variables to get the result.  
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demand from investors cannot take all the shares in the offering, investment banks 
have the advantage of taking these shares at a discounted price first, then reselling 
them into the market. This intermediate function is same as the role of market maker 
in the price-driven market.  
 
Assumption 2: in the theory, the issuer of the equity has no patience. The limit order 
model requires the party who initiates the deal to be impatient and complete the deal 
immediately. As discussed in Chapter Two, the offer price, and other profit-sharing 
agreements are decided one day prior to the issue. If the underwriter and the issuer 
cannot reach a deal, the SEO would face cancellation or postponement in a firm 
commitment transaction. In a best efforts offer (which is rare in SEOs), if the shares 
cannot be sold at offering price, the unsold shares would be withdrawn by the firm. 
Both cases are regarded as the issue failure. If the cancellations or postponements of 
SEOs occur, the issuer will lose registration fees, accounting expenses and 
management time devoted to the offering process. Due to the cost of the failure, SEO 
cancellations or postponements rarely occur (Mikkelson and Partch, 1988). Therefore, 
it can be reasonably assumed that issuers of SEOs have no patience in normal 
circumstances since, for a unified final price set for all members in the syndicate, the 
6(2 FDQ EH UHJDUGHG DV D µRQH-VKRW H[HFXWLRQ¶ %RWK DERYH FRQGLWLRQV LQ DQ 6(2
emphasize the role of immediacy cost in SEO pricing.  
 
However, the cancellation of SEOs is slightly different from the pattern of a limit 
order model. In a limit order, the seller can still withdraw the limit order after the 
order is set but in an SEO transaction, before setting the offer price, the firm can 
cancel or postpone the offering ± but once the offer price is set on the issue day, it can 
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no longer be cancelled. In a firm commitment offer, the unsold shares should be taken 
by the investment banks. In other words, unlike a seller who can withdraw the order 
even after setting the price, an issuer has no right to withdraw the deal once it has been 
made. However, as discussed, the limit order model assumes that the transaction 
initiator has no patience. As a result, the offer price set by the underwriter is taken 
almost immediately by the transaction initiator (or the issuer) in the equity offering 
transaction. Therefore, the slight difference in the aspect of withdrawal setting might 
not have any substantial impact on the application of a limit order model on SEO 
transactions. 
 
Parameter Estimation 
To summarize, the SEO process satisfies the major assumptions required by the limit 
order model. Therefore, it might be used as a base model in measuring immediacy 
cost or price pressure. As discussed before, the discount given by the limit order 
model is,  
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V : the volatility of a firm's fundamental value is estimated using the standard                  
deviation of its daily stock returns over a specific period (e.g. one year).  
           Q:  the offer size of the issue. 
          
O : arrival rate of opposing order in the primary market. 
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There are four parameters to estimate, namely order size, volatility, risk free rate and 
the arrival rate of opposing order )(QiO . The offer size is given by the SDC database. 
To estimate the risk free rate and volatility, there are available methods in the 
literature. The yield on 1-month Treasury bills is taken as the prevailing risk free rate. 
The volatility of the underlying shares can be estimated using two methods suggested 
by Hull (2006). One is to estimate volatilities from historical data. Specifically, the 
volatility is defined as the standard deviation of stock return over a certain period.  
 
The other method is to calculate implied volatilities based on the Black-Scholes 
pricing formulae. However, only a small portion of SEO issuing firms has listed 
options. For instance, Kim and Shin (2004) find only 5.54% of their SEO firms have 
listed options during the sample period. Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) report that 97 
out of the 476 SEO firms in their sample have listed options. Therefore, due to data 
availability, the volatility can only be estimated from historical data in this PhD study. 
In this section, the volatility follows the definition in previous chapters ± the standard 
deviation of daily returns over 30 trading days ending 11 days prior to the offer. 
Moreover, because risk free rate is much smaller than the arrival rate of opposing 
order, the expression of immediacy can be approximated as ݌ሺܳሻ ൌ ߪට ொଶఒ. As a result, 
only the volatility and the arrival rate of opposing order need to be estimated. 
 
Estimation of the arrival rate of opposing order O  
It is quite difficult to estimate the arrival rate of an opposing order in the limit order 
transaction. As discussed in the literature, the arrival rate of opposing order is critical 
for the limit order model. In Chacko, Jurek and Stafford (2008), the arrival rate of 
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opposing order is estimated by two methods. Both methods assume that the arrival 
rate of an opposing order is the simple function of offer size Q: 1)1()(  QQ BB OO  . 
The arrival rate of expected waiting time for the completion of a Q-share order is 
precisely Q times larger than the corresponding waiting time for a one-share order. To 
ensure this setting, they examine the scaling order with respect to quantity by 
estimating the following nonlinear least squares regression, > @ ni QQE  10)( DDW . 
The sample consists of 1,488 firms and the mean estimate of n is close to 1. Thus, they 
conclude that the above setting is reasonable.  
 
As for the estimation methods, one is µWKHQDLYH¶PHWKRGZKLFK LV LOOXVWUDWHG LQ WKH
working paper by Chacko, Jurek and Stafford (2006). To estimate waiting time for a 
one-share order, one simply takes the total amount of time that has elapsed and divides 
it by the total realized volume. For instance, if the daily trading volume of a share is 
1000, the estimate waiting time for a one-share order is 1/1000 day. And the expected 
waiting time for an offer with 1000 shares is 1 day. The other method is the implied 
method. It uses historical data to imply the order arrival rate. Chacko, Jurek and 
Stafford (2008) implement this method to calibrate the arrival rate in estimation of 
transaction costs for NYSE Firms. They use the quantity cross-section of the realized 
percentage transaction costs and imply out the order arrival rate. Then they effectively 
produce a transaction cost function for use at the end of the year.  
 
In an SEO transaction, the arrival rate of an opposing order in an SEO transaction (the 
primary market) reflects the information gathered by the book building process in 
SEO pricing practice. As discussed in Chapter Two, the lead underwriters usually 
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gather bid information from investors through the book building process to decide the 
offering price. Therefore, the arrival rate directly measures the demand for the 
seasoned equity in the book building process. However, in an SEO transaction, the 
price pressure effects only represent a portion of SEO underpricing. Therefore, the 
implied method cannot be implemented. The naive estimation uses the average daily 
volume of the underlying shares to measure the arrival rate. The estimation of arrival 
rate in the primary market is an attempt to estimate demand information prior to the 
offer date. However, in SEO pricing, the demand for the seasoned equity is separated 
from the secondary market. The shares are traded in the primary market in which the 
participants are mainly institutional investors. Indeed, it is almost impossible to 
measure the arrival rate in the primary market 1 day prior to the offering. Then the 
second hypothesis is need.  
 
Hypothesis Two: the arrival rate in the primary market is highly related to the 
trading volume in the secondary market.  
 
The underlying notion behind this hypothesis is that if there is a strong demand in the 
secondary market, the demand can be satisfied by bidding in the primary market. 
Because O  is calibrated using trading volume in the secondary market, the number 
calibrated by OV 2
Q
cannot be regarded as the immediacy cost directly. However, if 
Hypothesis Two holds, the variable OV 2
Q
might be a more precise measure to reflect 
temporary price pressure.  
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The base model for the regression test is similar to that in Chapter Six. If the 
immediacy cost is taken into consideration, then relative offer size and volatility 
should be removed from the base model because the expression of immediacy cost 
already includes volatility and the offer size factors. In this section, we compare the 
regression results of the base model with those of models that include immediacy cost. 
The immediacy costs is expressed as OV 2
Q
. As discussed earlier, daily volumes of 
the underlying shares are utilized to estimate the arrival rate of opposing orders. We 
use the average daily volume calculated from 5 trading days, 11 trading days, and 30 
trading days prior to the issue to estimate immediacy cost. As for NASDAQ issues, 
the volume is divided by two.  
 
The regression results are presented in Table A-2. These suggest that there is no 
statistically significant relation between immediacy costs and SEO underpricing (R0). 
Three variables immediacy cost (30days), immediacy cost (11days) and immediacy 
cost (5days); all have insignificant coefficients. Among them, only immediacy cost 
(30days) has positive coefficients. The other two variables even have negative 
coefficients, showing a completely reverse relation compared with the hypothesised 
relation. Among all these models, Model 1 has the highest adjusted R2. This result 
shows that when immediacy cost is incorporated, the overall explanation power does 
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not improve but declines. All this suggests that incorporating immediacy cost into the 
existing models generates unfavourable results.  
 
As discussed earlier, the most likely explanation for the undesirable results is that 
Hypothesis Two is inconsistent with the real case. The arrival rate in the primary 
market cannot be estimated using the volume data in the secondary market. For 
instance, in the limit order model, the size of the order is completely unexpected by 
the market ± therefore, the daily volume from the secondary market may be a suitable 
estimation for the arrival rate of the opposing order. However, in an SEO transaction, 
the deal is often announced several months before the issue date, therefore, investors 
are well informed about the deal. The awareness of the offer size would make it 
unsuitable to estimate the arrival rate of opposing order based on the daily volume.  
 
However, even Hypothesis Two might be not correct and, in the future research, there 
might be a chance that the bid information collected from the book building process 
can be used to estimate the arrival rate of opposing order in the primary market92. For 
example, in the book building process, above a specific price (e.g. the prior closing 
price), the subscribed volume is Size 1 below the offer size-Size 2, then the size of 
unexpected part of the offering should be (Size 2-Size 1). Thus, in the limit order 
model, (Size 2-Size 1) should be regarded as the order size and arrival rate of the 
opposing order can be estimated from trading volume in the secondary market.  
 
 
                                                 
92
 Although the information gathered from the book building process is confidential, the limit order 
model still has a chance to be utilized by these underwriters themselves. 
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Table A-2 OLS Regression results for SEO underpricing (with Immediacy Cost) 
Model 1 2 3 4 
Volatility 0.2865*** 
   
 
(12.95) 
   
Reloffersize 0.0071** 
   
 
(2.53) 
   
Immediacy Cost (30days) 
 
0.3821 
  
 
 
(1.19) 
  
Immediacy Cost (11days) 
  
-0.5013 
 
 
  
(-1.55) 
 
Immediacy Cost (5days) 
   
-0.2576 
 
   
(-0.91) 
GrossSpreadPercent -0.0023*** -0.0018*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** 
 
(-4.78) (-3.80) (-3.52) (-3.61) 
CARPos 0.0769*** 0.1082*** 0.1079*** 0.1075*** 
 
(7.76) (11.03) (11.00) (10.96) 
CARNeg -0.0181** -0.0497*** -0.0517*** -0.0511*** 
 
(-2.03) (-5.67) (-5.93) (-5.87) 
LnPrice -0.0166*** -0.0165*** -0.0166*** -0.0166*** 
 
(-20.02) (-19.73) (-19.97) (-19.92) 
CLUSTER 0.0124*** 0.0136*** 0.0136*** 0.0136*** 
 
(12.74) (13.81) (13.82) (13.80) 
CloseBidDiffNY 0.0915 0.0937 0.1002 0.0982 
 
(0.71) (0.72) (0.77) (0.75) 
CloseBidDiffNas 0.4742*** 0.4771*** 0.5096*** 0.5051*** 
 
(14.07) (13.23) (14.08) (14.00) 
NASDAQDummy -0.0011 0.0014 0.0018 0.0017 
 
(-0.80) (1.01) (1.25) (1.19) 
Underwriter -0.0069*** -0.0062*** -0.0063*** -0.0062*** 
 
(-5.32) (-4.71) (-4.78) (-4.77) 
Toptier 0.0018 0.0015 0.0014 0.0014 
 
(1.55) (1.23) (1.17) (1.20) 
Constant 0.0733*** 0.0778*** 0.0783*** 0.0781*** 
 
(18.26) (19.19) (19.32) (19.30) 
N 4701 4690 4700 4699 
Adjusted R
2
 0.2389 0.2119 0.2113 0.2110 
Underpricing is defined as ((P-OP)/P)*100, where P is the prior offer closing price and OP is the offer price. Immediacy cost (30days), 
(11days), and (5days) are variables calculated based on the volume of 30 trading days, 11 trading days and 5 trading days prior to the issue 
respectively. Volatility is the standard deviation of daily close-to-close returns over the 30 trading days ending 11 days prior to the offer. 
CARPos (CARNeg) is defined as the cumulative market-adjusted return over the 5 days prior to the offer and it equals zero if the return is 
negative (positive), where market return is defined as the return on the CRSP value weighted index. GrossSpread is defined as a 
percentage of the issue proceeds. LnPrice is the logarithm of closing price prior to the offer. CLUSTER is a Dummy equal to one if the offer 
price is set at integer. CloseBidDiffNYSE (CloseBidDiffNas) is Closing transaction price-closing bid quote)/closing transaction price and is 
zero if the issuer is list on Nasdaq (NYSE).  NASDAQDummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer is list on Nasdaq. Toptier is a 
dummy equal to one if the SEO underwriter (book manager) has an analyst group ranked among the top 10 groups selected by 
Institutional investor each Octobor of the prior calendar year. Reloffersize is the ratio between the shares offered to the outstanding 
shares prior to the offer. Expected proceeds are defined as the production of closing price prior to the offer and shares offered. 
Underwriter is a dummy equal to one if the book manager of the syndicate has a reputation rate more than 8 in the ranking proposed by 
Ritter http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. The value of t statistics is in brackets. ***,**, and* represent 1% 5% and 10% 
significance, respectively. 
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In sum, in this section, we explore the possibility of incorporating a structure model 
into the empirical model. However, this attempt does not generate the desired results. 
We attribute the failure to the difficulty of assessing the arrival rate and inaccessibility 
to the bid information from the book building process. Although the attempt is 
unsuccessfully, we find that there is no empirical evidence to prove that demand in the 
primary market is closely related to that in the secondary market. We also suggest that 
the limit order model may have a chance to be utilized by those banks with 
confidential bid information collected in the book building process. Unfortunately, in 
academic research, unless the information is available, the chance for the limit order 
model to be incorporated into SEO underpricing studies is slim.                                    
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Appendix 4 
Table A-3 Descriptive statistics of underpricing R(0) and underpricing R(1) with 
reduced size sample 
year No. of Obs. Mean of R(0) Median of R(0) Mean of R(1) Median of R(1) 
1987 85 0.0096 0.0000 0.0104 0.0074 
1988 40 0.0114 0.0121 0.0154 0.0071 
1989 85 0.0138 0.0109 0.0186 0.0098 
1990 51 0.0213 0.0108 0.0229 0.0132 
1991 167 0.0260 0.0196 0.0225 0.0130 
1992 150 0.0305 0.0225 0.0305 0.0184 
1993 374 0.0241 0.0129 0.0226 0.0096 
1994 206 0.0227 0.0153 0.0273 0.0143 
1995 341 0.0269 0.0180 0.0252 0.0135 
1996 394 0.0332 0.0195 0.0337 0.0150 
1997 342 0.0268 0.0175 0.0277 0.0135 
1998 216 0.0217 0.0120 0.0228 0.0097 
1999 256 0.0270 0.0167 0.0311 0.0131 
2000 267 0.0312 0.0209 0.0458 0.0178 
2001 182 0.0382 0.0258 0.0434 0.0268 
2002 187 0.0332 0.0267 0.0290 0.0218 
2003 217 0.0312 0.0212 0.0385 0.0206 
2004 239 0.0271 0.0200 0.0283 0.0129 
2005 183 0.0302 0.0208 0.0290 0.0114 
2006 179 0.0314 0.0221 0.0297 0.0178 
2007 152 0.0274 0.0214 0.0225 0.0074 
2008 130 0.0489 0.0348 0.0436 0.0133 
2009 313 0.0602 0.0492 0.0444 0.0267 
Period1 1987-1995 1,499 0.0235 0.0152 0.0235 0.0116 
Period2 1996-2001 1,657 0.0296 0.0190 0.0336 0.0147 
Period3 2002-2009 1,600 0.0375 0.0263 0.0338 0.0171 
p-value for diff(2)-(1) 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0011 
p-value for diff(3)-(2) 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.4661 0.4351 
Underpricing R(0) is defined as  ((P-OP)/P)*100, where P is the prior offer closing price and OP is the offer 
price. Underpricing R(1) is defined as ((P1-OP)/OP)*100, where P1 is the closing price on the issue day and 
OP is the offer price. p-values for difference within subsample means (medians) are from standard t-tests 
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test) 
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Appendix 5 
Panel A Rate of Underpricing (R0) From 1987-
2009 
Panel B Rate of Underpricing (R0) From 1987-
1995 
Panel C Rate of Underpricing (R0) From 1996-
2001 
Panel D Rate of Underpricing (R0) From 2002-
2009 
Figure A-2 Panels of magnitudes of underpricing (R0) for the reduced size 
sample 
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